

125023

JPRS-NEA-86-012

30 January 1986

Near East/South Asia Report

19980213 065

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30 January 1986

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

OAPEC SECRETARY GENERAL DISCUSSES OIL CUTBACKS

Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 18 Nov 85 p 3

[Interview with Dr 'Ali 'Atiqah, secretary general of OAPEC, by 'Izzat 'Abd-al-Mun'im; date and place not specified]

[Text] In light of the current oil situation, the oil glut in the market and the crisis in oil prices which continue to decline, the question raised is how to overcome the current crisis. This question becomes more urgent if we mention that many Arab countries, particularly those in the Gulf, depend on oil revenues for a significant part of their income.

The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, OAPEC, represents the Arab framework for protecting Arab oil wealth, especially in light of OPEC's current state of collapse. In an interview with AL-RAYAH, the secretary general of OAPEC, Dr 'Ali 'Atiqah, talked about various oil issues and the means of resolving them.

Regarding the current oil situation and how it should be handled, the secretary general said that for some time now the oil market has been going through what can be called an oil glut, where the supply of oil exceeds the demand for it. The brunt of the decrease in demand has fallen on OPEC members who experienced a drop in oil production from about 32 million barrels a day in 1979, to about 16 million barrels a day now. Arab oil output also has declined from about 22 million barrels a day to about 11 million barrels a day during the same period.

Although this represents pressure on the oil revenues of the Arab countries on the one hand, it represents something of a mandatory preservation of Arab oil wealth for a longer period of time.

[Question] Do you think that there was an ideal way of utilizing Arab oil wealth in accordance with economic criteria during the recent past?

[Answer] There is no agreement on a specific definition for 'ideal utilization.' One can say, however, that the oil wealth which a limited number of Arab countries have is a substitute for expendable capital, which is oil. A number of Arab countries managed to accomplish important development projects. The infrastructure in some Arab countries has also undergone a fascinating development over the past ten years. Nobody can

deny that the standard of living of many individuals in the Arab world has been positively affected by the rise in oil revenues. As for the rise in consumption, the current circumstances can correct this situation. Regarding the soundness of spending, there are many projects which are still under completion, and consequently it is too early to judge spending now. The Arab countries still have many opportunities ahead of them to utilize oil revenues both at the national level and on the level of the Arab world as a whole.

[Question] What are the alternatives to oil as the source of national income for the oil exporting countries?

[Answer] The available alternative now really is to utilize the oil wealth properly and rationally. Oil wealth can be converted in the medium and long term into development projects in the various sectors, such as industry, agriculture and services. But there are other requirements to consider which relate not only to the soundness of the development plans and policies, but also to the fact that the human element, its development and training has a major role to play. Integration and cooperation between the Arab countries are imperative, if they are to catch up with the next century. The level of development of these countries is close to that of the major world blocs.

[Question] What are your predictions for oil prices? Do you think they will drop to \$20 per barrel? How will the current oil crisis affect OPEC?

[Answer] As far as the decline in oil prices is concerned, it is not possible to predict a specific figure. The trend now is toward further decline despite the temporary stability of the market. I do not wish, however, to go into predicting the degree of decline since the market is dependent upon several interrelated factors of which the most important is demand for oil, and it is difficult to predict the direction of demand precisely. As for OPEC, the organization faces a crisis represented by the weak demand for its oil and by the difficult coordination between its members. OPEC is used to surviving crises. We hope that it will continue to do so, because the organization represents unparalleled precedence of making it possible for the developing nations to deal with the industrial countries. It is also in the interest of the whole world that OPEC survive, because it represents the main balancing element in the international oil market, a fact which has been proven by the organization over the past years and which it continuously seeks to achieve.

[Question] What do you think are the ramifications of the problem of restrictions which are facing Gulf petrochemical exports to Europe?

[Answer] The capacity of Arab petrochemical plants does not exceed 5 or 6 percent of world capacity. Yet these exports face protectionist measures in Europe, America and Japan. There are intensive contacts between the Arab Gulf states and the EEC regarding this situation. We hope that these contacts will be fruitful and that they will be followed up by negotiations on a broader level so that the Arab side as a whole would enter into negotiations with the European side or other parties, and this would enhance the Arab position.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the solution for the question of transporting Iraqi oil across Syrian territory?

[Answer] This question is being looked into by the judicial body of the organization which issued two resolutions concerning the initial procedural pleas and is still looking into this question.

[Question] What is the expected role of the alternative energy sources in reducing the value of oil?

[Answer] We are not worried about the effect of energy alternatives on oil. On the contrary, we have called and are still calling for the development of alternatives so that oil wealth can be preserved and used more for industrial purposes and as an energy source. It seems so far that coal--which is making a strong comeback to the list of alternatives--together with nuclear power are the most successful alternatives. It must be pointed out here that the change in oil prices which occurred in the 1970's was the main incentive for the development of alternatives.

[Question] Do you think that the oil exporting countries should receive their oil revenues in currencies other than The dollar?

[Answer] In our view, perhaps it is now time to reconsider the pricing of oil in dollars, and instead adopt a currency basket, which would include the dollar.

[Question] Can you give us an idea about OAPEC's expected projects?

[Answer] The organization has undertaken a number of studies, some of which are preliminary and others which have reached certain stages in establishing a number of projects. They include a study on the establishment of an Arab company for the exploration of oil, a study on the production of carbon black, another on the production of lubricating oils, and several other projects related to the oil industry. I must also mention that the Arab projects emanating from the organization in turn establish subsidiary companies. As an example, the Arab Company for Petroleum Services has established companies in the area of wells maintenance and drilling. The Arab Company for Shipbuilding and Repairs has also established a subsidiary marketing company and other companies related to its technical services. The establishment of companies is important. It is more important, however, to take care of and improve existing companies and to give them joint attention, in order to ensure their success and the attainment of the objectives for which these companies were established.

[Question] What, in your judgement, is the method for rationalizing energy in the Arab world in light of the current energy waste?

[Answer] There is no doubt that rationalization of energy consumption in the Arab world is an issue that receives increasing attention at the official and the popular levels. The most salient measure in the rationalization policy was the increase in prices for oil products for all

Arab countries without exception. The percentage of this increase varied, but sometimes reached 400 percent for some of the lowest-priced products. In a number of Arab countries, the price of some products, particularly gasoline, is still lower than one-fourth the world rate. Energy consumption in the Arab world is estimated to reach more than 6 million barrels of oil per day by the end of this century, which is to say more than half of current Arab oil production.

It is impossible to separate the concept and policy of rationalization on the one hand from the general consumption trend of the people on the other hand. The tide of increased consumption that has swept the Arab world in the 1970's and early 1980's is still strong. It is important to realize the dangers inherent in the continuation of this tide at a time when the industrial countries--from which we import most of our consumer goods in the Arab world--are bent on reducing their imports of oil, and in particular, OPEC's oil. If energy has a special importance among all consumer goods and materials, rationalization of its consumption will not be accomplished unless undertaken within a framework of general rationalization of consumption. Such a general rationalization would bring balance back to the situation and reduce the pressure on the authorities to increase production in order to generate the money needed for unnecessary consumption at a time when oil prices are under increased pressure in the world market.

Since the industrial countries are now pursuing a policy of reducing their dependence on oil imports from the Arab countries, then the Arab countries will have to agree to a policy of reducing their dependence on imports from the traditional industrialized countries by increasing their local production, raising the level of trade with the developing countries, and working to limit the consumption which exceeds the real need for growth and development.

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CSO: 4404/115

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

RESULTS OF GCC INTERIOR MINISTERS MEETING

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 28 Sep 85-4 Oct 85 p 12

[Text] The fourth meeting of the interior ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, which was held at the General Secretariat headquarters in Riyadh on 17 September 1985 and lasted 2 days, ended with a number of decisions made of a security nature to confront the dangers that threaten the region. It also left the door open, however, for the plenary committee composed of the deputy ministers to continue discussing all aspects and views in order to ensure that the necessary steps are taken to maintain the peace and security of the member states.

Although the final communique, which was read by GCC Secretary General 'Abdallah Bisharah, did not hint at the nature of the agreed upon recommendations, a source who participated in the conference stated that agreement on a unified Gulf passport was among these recommendations, but that this question still requires that some details be worked out and this will be left to the individual states to determine.

It was clear from the beginning that agreement on a common concept of Gulf security among the ministers of interior had become closer than at any previous time. This is because of the nature of developments that have plagued the region in the recent past.

It is true that Kuwait continues to adhere to its own interpretation of a security agreement that is yet to be signed among the GCC states. It wants to ensure compatibility between some of the proposed treaty arrangements and the laws of the country so that there will be no contradiction between the two. Nonetheless, the concept of a security strategy is a unified one. It is this shared concept that can be worked with for the time being. Still, there is no substitute for a security agreement, but a common view does constitute a shield against the onslaught of dangers to the region.

This new understanding of Gulf security, if one may use the phrase, was hinted at by Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the Saudi minister of interior, in a speech he delivered at the opening session. He expressed his hope that the meeting would be one that would achieve comprehensive security to confront the dangers that the region is exposed to--dangers whose potential harm is not

hidden from anyone. He said that this situation requires extensive cooperation to thwart the dangers that envelop the region.

Regardless of the discussion that dominated the fourth conference of interior ministers of the GCC states, the question of Gulf security emerges as one of the issues that can no longer withstand postponement in finding ways to devise a security strategy that can contain new developments caused by the Iran-Iraq war and the nature of the international struggle for the region. Therefore, any observer would note that the concern of the Gulf countries has become focused on two areas:

First, to control internal security by confronting the complications resulting from the continuation of the Gulf war and the danger that it will spread to the states in the region.

Second, to control foreign security by confronting the complications of the international struggle for the region, which are becoming sharper with the approach of the American-Soviet summit this November.

Thus, it has become clear to what extent the linkage between internal and external security has become a necessary factor in the consideration of Gulf security, regardless of differences in perceptions. It is this aspect that was emphasized by Prince Nayif when he said, "We refuse to turn away from anything that touches on our security, for security is the basis of everything. Nothing can be accomplished except with security and stability. We must overcome every obstacle and pursue every path that leads us to security."

With this clear view of the question of security, the issue of differences about the sources of threats to the Gulf region becomes divided between those who say that the security of the Gulf is threatened most by foreign threats and those who say that the threats are domestic ones. Nonetheless, both of these threats have a single goal, and that is to shake the stability of the region. The Gulf view, which is unified on the subject of security, transcends this debate and the Gulf states stand firmly against any threat, regardless of the direction from which it comes.

The final communique stressed this point by mentioning the determination to confront every threat to security and peace in the region in a collective manner, based on the principle that any threat to any state is a threat to all of the member states of the GCC.

This statement nullified the rumors that were being circulated by the Western media at the time of the explosions in Kuwait. At that time, the Western press focused on the notion that the individuality of Kuwait in this regard would prompt the states in the region to take individual action and search individually for means to maintain their security and stability. Therefore, a speech given by Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad, the Kuwaiti interior minister, who chaired the fourth session of the meeting of interior ministers of the GCC states, focused on the principle of collective action when he said, "Since the last meeting of the interior ministers of the Gulf, the region has witnessed painful events that it has never experienced before, all aimed at taking our

sovereignty and subjugating our will to ideas that are against the national interest of our states."

Shaykh Nawwaf warned against the dangers of these senseless and immoral acts and said that there was no exception among the Gulf states to a firm resolve to confront these actions in a collective fashion.

Therefore, the Gulf Cooperation Council states are stressing the importance of joint action in confronting challenges that threaten their security. It is worth noting that the fourth meeting of the interior ministers of the GCC states moved the view of individual security into the field of collective security. This new gain renders meaningless the previously predominant notion that Gulf security had been one of the most tangled and difficult issues that has faced the Gulf Cooperation Council since its inception.

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CSO: 4404/51

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

INCREASE IN INTER-ARAB TRADE URGED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 2 Nov 85 pp 39-40

[Article: "Arab-Arab Trade: They Demand Political Unity and Work Toward Economic Disunity"]

[Text] Last week a committee of Arab experts in the field of the development of commercial exchange among the Arab states held a meeting in Amman in which they discussed the obstacles to commercial exchange among the Arab states and the solutions to these obstacles.

This subject appears to be of key interest to Arab financial and economic figures and to consumers, but it comes at the bottom of the list of concerns to Arab political leaders. Therefore, it is believed that the studies of these experts and the solutions that they propose will be tantamount to whistling in the wind. The reality among the Arab states with all of the suffering and disunity is a reality that is essentially irreversible and unshakable.

A phenomenon occurred in the past 3 years that prompted sudden interest by the Arab states in multilateral trade among the Arabs. This interest was spurred by the feeling of the states of the Maghreb that Spain's and Portugal's entrance into the European common market would place the Maghreb outside the European context, and that they would lose their export market, particularly for oranges, fish, olive oil, and some types of inexpensive textiles. For this reason the Maghreb states took action to open Arab markets to their products.

After ample studies these countries found that the primary obstacle that stands between them and Arab markets, specifically the markets of the Gulf states, was the lack of regular shipping. Actually, the Maghreb states had run ships directly at the rate of one trip per week, but no one knows if this arrangement still exists. It also became clear to the Maghreb states that it is very difficult to market their products in Arab markets because of the absence of Arab credit arrangements, such as those normally provided by European banks when these exports are sent to European markets.

This subject has been raised at the annual conferences of finance ministers and it has been decided that the Arab Organization for Investment Security

will undertake to provide these arrangements so that the Arab banks that are deeply involved with international banks can provide export credits, according to Mr Anwar al-Khalil, chairman of the Arab Banking Federation.

The states of the Maghreb were given a reprieve from their nightmare when Claude Cheysson, the former French foreign minister, stressed to officials in the Maghreb France's desire for exports from the Maghreb countries and the requirement that Spain and Portugal limit the agricultural exports that are similar to those exported from the Maghreb so that the exports from the Maghreb states would not be affected when Spain and Portugal enter the European Common Market. The Maghreb states were relieved and action in the area of developing multilateral commerce among the Arab states lost its urgency.

A Tunisian official says that he found it difficult to sell Tunisian olive oil to Arab markets, but that it seemed that this difficulty was natural when viewed in the light of changing tastes. He said, "But I found, however, that the consumers in one of the Gulf states accept a certain brand of olive oil manufactured in Europe. After some research and investigation, it became clear that this oil was Tunisian in origin and that the factory had imported its oil from Tunisia. Then I discovered later that many Tunisian products arrive in the Gulf market via Europe, and Gulf consumers will accept them on the grounds that they are European products."

It is clear from the words of the Tunisian official that the Arab mind must also be considered an obstacle because the Arabs refuse to purchase Arab products unless they are marked with a European stamp. "Therefore, it appears that we must be fraudulent in the marking of goods and choose European names for them, or first export these goods to the European market, and from there to the Arab market where they will arrive at much higher prices."

The reports of Arab experts point out a number of other obstacles and issues that make it difficult to market Arab goods in Arab markets, including, for example, treatment at the borders by Arab customs officials. Recently this treatment has become shamefully harsh, at the same time that trucks coming from Europe cross Arab borders with the traditional Arab welcome. Yet we know that the likelihood of smuggling by European carriers is no less than the likelihood of smuggling by Arab carriers. In fact, in light of the measures taken by Arab customs officials, one can assume that the smuggling is taking place through European freight companies. It is "unfortunate that the concerned Arab authorities are not bold enough to inspect European trucks," says the owner of a Kuwaiti-Jordanian freight line. The grumbling recently reached the owners of Kuwaiti freight lines. The general manager of a Kuwaiti freight company says, "We have no choice but to cease operations in the burdensome environment such as that experienced at border crossings." A short time ago Qatar instituted a measure stipulating that every truck owner obtain an entry visa. This means that the exporter must wait for a period ranging from a week to a month until he is permitted to bring his goods into the country. One truck driver says, "We know that all of these measures will not provide security because the smugglers have roads and passageways that no one knows."

The border measures head the list of obstacles and have the most serious implications for the future of a large number of Arab countries. It was thought at the beginning that these measures would only apply to Lebanese trucks, goods, and drivers, but they quickly spread to include everything Arab.

Mr Ma'mun Ibrahim Hasan, the secretary general of the Arab Organization for Investment Security, says that Arab goods, whether raw materials or manufactured goods, experience intense competition in foreign markets. This is particularly true of the petrochemicals of the Arab Gulf states and citrus fruits and oils from the Arab states of the Maghreb. Still, Arab markets are considered the natural outlet for the distribution of these goods.

According to the words of this official, the future of any product is limited in Arab markets. In 1983 Mr Sami Marun, chairman of the Lebanese Council of Foreign Relations, undertook an effort to diversify the market for Lebanese exports, 90 percent of which are concentrated in the Gulf states. He traveled throughout the European states where he found that it was very difficult to market goods that were not the traditional Arab products such as decorative boxes, large metal pestles, traditional Arab headbands, traditional leather products and products with traditional Arab ornamentation. There is no point in introducing goods with the exception of the foregoing into the European market and, for that matter, into the American market.

Observers do not fail to note the difficulty of the mission undertaken by the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, who is negotiating with representatives of the European Common Market. He knows full well that Europe has made the decision not to import Gulf petrochemical products above a predetermined quota. The "protectionist spirit" prevails now throughout the world.

Therefore, based on what Ma'mun Ibrahim Hasan has said, the Gulf states have no choice but to sell their petrochemical products in the Arab environment. This, however, requires that an infrastructure and Arab production facilities be built that can consume Gulf petrochemicals. This will only occur with the establishment of secondary petrochemical industries in Saudi Arabia and all of the Arab countries together. Otherwise, the Gulf petrochemical complexes will continue to operate at their minimum capacity. The Kuwaiti experience in these fields is extremely important. It is known that the Petrochemical Industries Company was established in the late 1960's and was one of the first experiments in petrochemicals. Three years after it began operations, it had not found a foothold in international markets because of the control of industrialists over the powers of government decision-making. It would have declared bankruptcy had it not turned to the Kuwaiti government, which appointed effective management which was able to penetrate the market and conclude contracts with states and individuals with the help of political pressure by the Kuwaiti government and a policy of establishing production facilities in underdeveloped countries.

Arab multilateral trade is extremely weak. It does not exceed 5 percent of total Arab exports and 9 percent of Arab imports, for an average of 7 percent. It is only 4 percent of foreign trade, this despite the multilateral

agreement to facilitate and develop commercial exchange among the Arab states which was signed in 1981 and implemented in 1982. The agreement relies on a collection of important principles to facilitate and develop Arab commercial trade, which amounted to \$8 billion in 1982. The most important of these principles are:

1. The principle of gradual protection of Arab goods.
2. The principle of linking the production and trade of Arab goods.
3. The principle of direct exchange in Arab multilateral commerce.
4. The principle of just distribution of encumbrances.
5. The principle of not resorting to economic obstacles to commerce between Arab states.

The question is how this agreement has been implemented. The answer is that it has been implemented 100 percent backwards.

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CSO: 4404/51

30 January 1986

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ARAB STANDARDIZATION EFFORTS REVIEWED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 12-18 Oct 85 p 31

[Text] The Arab states of the Gulf joined with the rest of the world in commemorating international standards day, which falls on 4 October. This year the celebration of the Gulf states is distinguished by the creation of the Gulf Authority for Standards and Measures, which comes within the plans of the Gulf Cooperation Council to unify the economic framework in the region.

It is worth noting that the Gulf summit in Bahrain in 1983 made the decision to establish the standards organization, which was announced officially in July of last year. It was established to provide an effective means of controlling coordination and integration of the Gulf states, after the region had suffered for so long as a result of the lack of such an organization. This situation exposed the region to commercial fraud and threw the states of the region into the snares of those who export low quality goods. This happened as a result of the absence of technical controls and this is what made the region merely a center for goods that were rejected by other countries, and the consumer of goods that were produced according to the standards of other countries, which have other characteristics.

The announcement of the standards organization was met with general welcome among commercial circles and among the public since through it the flow of rotten goods or products that are inappropriate for the region would be controlled. The announcement was also welcomed because the organization would provide opportunities for the training of Gulf cadres in the standards profession. The speed of integration in this field among the states of the region is governed by a number of shared factors:

1. Environmental similarities among the states of the Gulf which differ from the states that export goods to the region. This confirms the need for the Gulf states to have new standards which are appropriate for their environment and meet their needs. Moreover, there are shared requirements dictated by Islamic traditions and customs, such as abstention from pork and alcohol.
2. Similarities in the rate of economic growth, trends in the establishment of national industries, and the movement of the wheel of progress in the various sectors. This has led to an increase in the level of imports of various goods, industrial equipment in particular. It is therefore necessary

to unify the standards and specifications concerning the importation of equipment that is appropriate for the region and that lays the foundation of sound industry.

3. The importation to the region of similar goods from the same source. This requires the unification of standards and specifications that would lead to the consolidation of demand and would convert the Gulf market into a single market. This would reduce many of the factors of competition and would raise the quality of imported goods.

4. Shared factors among the states of the region which inhibit the confrontation of the unrestricted flow of goods. The establishment of the organization has paved the way for the creation of Gulf cadres which are capable of unifying standards and finding joint solutions to the problems that are common to the states of the region.

The region had become in urgent need of such a standards organization to participate in the protection of the environment by preventing pollution of the water, air, soil, and natural resources. This organization has helped to unify the approaches concerning the setting of standards, including the establishment of controls on the quality of production, the taking of samples, the implementation of analytic and testing methods, the setting of specifications for containers and standards for commercial advertising claims. In those areas directly related to the consumer, the organization has helped set standards for instruction manuals, statements on food product labels, declarations of quality, and certificates of conformity of products such as electrical appliances and others to safety guidelines for consumers.

After the establishment of the organization, the states of the Gulf quickly created local departments subordinate to the parent organization to conduct all tests and inspections for food, chemical and electrical goods and products, building materials, and gold and precious stones. Perhaps the greatest danger posed to the region in the area of the flow of goods that are not subjected to standards and specifications that are appropriate for the region is the danger resulting from the flow of automobiles of all kinds and from all sources into the region, automobiles built according to standards and specifications that are not appropriate for the Gulf region with its hot and humid climate. This leads to a short life for the car and sometimes represents a danger to the driver.

The Gulf states are requiring from European, American, and Japanese exporters of automobiles that they adhere to standards appropriate to the region. These include a sound battery and good bumpers and safety devices, features for the safety of passengers including seat belts, safety locks for the doors, side mirrors and warning lights, and engines that are appropriate for the region and which adhere to environmental emissions control limits.

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CSO: 4404/51

ALGERIA

FAMILY PLANNING SEEN AS VITAL TO DEVELOPMENT

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Nov 85 p 16

[Text] Workshops on family planning, "demographic policy and development in Algeria," were held Wednesday and Thursday in the Hall of Records (in the basement of the building). They were organized by the Union of Algerian Sociologists and Economists (USEA). These workshops are a scientific activity conducted by the Union as part of its research on overall problems in national development.

Presiding over the opening of these workshops, which brought together academics, investigators and officials in the field of social affairs, was Mr Ahmed Ali Ghazali, member of the permanent secretariat of the Central Committee in charge of social affairs.

In his keynote speech, Mr Ghazali emphasized the importance of demographic control to the flourishing of the family as an institution, the quality of life, and the national economic well-being. The speaker said that no demographic policy can be implemented without the support of all citizens and the work of all parts of the public sector, as well as the establishment and efficient operation of institutional structures. The latter, he added, should work right alongside the broad voluntary actions of the popular masses.

It is worth noting that the purpose of this meeting is to study the subject of demography from the practical point of view, as Mr Ghazali stressed. Because, he said, it would be useful come up with a fully developed family planning program.

The participants also heard presentations from several representatives from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Social Protection, the UNFA [National Union of Algerian Women]...on the subject of controlling demographic growth in Algeria, baby planning, family structure and transformation of the environment, Islam and family organization, etc.

Mr Abdelwahab Hamouda of the Ministry of Religious Affairs gave a seminar on the theme of "Islam and family organization." The speaker emphasized that in Islam the act of procreation creates responsibility, because

parents must nourish, educate and supportively discipline their offspring. Concerning the spacing of births, Mr Hamouda noted that there is a very big difference between regulation and limitation of births. Regulation, he said, is not just a recommendation--it is a necessity, because births spaced too closely together constitute a clear threat to the health of the mother. It is for this reason that in the Koran one finds 30 to 33 months described as the ideal interval between children. That, he said, does not mean that the Algerian family must be limited to three or four people: quite to the contrary, it can expand up to eight people, depending on the circumstances and living conditions each family faces. It is only a question of regulating the spacing of pregnancies, and this of course should be done with the consent of the husband.

Mr Kahlat Said, teacher at the Institute of Economic Sciences, stressed the importance of the family in the nation's development.

Mr Kahlat said that the satisfaction of the social needs of the citizenry, the upgrading of purchasing power, access to quality care, housing, etc....cannot be accomplished without better control over demographic growth.

9516

CSO : 4519/26

ALGERIA

NEW TECHNOLOGY LINKED TO INCREASED PRODUCTION IN SOUTH

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 7 Nov 85 p 3

[Text] On an inspection and working visit to the wilaya of Ouargla, Mr Kasdi Merbah exhorted local agricultural officials to free themselves from traditional views of Saharan agronomy and be receptive to technical progress.

Prospects for improvement in Saharan agronomics were the main theme of an inspection and working visit to the wilaya of Ouargla by Mr Kasdi Merbah, candidate member of the Political Bureau, minister of agriculture and fisheries.

Recent steps taken by the government to improve land in the south and extend land ownership have excited a great deal of hope among the peasants, increasingly large numbers of whom are swelling the list of beneficiaries of the fine prospects promised by this important activity.

In the past, the peoples of the south, the peasants who never lacked fighting spirit or inventiveness, faced a life of uncertainties with a fatalistic resignation born of impotence in the face of the iron laws of nature. Today they are entering a time of reconciliation with nature, which energetic research is beginning to force to yield up its secrets.

These revelations sometimes come as a surprise, and just hearing officials and peasants in the wilayas talk about crop diversification, increasing production and improving yields, research...is enough to make all the well-worn cliches about the south fall one by one, like worm-eaten fruits.

The welfare mentality of the south is in fact beginning to disappear, both from the peasantry and from local agricultural officials.

This can be amply attested by looking at yields. Crop yields in the north are no different from those in the south. Agricultural activity is one and indivisible.

The introduction of technology into agriculture has made it possible for many hectares of land to escape the voracious appetite of the desert, to be

turned into productive land for the benefit of the local population, who until recently were quite ignorant of scientific thinking.

The "Hassi Abdellah" station of the Truck Gardening Crop Development Institute, the impressive research and crop study laboratory founded several years ago and visited by Mr Kasdi Merbah, can help us put some perspective on the changes that have taken place.

This station is one on which many fervent hopes have been clinging, because its solemn mission is to explore in every way possible the potential of the wilaya and even points beyond, and to monitor agricultural development programs (research on seeds, crop diversification, and stock-raising of every kind).

Research: Getting Rid of "Technocratic" Illusions

Also, given the multi-faceted impact of this facility, the minister did not fail to draw station officials' attention to the necessity of uniting theory to practice and getting rid of certain technocratic illusions, because research, he pointed out, has no meaning unless it finds practical and concrete applications in the field.

Mr Kasdi Merbah, in a like vein, urged all the other interlocutors in the agricultural fields and offices he visited to show dedication and a hardworking spirit in their endeavors.

The minister laid particular emphasis on the land development plans for the wilaya.

Upgrading Agricultural Land: A Major Increase

During 1984, out of an overall recorded area of 21,394 hectares, some 4,620 hectares were distributed among 2,270 beneficiaries. Requests for distributions rose to about 6,280; which indicates the operation is popular at the wilaya level.

Some recipients have already gone straight into production.

In the H'dab El-Hamra area, where the minister visited an area in production, the hothouses for truck gardening are already in place, and the beds are ready to be planted.

The allocation of land to various crops has already been made, and nothing is lacking from this rural scene: truck gardening, pastureland, palm and date groves, sheep, cattle and goat-raising...

But what about water? The problem of overall availability has not been addressed, or when it was, it was not in terms of the inadequacy of resources but in terms of their mobilization and rational utilization.

In the 52 areas of the wilaya, 56 pasturage areas have been planned, which should be more or less sufficient for agricultural purposes.

In addition to that program, there are ambitious efforts at the drainage and containment of saline lakes ["chotts"], which is a high priority for this wilaya.

It is a gamble, since as of today the fruits of these major investments have not yet made themselves fully felt, even though it is clear that progress has been made, and that the most important investment has already shown itself to be profitable: the investment in people and the new attitudes that are slowly but surely evolving, despite the weight of long-held prejudices.

The best proof of that is incontestably furnished by the Technological Institute of Saharan Agriculture (ITAS), which also received a visit from the minister of agriculture and fisheries, and which seems to look down with lofty disdain on the agricultural past of the wilaya, from the lofty perch of the technological know-how it is dispensing to some 160 engineers and technicians, most of whom were born in the wilaya or in surrounding areas.

Speaking to officials of the institute, whose first student class was graduated in 1975, the minister of agriculture and fisheries said it is necessary to break with traditional views about Saharan agronomy and become open to technological progress. While promising his perfect willingness to help overcome the constraints holding back the institute, Mr Kasdi Merbah also said that the institute must never lose sight of the objectives--increasing every aspect of production and increasing yield--both of which are part of ITAS's primary mission.

In visiting the palm groves at El Ksar and N'Goussa, the minister reminded the producers that despite the recent introduction of new experimental crops, the further development of palm and date plantations is still the mainstay of agricultural development in the region, as it has been for generations.

This sector, which for a long time was ignored, as is shown by its abnormally low yields (on the order of 26 kg per palm-tree, while the national average is 35 kg), now has some really promising prospects. The many drainage projects--some of which, notably in El Ksar and N'Goussa, were visited by the minister--have stirred new hope in the hearts of the peasants, who are already starting to dream of green oases.

9516

CSO : 4519/26

ALGERIA

CONFERENCE ON REAL ESTATE COOPERATIVES HELD

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12 Nov 85 p 3

[Text] The work of the national seminar on real estate cooperatives got under way yesterday morning at the National Institute of Professional Training at Kouba, under the chairmanship of Mr Abderahmane Belayat, member of the Central Committee, minister of construction, housing and urban planning. Also in attendance were the secretary general of the Ministry of Interior, representatives from the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Finance, officials from various offices of the Ministry of Urban Planning, Construction and Housing, as well as the chiefs of research offices, heads of real estate cooperatives and presidents of APC's [People's Communal Assemblies].

This seminar was undertaken, in accordance with the housing policy approved by the government in February 1985, in order to augment activities of the real estate cooperatives designed to expand public and private housing and find ways to increase the effectiveness of the cooperatives. If this can be done, they can carry out their role of mobilizing sectors, individuals and capital so that public and private housing can be developed in an organized and coherent fashion.

An operational plan for the real estate cooperatives at the communal and wilaya levels will be produced and presented to the government for its approval.

Mr Belayat said in his keynote speech that the purpose of this meeting, which is being held in consequence of a decision by the assembly of real estate cooperatives, would be to review the role of those cooperatives which have deviated from their primary mission in some wilayas by assuming an egotistical character instead of facilitating solidarity and good organization.

Continuing with his remarks, Mr Belayat said that this meeting will provide an opportunity for studying the kinds of methods needed to assure that real estate cooperatives fulfill their mission as instruments and organs for the mobilization of individual, familial and social energies. Mr Belayat also said that they promote solidarity and good organization, thus avoiding anarchy and encouraging social advancement, the purposes and benefits of which must be identified.

After having recalled the stages and circumstances traversed by the housing sector since independence, Mr Belayat called for an evaluation of the real estate cooperatives in their various aspects, urging those present to draw both the negative and positive lessons from the past and to use those lessons to correct inadequacies in this field so that future efforts will be more effective.

One thing is for certain: people are interested in real estate cooperatives, to judge from the number of applications constantly being received by the communes and the Algerian National Savings and Insurance Bank (CNEP). The government, for its part, encourages the growth of cooperatives. But everyone agrees that the few cooperatives in existence are hardly "functioning" as they should.

Some conferees say the laws need to be changed, others say the problem is building sites, or land availability, or the credibility of the members themselves...In a word, a variety of questions either closely or distantly related to the promotion of cooperatives have been posed and discussed by those who have assembled for a very precise reason: to get out of the present impasse and give fresh momentum to collective self-help construction.

Respect for Urban Planning

The goal of the seminar reflects the inadequate number of existing cooperatives, most of which are concentrated in the large urban centers such as Algiers, Oran and Blida...This situation is further exacerbated by the fact, as indicated by the majority of speakers, that most of the existing cooperatives have also been diverted from their real objective--the creation of public housing--and are primarily pursuing individual housing construction projects.

In order to get at the obstacles impeding the expansion of this form of construction, everyone--APC presidents, housing and urban planning directors (DUCH), bankers (CNEP, Public Treasury...)--discussed the problems they themselves had encountered.

For the DUCH in particular, and especially for the director general of urban planning, the statutes fail to establish a clear relationship between urban planning and real estate cooperatives. In principle, the cooperative should turn over to its members a finished plot of land, i.e. one where all the environmental infrastructure that should accompany public housing has been provided. This amounts to saying that the decisions about construction sites need to be made in conformity with urban planning guidelines (PUD).

Similarly, conditions need to be arranged in such a way that the cooperative can act as general contractor for the project.

In terms of financing, costs, and benefits...and the need to make procedures as flexible as possible...the cooperative is the ideal locus for promoting housing. It can do much to reduce the incidence of anarchic and illicit construction.

In citing concrete examples, a number of speakers referred to "fictional cooperatives." CNEP's director general for credit mentioned the case of cooperatives that have split up building sites into a multitude of individual building sites.

Fictional Cooperatives

The director general of urban planning also noted, in the case of Algiers, that very few cooperatives have been set up in the ZUHN (New Urban Housing Zones). Moreover, he said, "no cooperative has built public or semi-public housing; instead the tracts have been turned into individual building sites." It goes without saying that this practice not only goes up against urban regulations, but also poses problems in terms of controlling urban growth.

Similar considerations suggest that the (rather small) number of cooperatives is not itself an adequate index of progress, since in general [lines dropped]

What interests the cooperative member is land. This is certainly true of the 74 cooperatives in Algiers (which has more than any other area of the country) and the 16 or so in the wilaya of Tipaza. The cooperative should not become a pressure group for land acquisition.

There have been financial problems ever since the system for financing cooperatives was established in 1977 and the first commitments were made to some 30 cooperatives having a total of some 250 members. This is true despite all the subsequent measures taken to ease the situation. In general, financial flows were adequate in 1981-1982, but fell off in 1983 with the emergence of numerous problems linked to cooperative borrowing. For confrontational situations developed among the members themselves.

At the moment, 69 cooperatives in Algiers, Oran, Batna and Blida have received financing.

Some 1,285 loans totaling 27 billion centimes have been provided to these 69 cooperatives. Of that amount, about 20 billion has actually been disbursed.

This situation prevailing in various "fictional cooperatives" led one speaker to say that it is necessary to look closely to see whether the cooperatives are holding together until all costs incurred have been paid.

Credibility

The director of regulation of local activities (DRAL) in Constantin really put his finger on the problem. The law of 1976, he explained, called for the APC's to designate one public housing site for the whole cooperative. Also, in terms of expense ledgers, for example, the APC's require individual designation of beneficiaries and lots. Finally, payment of loans is also individualized, so it is natural for the member to build individually rather than collectively. Because of this, the CNEP questions the credibility of the cooperative member.

All of this shows why the combination of statutory language, prerogatives at stake and factual realities has led to a degree of confusion that is a tremendous obstacle to any building, despite the good will of all concerned.

The conferees made proposals regarding both financial and regulatory aspects of reinvigorating the real estate cooperatives.

The DRAL in Jijel, for example, proposed a prioritization system based on housing type, in order to make best use of available land: collective housing would have highest priority, followed by semi-collective, and finally individual.

He similarly proposed classifying developers into governmental, private, and collective.

The seminar, which continues today, will undoubtedly help clarify many of the steps needed to give fresh momentum to collective housing.

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CSO : 4519/26

ALGERIA

MOROCCAN PRESS CRITICIZED FOR POSITION ON SAHARAN INDEPENDENCE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 17 Nov 85 p 1

[Editorial "Desperate Belligerence"]

[Text] Despite their swaggering, Moroccan firebrands bitterly resent the UN decolonization committee's affront to Morocco's expansionist Western Sahara policy. While officials in Rabat, aping the colonial powers of the 1950's, indulge their pique against the UN and practice "empty chair" diplomacy, the die-hards of the Moroccan press are venting their spleen with a desperate belligerence which in reality does nothing but show their confusion.

Thus the daily AL BAYANE--which calls itself "socialist" but carefully avoids informing its readers that the socialist countries voted for the resolution in support of self-determination for the Saharan people--speaks of a "blind voting majority" winning "by a narrow margin"--the vote was 92 to 6! The mathematics shows how narrow it was, and to try to convince the public otherwise is to treat them like retarded children. As for "blindness," that is really what characterizes the Moroccan leaders who bullheadedly cling to a universally deplored position, to the great detriment of peace and their own people, who must cope with ever-worsening conditions and pay the costs of Rabat's bellicose adventurism.

AL ALAM, for its part, has as usual blindly charged ahead to even more grotesque extremes. This Istiqlal organ calls for "reopening the Eastern Sahara issue," to "recover Kenadsa, Touat, Tikidelt, Hoggar and Tindouf"! It would be better off if it tried to recover some common sense and a reasonable picture of reality. This kind of desperate belligerence has never solved any problems. The Algerian-Moroccan border issue has been resolved since 1972, when King Hassan II himself signed the accord for the Moroccan side. We have said many times that Algeria, even though it has no territorial claims against its neighbors, would never tolerate any attack against its own territorial integrity, as every square inch was purchased by the blood of martyrs. We have also said many times that Algeria, the Algerian people, have an unshakeable determination in that regard, and the necessary means to enforce their will.

Rather than succumbing to warlike fantasies, AL ALAM would do better to try to extricate Rabat from the sands of the Western Sahara. It would do better to objectively inform the Moroccan public about the fact that Morocco's expansionism is disapproved almost unanimously, in Africa and the rest of the world as well. It would then be helping Moroccan leaders understand both the error of the ways in which they are persisting and the impasse in which they presently find themselves. That is how AL ALAM could really serve peace and the building of the Maghreb--not by saber-rattling, which does not scare us a bit.

9516

CSO : 4519/26

EGYPT

FEATURES OF NEW 5-YEAR PLAN OUTLINED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 10 Nov 85 p 4

[Article: "Egyptian Government Preparing for New 5-year Plan; Plan Focuses on Developing and Increasing Foreign Remittances and Seeks To Redistribute Investments and Boost Private Sector"]

[Text] Cairo--The Egyptian government's concerned agencies have begun preparing for the new 5-year plan, which starts in 1986-87 and ends in 1991-92, considering that the coming fiscal year is the last year of the current 5-year plan.

Because the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the current plan have changed, especially in terms of the drop in Egypt's foreign currency resources as a result of the drop in oil prices and the decrease in the remittances of Egyptians working abroad, the main objective of the new plan is to tackle this problem and to create new foreign currency resources.

The new plan seeks, according to assertions of the Ministry of Planning, to increase Egypt's exports and to deal with the problems emanating from the negative consequences that impede the activities to encourage the remittance of foreign currency so as to maintain the strength of the Egyptian pound versus foreign currencies.

The main reason for the formation of the new Egyptian cabinet under the premiership of Dr 'Ali Lutfi was to begin preparing for the new plan which will seek to tackle Egypt's economic problems.

Dr Fathi 'Afiyah, the adviser to the minister of planning on preparing the coming 5-year plan's research and studies, said that the arrangement of the plan's objectives will be reexamined in light of the change in the local and international economic circumstances because the circumstances under which the current plan was formulated were different from the circumstances surrounding the new plan. The current plan did not suffer from a shortage of foreign currency, oil prices were high, Suez Canal revenues were suitable, tourism was flourishing, and remittances of Egyptians working abroad were growing steadily whereas now oil prices are declining, Suez Canal revenues are increasing only a little, and Egyptians' remittances are diminishing.

Dr 'Afiyah also said that the most serious problem facing the new plan is the problem of how to deal with the foreign currency shortage and how to mobilize the savings of Egyptians abroad because the current plan has not mobilized them by a sufficient degree, thus causing the loss of a large part of these savings through unofficial and illegal channels.

The advisor to the minister of planning asserted that the plan will tackle this problem with several means, including sophisticated exports and enhanced remittances through official channels. A policy will be formulated to avoid many of the problems emanating from the negative consequences impeding the activity to encourage the remittances in order to preserve the Egyptian pound's strength versus foreign currencies.

The new plan's objectives are defined in raising the standard of living at rates that enable the Egyptian economy to move close to the industrial and advanced countries, despite the high population growth rate, to achieve a form of justice in distributing the fruits of production among society's classes, to achieve economic independence by supplying a large part of our essential foodstuff needs, to establish relations with all the countries of the world so that no country may dictate conditions to Egypt, and to draw up regional plans in the interest of the backward local provinces so as to enhance their standard of living.

Dr 'Afiyah also asserted that the new plan's most important objective will be embodied in building a strong economy that enables Egypt to meet the requirements of external security. He said that the plan will call for increasing the percentage of savings to income so that the investments may rely on local savings in order to make it possible to repay the loans and their interest.

He added that the different circumstances surrounding the new plan will saddle this plan with the burden of rationalizing investment spending and of moving ahead with the rationalization activities in all spheres so that the yield may be bigger and may make up for the financing difficulties that may confront the plan and that may affect the growth rates.

Fathi 'Afiyah said further that the imbalance in the price and wage structure impedes the economic development process, that dealing with the flaw in many of the prices will lead to raising the prices, and that the new plan will be more conservative vis-a-vis loans, credit facilities, and grants so that they may all serve the 5-year plan and may not lead in one way or another to introducing into this plan changes that may not be compatible with its objectives and so that the burden of loans to the national economy may not increase at a damaging rate.

Population Growth Rates

Dr Muhammad Anwar al-Hawwari, the UN adviser and first undersecretary of the Ministry of Planning, said that the thinking of the coming 5-year plan must take numerous factors into consideration, especially the size and quality of the performance in the current plan, the local and international developments that may influence the new plan, and the reasons for the lack of integration between the current plan's activities and projects.

Dr al-Hawwari added that the intermediate and family consumption patterns that are to be included in the new plan are of major significance because the size of spending on consumer demand must be governed by principles that curtail such spending, especially if the issue concerns an increased number of imports of consumer goods without regard to the possibility of supplying them locally and, consequently, of saving foreign currency.

He asserted that a special estimate has been made of the level of technology suitable for application in the new plan in the use of intensive labor and of capital, in the degree of worker training and awareness, and in tying the various kinds of raw materials to the production of goods agreeable to the consumers' preferences and to the requirements of the industries using the products of the projects.

Dr al-Hawwari pointed out that the coming plan will take into account the population growth rates, the elements of internal and external emigration and the currency remittances tied to such emigration, the degree of strength enjoyed by the national economy to preserve a suitable exchange rate for the local currency versus foreign currencies, and the degree of liquidity and size of the financial revenues produced by taxes and customs fees.

The first undersecretary of the Ministry of Planning urged the need to eliminate the subsidy to the maximum degree possible and to restrict this subsidy to a form of cash or in-kind aid for certain groups of people with low incomes. The reason for this is the constant rise in the incomes of many citizens--a rise reflected in the increased spending which the authorities concerned cannot meet with an increased supply of final consumer goods.

Dr al-Hawwari asserted that the constant rise in individual incomes has resulted in a drop in the productivity of the people getting these incomes as a result of the drop in their contribution to the national production process.

Boosting Private Sector

Dr Muhammad Anwar al-Hawwari, the first undersecretary of the Ministry of Planning and head of the Prices, Consumption and Incomes Department, stressed that changes have occurred through implementation of the First 5-year Plan in Egypt.

He believes that some of these changes are reflected directly in the annual followup data compiled to assess the performance of each annual plan and some are reflected in the development of basic utilities, in improving labor conditions, in improving the balance of payments, and in moving ahead with the housing program--all of which are changes stipulated in the First 5-year Plan.

Dr al-Hawwari said that there are other changes reflected in the activities to implement the contents of the first plan--changes which, in our opinion, constitute leaps resulting from implementing the policy of boosting the

private sector's activities are diverse and spread throughout the republic and the various economic sectors.

He noted that applying this system to the private sector will lead to clarifying the economic changes that have developed as a result of boosting the private sector's activities. He said that for this reason, it is difficult to comment on the direct results produced as a consequence of the strong boost given the private sector.

The first undersecretary of the Ministry of Planning said further that the evident contributions made by the private sector are felt by the citizen in the private sector's activities in the production of food, clothing, textiles, and numerous manufactured goods, including modern and traditional furniture and other electrical and non-electrical manufactured goods.

"Ali Faraj, the first undersecretary of the Ministry of Planning and head of the Followup and Planning Budgets Department, said that the new plan will take into account the presence of the fundamental prerequisites of planning, considering that these prerequisites are among the factors for its success. The plan will also confront the problems experienced by our national economy more decisively.

He added that the new plan's indicators include:

- Emphasizing the binding nature of the plan so that its various investment, production, revenue, and export objectives may be implemented with the required precision and may include all sectors of the national economy.
- Bolstering the public sector, strengthening its role in the plan, encouraging the private sector, and increasing its investments and production capacities.
- Subjugating planning to the requirements of the flexibility dictated by the open-door economic policy which welcomes investments within the plan.
- Devoting greater attention to educational and training planning and to tying this planning to the plan's requirements.
- Confronting the population inflation and the enormous burdens with which it saddles development, especially in terms of providing work opportunities for the numbers that are added to the workforce each year.
- The plan includes fiscal, price, wage, and credit policies, in addition to the in-kind and financial policy that insures conformity in the flow of money and goods into society.
- Curtailing excessive reliance on the outside world to secure food needs, raw materials, and semi-processed and investment goods.
- Rationalizing the subsidy so that it may reach those who deserve it and dealing with the disparity in the distribution of income among the people's classes.

- Devoting attention to the psychological and social factors which are important to the success of the plan.

Dr 'Ali Faraj proposed that the excess labor be given unemployment aid and put on waiting lists to await future work opportunities and that a long-range educational plan be drawn up in accordance with the plan's needs.

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CSO: 4504/79

EGYPT

NASIR MILITARY ACADEMY COMMANDER DISCUSSES ACADEMY'S ACTIVITIES

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 11 Nov 85 p 8

[Interview with Staff Major General 'Ali Fahmi Hamid, commander of the Nasir Higher Military Academy: "Commander of Nasir Military Academy to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: War with Israel Dictated Developing Arab Strategic Thinking"]

[Text] Cairo--Staff Maj Gen 'Ali Fahmi Hamid, commander of the Nasir Higher Military Academy in Cairo, stated that the war with Israel has dictated the development of Arab strategic thinking and that the liberation wars taking place in Africa have dictated the development of this thinking at the level of the entire continent. In an interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, he said that the founding of the Nasir Military Academy was delayed for 9 years because the academy was supposed to be founded in 1956, not 1965.

The founding of the academy was an essential and vital step. The importance of establishing a national scientific military institute to undertake the task of developing strategic thinking surfaced after the Arabs had waged the first and second rounds of the war with Israel in 1948 and 1956, when a number of regional conflicts erupted in the Middle East area and Africa, and then the small countries opened up to the international arena with all its changing elements and balances. In the early 1960's, Egypt felt an acute need for the presence an academic scientific level of cadres concerned with comprehensive strategy and with the issues of national security to deal with the world's countries, in addition to the need to formulate and develop a military creed compatible with the language of the age and of the future. This was in addition to the national objectives. The Nasir Higher Military Academy was thus founded and studies for the first course were begun at the Higher War College. The first faculty was formed and before the end of 1966, the first academic course was held at the National Defense College, the academy's second college.

Preparation for October War

[Question] Was activity at the college halted after the June 1967 war?

[Answer] No, it was not. Rather, the Higher War College conducted short academic courses for military commanders to develop their military qualifications and their mature participation in the preparations for the liberation war which took place on 6 October 1973. Meanwhile, the National Defense

College continued to receive civilian students from among leaders of the state and public-sector institutions.

The academy has resumed its activity with the spirit of October, has Arabized the foreign references, and has fully Egyptianized the faculty. The Higher War College has opened its doors to fraternal Arab students from Sudan, Somalia, Tunisia, and Iraq and the academy has regained its role as the biggest scientific military institute in Africa and the Middle East with its mission of qualifying its students in the spheres of strategic and mobilization thinking and of familiarizing them with the modern military sciences and with national strategy. As for the military, the academy has carried on with its role in developing the capabilities and skills of the armed forces' prominent officers so that they may hold the top positions in the major military branches and in developing the capabilities and skills of civilians to hold the leadership positions in the various state agencies.

Military Contests

[Question] What are the modern methods in the academic programs of the Higher War College and what is the duration of studies at the college?

[Answer] In addition to the lectures in the specialized chairs, symposiums are organized, discussions are held, war plans are carried out with maps, collective research, intellectual military contests, individual studies and research, and actual participation in training mobilizational and strategic exercises, and actual visits to various war theaters in and outside of Egypt take place. Then the graduation thesis is prepared. Studies last 1 year.

[Question] What are the prerequisites for students enrolled in the National Defense College?

[Answer] It is required that the student be a first-class government employee or that he hold an equivalent position in the other sectors. Students with an M.A. degree are preferred. The period of study is 11 months.

[Question] What is the "gist" of the studies at the National Defense College?

[Answer] Familiarization with Egypt's political, military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural capabilities and with the threats facing Egyptian national security and teaching the ideal methods of researching and analyzing the local and international problems that influence our national security so that the students may be able to participate in formulating the Egyptian foreign and defense policy within the framework of the state's national strategy. This is why no foreigners are allowed to enroll in the National Defense College's courses. However, special courses are held for the citizens of friendly countries. The academy awards its graduates a Ph.D. in the military sciences and in national strategy.

[Question] When did international symposiums start at the college?

[Answer] In 1980, we conducted the first African scientific military symposium in which only Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, and Zambia participated. In the second symposium, organized in 1982, a total of 13 African countries participated. In the third symposium, conducted last year, the number rose to 17 African countries.

[Question] Have some graduates of the academy gained prominence in the political arena?

[Answer] Field Marshal Ahmad Isma'il, the general commander of the Egyptian armed forces; all those who have held top command positions in our armed forces; a large number of Egyptian ministers; General 'Abd-al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab, chairman of the Transitional Military Council in Sudan, and not a small number of his colleagues in the council; a number of Sudanese ministers; the Iraqi chief of staff and a considerable number of Iraqi commanders; Brigadier General 'Adb-al-Rahman Nasir, commander of the Somali popular defense forces; and numerous personalities who have held top leadership positions in sisterly and friendly countries and who have figured prominently in the international arena and not just in their countries.

[Question] Will another international African military symposium be held?

[Answer] Next year, God willing. Contacts are currently underway to agree on its venue in implementing the third symposium's recommendations.

Major Powers Obstructive

[Question] It is well known that 41 African countries were invited to participate in the previous international symposium which was held in Cairo last year and that only 14 countries actually participated. Are there foreign pressures?

[Answer] It is evident that the major powers have put pressure on the African countries. We encountered such pressures when preparing for the second symposium in 1982 but were able to overcome them and to succeed in conducting the symposium with the good participation of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Africa Department, which tried to increase the number of participants in the symposium through their international contacts. Those contacts had such a successful effect that a number of European countries asked to take part in the symposium. But we declined out of our eagerness to underline the symposium's African character, the freedom of dialogue among members of the African family, and the desire to steer clear of any likely influences by the major powers or by the countries with continuing interests in the African continent.

It is no secret that the major powers try to freeze the activities of the modern regional organizations working for the independence of their peoples, including the OAU. We have exerted our utmost efforts to reduce and contain this influence since participating in the symposium of the Higher Military Center in Zaire in 1979. We have encountered these pressures through coordination with friends—a coordination which has given our unified policy the desired effectiveness.

[Question] What are the positive results produced by these African military symposiums?

[Answer] Through the first symposium in October 1980, we were able to declare to the world, one of the main topics we have learned as a topic of military thinking--a topic pertaining to the October war and focusing on the management of war, even though the two superpowers had prescribed military let-up for the Middle East area. We also emerged from the symposiums with important recommendations underlining the need for intellectually oriented military meetings, for unifying military thinking among the African countries, and for organizing advanced military courses at the Nasir Higher Military Academy for the prominent African leaders so as to approximate and unify our concepts of land and policy, i.e., the science of "geopolitics," throughout the African continent and to unify the methods of using the armed forces to serve African national security through setting up for the symposium a permanent secretariat that undertakes the preparations for future symposiums and broadens the base of participation in these symposiums. This is in addition to other recommendations concerning the African refugees, numbering 5 million refugees, who represent 45 percent of the total number of refugees in the world. The steps to find a positive solution to this problem have faltered. The recommendation to set up an African peace-keeping force has also faltered even though such a force was actually formed in the past but came to a halt because of financing problems and of the lack of an OAU military agency to control the operations of that force.

Another topic raised for discussion in the second and third symposiums was a purely military subject focusing on the theaters of military operations and the strategic tendency of African and, of course, Egyptian national security forces to confront the superpowers' intensifying control of the naval routes around Africa and of Africa itself in its capacity as the world's potential bread basket, since food will become one of the most important strategic weapons in light of the expected decline of the role of oil by 1990. We studied this issue at length.

Collective Action

[Question] What about the latest symposium, which was held in November 1984?

[Answer] It produced a number of recommendations, led by the recommendation on the need for collective action to have the OAU issue a resolution declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone and to plan an African strategy in cooperation with the Arab countries and with the nonaligned countries to confront the foreign threats to African security. There are other demands we continue to voice, including:

- Speeding up the formation of a common Afro-Arab market, self-financing production investment projects, and manufacturing Africa's raw materials.

Africa has the raw materials, the land, and enough manpower and it needs the financing which the Arab countries possess with a large surplus and which they utilize outside the Afro-Arab land.

- Developing a complete action program in the sphere of military production which has begun, in a number of African countries, to meet the needs of the African armies within the framework of complete armament plans that reduce reliance on foreign sources and that serve the freedom of the African decision-making.

- Participation by all OAU member states, each according to its capabilities, in forming an African military force and defining its tasks and the method of its mobilization and use to insure the security and safety of the African countries from foreign threats.

- Developing a system for information exchange, for curtailing the threats to African security, for bringing the African countries' military strategy concepts, combat doctrines, and armament systems closer to each other, and for conducting joint African military maneuvers so as to make use of the experts and of previous lessons.

There are other recommendations, such as the recommendation to coordinate university curricula to achieve educational and cultural integration between the continent's countries, and following:

- Exerting efforts to establish an African information strategy in the economic political, military, and human sphere.

- Speeding up the establishment of a center for African strategic studies. Egypt has begun the establishment of such a center at the level of the Egyptian armed forces.

- Organizing French-language strategic mobilization courses for the African countries, in addition to the English-language courses.

- Holding the fourth symposium in the first half of 1986.

[Question] What about the symposium organized by the academy last March?

[Answer] It was a local symposium which studied the Egyptian experiment in training and qualifying the decision-makers in Egypt in light of the resources available at the military and civilian levels.

Maj Gen Fahmi also said: With its curricula in the Higher War College and the National Defense College, the academy seeks to train the commander and the manager with the highest degree of capability. "The commander and the manager" are the starting point, for building the future renaissance scientifically. Man is the starting point, the mainstay of victory, and the objective of the national struggle. He scoops from the wells of art and learning to transfer this knowledge, coupled with mature planning, to the sphere of real implementation in the armed forces' theaters, in the national production arenas, and in the state utilities.

Major Gen Fahmi added: Prior to the March 1985 symposium, we organized a separate symposium to study the Lebanese problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict,

a symposium on the Red Sea, and another symposium on the geopolitical balance between the two superpowers in the Mediterranean Sea and east of the Suez. We also organized military mobilization and strategic contests at the level of the Higher War College--a contest in which the Egyptian armed forces' general command agencies participated. We then organized political strategic contests on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The symposiums and contests I have mentioned were organized in the first 5 months of this year.

8494/13045

CSO: 4504/79

EGYPT

NEW MEDIUM-STAPLE COTTON VARIETY DEVELOPED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 9 Nov 85 p 6

[Article: "Successful cultivation of New Variety of Medium-staple, High-yield Cotton in Egypt"]

[Text] Cairo--A team of Egyptian agricultural scientists at the Scientific Research and Technology Academy announced the cultivation of a new variety of rapid-growth, high-yield cotton that excels over the well-known varieties of long-staple cotton, which need a long time to mature and for whose production Egypt is famous and is considered one of the top exporters in the world.

Sources at the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture said that the continued cultivation of long-staple cotton varieties has proved that these varieties have achieved no economic benefit by supplying local Egyptian textile plants which produce the needed quantities of popular cloth materials because the use of these varieties to produce the popular textiles is tantamount to draining resources and reducing foreign currency revenues, because the popular yarn and textile plants require varieties of a lesser quality. This why the Egyptian scientists turned their attention to conducting experiments for the production of this new variety of cotton.

The scientists stress that the cultivation of the new variety of cotton does not mean stopping the production of long-staple varieties. These scientists have demanded that large areas be set aside for the cultivation of this new variety of medium-staple cotton, which excels over the long-staple variety by its high yield and by a quality and price suitable for supplying the local textile plants which produce the popular cloth varieties. This new variety is fit for the most widespread yarn production purposes because the world's entire textile industry relies on this variety which now constitutes the major part of the world's cotton production.

Four Years of Experiments

Members of the team of agricultural scientists who succeeded in cultivating the new variety of cotton said that the experiments lasted 4 years, from the end of 1980 to 1983, and that the Scientific Research and Technology Academy imported from the United States and Mexico 20 varieties of cotton selected from among 40 varieties cultivated there because of their short growth period and abundant yield.

The Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture, in cooperation with the Scientific Research and Technology Academy and the universities, conducted research studies and experiments on these imported varieties which yield a bigger crop than the Egyptian varieties and set aside nine areas in the various Egyptian governorates to conduct their experiments.

Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, the supervisor in charge of the project, stated that economic motives dictated the running of the experiments until this new variety of cotton was developed. These motives are embodied in:

- First, Egypt's need for agricultural intensification and for saving a part of the land for the production of food crops.

- Second, the shortage in quantity of cotton available for precession, especially in connection with yarn used for the popular textiles and particularly since the Egyptian farmer often turns away from cotton cultivation and prefers to cultivate other crops. Moreover, the short and medium-staple cotton varieties, including the new varieties, facilitate the use of agricultural machinery and yield a large crop.

Dr 'Abd-al-Ghaffar added that cultivation of the new variety in Egypt will contribute to saving the subsidy which the government pays to reduce and stabilize the prices of popular textiles.

8494/13045

CSO: 4505/79

TUNISIA

ECONOMY MINISTER OUTLINES JOINT SAUDI-TUNISIAN PROJECTS

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 28 Nov 85 p 4

[Interview with Economy Minister Rachid Sfar by 'Abdallah al-Hajj in Jeddah, date not specified]

[Text] Rachid Sfar, the Tunisian Minister of Economy, spoke of the results of his visit to Saudi Arabia and during a press conference held at the headquarters of the Chamber of Commerce in Jeddah announced the creation of a joint Tunisian-Saudi investment company, composed of Saudi and Tunisian businessmen, in the areas of industry, tourism, and agriculture. At the conclusion of a business session yesterday between the Tunisian and the Saudi sides at the headquarters of the Saudi Chamber of Commerce in Jeddah, he referred to the efforts made by the Saudi Development Fund in various fields in the Tunisian Republic. He expressed his hopes that the North African countries would come to follow the example of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, which have succeeded in creating a strong economic structure that helps in strengthening the economy of the Arab nation.

Regarding the outcome of his visit and the concrete results of the working sessions with the Saudi side, Tunisian Minister of Economy Rachid Sfar said:

"I assure you that I have good impressions of this visit and of this meeting that began with a profound dialogue and many hours of work. There was a frank dialogue about increasing mutual trade and about certain joint industrial, touristic, and agricultural projects. The most noteworthy idea on officializing this joint desire on the part of the businessmen of the two countries is the depth of the mutual agreement that we felt during this meeting between the two parties to move quickly to get Saudi and Tunisian businessmen to set up as soon as possible a joint investment company, operating in the fields of industry, agriculture, and tourism."

"Aside from this idea, which is to take concrete shape in the very near future in Tunisia, I hope that it will do so on the occasion of the response on the part of the Saudi businessmen to the invitation extended by Tunisian businessmen who were representatives in the Tunisian Industry and Trade Federation (UTICA). I hope that the joint investment company will begin operations on the occasion of the upcoming visit to Tunisia of the delegation of the Saudi Chamber of Commerce in Jeddah."

Regarding the benefits that will accrue to Tunisia from the Saudi Development Fund's support for building dams, particularly in the region of Kairovan, the Tunisian minister replied to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT:

"Work on the Kairovan dam was completed after the Saudi Development Fund participated in carrying out the project and the dam was inaugurated. In addition to protecting the historic city of Kairovan from floods, it helps provide water for agriculture. As for the Al Haouareb dam, on which we shall soon begin work with the participation of the Saudi Development Fund, it is a source of pride and an embodiment of the strong desire to serve the people of both countries. This dam will have a share in developing agriculture, raising the income of the Tunisian farmer, and perhaps increasing the possibility of providing crops for export to Saudi Arabia and the region."

Regarding the restriction of most of the available news about Tunisia to the sphere of tourism to the exclusion of other matters, Rachid Sfar said:

"The truth is that our press had much to say about the touristic projects and did not give fair treatment to the matter of Saudi participation in other projects. For the Saudi Development Fund had a share in no less than 12 projects concerned with basic development in Tunisia, such as dams, which supply water suitable for drinking and especially for agriculture. In the future, we shall pay attention to that, for there is large-scale participation by the Tunisian-Saudi Investment Company that started 4 years ago and now amount to almost 80 projects. There are many projects in industry, agriculture, tourism, and the real estate field that have been completed as a result of Saudi participation in Tunisia. In addition, there is private Saudi collaboration in agricultural projects."

12541/13046
CSO: 4504/104

TUNISIA

LABOR LEADER CRITICIZES U.S. ACTIONS

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 1 Nov 85 p 7

[Interview with Habib Achour: "America Is the Aggressor"]

[Text] Mr Habib Achour expressed his welcome to Mr Faruq al-Qaddumi and representatives of the Arab trade union organizations, who accepted the invitation to attend in Tunis a study session of the Zionist aggression on sacred Tunisian soil and the attack on the headquarters of the PLO.

He continued, saying: "I am certain that Israel was unable to do anything without the assistance of the United States of America, and I said when I heard of the Zionist raid on our nation that there is no doubt that the American fleet stationed in the Mediterranean extended help to the Israeli aircraft to enable them to attack the headquarters of the PLO and commit their aggression on Tunisian territory."

Achour mentioned that "at one time the General Union of Tunisian Labor considered the Americans friends because they stood on the side of Tunisia during the period of French colonialism, but it appears that America did so only to take the place of the other colonialist nations. Likewise, it appears that the alliance is dictated by Israel." He also affirmed that America always works in opposition to the Arabs in international assemblies and at the United Nations, where it resorts to the use of its veto if an issue is relevant to the issue of Palestine or other causes, and that it is therefore an enemy of freedom, democracy, and independence. There is total consensus that America is the enemy of peace-loving peoples, and it is not surprising that demonstrations were organized in Italy and France, but in Tunisia, the peaceful marches were confronted by police and restrictions and arrests were imposed on the Tunisian workers to block them. [Last sentence incomplete]

12815/9435
CSO: 4504/94

TUNISIA

LABOR LEADER INTERVIEWED ON UNION ISSUES

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 1 Nov 85 p 9

[Interview with Mr Habib Achour, General Federation of Labor (UGTT) leader; union press conference, date not specified]

[Text] [Question] In the East you are regarded as a symbol of Arabism; likewise, the prime minister, Mr Muhammad Mzali, enjoys a good reputation and is also considered as a symbol of Arabism. The contrast and contradiction between these two symbols are surprising because they represent the same agenda. He said that there are factions within the UGTT which would like to harm these two symbols, which would mean harming the interests of Tunisia. What is your opinion?

[Answer] What I want to say is that each of us has a philosophy. Mzali has his philosophy, and it is one way, and I have my philosophy, and it is another way: it is the interest of the trade unionists, the workers, and the nation. In the union, every type of person and every political orientation are present, and all are directed by the interest of the union.

Doubtless, Mzali finds favor with some Arab factions (the Sa'udis), whereas I find favor with other factions, such as the socialists in particular. If one goes before the Arab world with contempt for the interests of the workers, one will never achieve success.

There is an absence of free trade unions, opposition, or political parties. On the day that democracy is present in the Arab world, all the problems will vanish. The catastrophe of the Arabs is the absence of democracy. There is no development or progress without democracy.

[Question] Some factions believe the current crisis derives from a personal dispute between two personalities, namely Mr Habib Achour and Mr Muhammad Mzali. These factions speak of your predisposition to strike against the Mzali government and of your previous statement to JEUNE AFRIQUE that the union would defeat Mzali as it defeated Nour. It follows that these factions believe that the solution to the problem is your resignation from the UGTT and your absencing yourself from the public arena. What is your opinion of this viewpoint?

[Answer] With regard to the dispute between Mzali and myself, this will never happen. With regard to the statement to JEUNE AFRIQUE, I said it in the specific context of Mzali's decision to cancel the monetary discount and membership of the union and to prevent union meetings, and when Mzali revived the imposition of strangling restrictions on the trade unionists by means of the police and with the help of the professional class. This means that he wants to put an end to the union and that he is in a state of war with us. Therefore, I stated that he would not draw blood in this war but that we would be victorious just as we were victorious over Hedi Nouira. I said this before and I repeat it today. We must win.

As Habib Achour, I am no more than a wayfarer, and Mzali, even if he stays in his post another 20 years, will be forced to review his policies. But talk does not guarantee success. If there are factions demanding my resignation from the union by accusing me of being a problem for the nation, then I say to them I alone did not install myself in the union.

I will ask the next national council about my fate, whether I will remain as head of the union or whether I shall go. If more than half of the members of the Parliament, that is 51 percent, demand my resignation, I will do just that and go my own way. If the majority demands that I stay, then I will remain and pursue the tasks upon which I have been expending my efforts. The issue of my resignation from the union is not contingent on one or two people alone. The union alone is the one to decide my fate.

What we see in some newspapers in the way of protests and petitions are forgeries, or they are issued under coercion and threats, which are a greater infringement on freedom. I protest to you on behalf of the trade unionists who are being forced to issue petitions, protests, and telegrams calling for my resignation from the union. Those who call for my resignation are known, and I challenge them to malign my patriotism and the sacrifices I have made for the people. I am prepared to confront them directly, on television, because I am secure in my patriotism and duties.

[Question] Have you decided to enter into conflict with the authorities, and will the national council decide to announce a general strike in the country, as happened previously?

[Answer] We have not yet decided anything, except to call for the convening of the national council.

[Question] And will the council decide to launch a general strike?

[Answer] We will act according to whatever the national council may decide, whether it decides on a general strike for a day or a month, or even if it decides on calm for an entire year.

[Question] Some view the appointment of Mr Nouredine Hached as minister of labor as being related to the social situation and that this appointment will help with the dialog between the government and the union, because Mr Hashad is one of the most talked-about trade unionist and is also the son of the late Farhat Hashad. What is your opinion of this?

[Answer] When I was under house arrest, Novreddine Hached came to me and told me that he had been assigned a position on the National Committee. I told him: "The work demanded of you is not in the interest of democracy and freedom." I told him: "You will lose your freedom, and your father will not rest easily in his grave." I was always telling Nur ad-Din Hashad that it was honor enough being the son of Farhat and that he didn't need a high position or great responsibilities. But in the evening I heard about the formation of the National Committee and that he had not heeded my advice.

The appointment of Hashad is a sign of escalation, rather than of relaxation, as they have brought him, and Karim, for specific goals, first among them being to oppose Achour by means of influencing the trade unionists.

[Question] What is the truth of the rumors circulating concerning the convening of an exceptional conference of the union, and what is the truth of the news concerning the financial situation of the union and of the existence of misconduct?

[Answer] Regarding what is published and said about there being petitions from trade unionists demanding the holding of an exceptional conference, they are counterfeit demands to which we give no credence in the union. These petitions are elicited by pressure and threats, and we have proof of this.

Regarding our fiscal conduct, the accounts of our organizations are correct, and we are prepared to divulge them; they are at the disposal of anyone who wants to confirm that. What is said about mismanagement in the union is said in the context of the war which has been declared against us.

Mr Husayn bin Qaddur, the union's financial director, enters into this matter. He disclosed that he had put forward a motion in the recent conference for disclosure of the financial affairs of the union and its internal accounts and expenditures. He offered this motion to the conference participants, and there was a consensus of agreement with him.

He said that in the upcoming session of the national council, he would seek a new disclosure of the union's finances. He also mentioned that the accusations of mismanagement leveled against the union were outdated, dating from 26 January 1978, and that the union was in the forefront of those advocating the prevention of mismanagement.

Patriotism demands the preservation of the UGTT as a patriotic and popular organization.

12815/9435

CSO: 4504/94

TUNISIA

OPPOSITION GROUPS ISSUE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 9

[Text] We have received the following communique from the national opposition movements:

Opposition parties meeting to study the general situation in the nation and the increasing strain in relations between the government and the Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT] as a result of the repeated attempts to hinder the activities of the union and out of its perception of the danger to its stance and its zeal to safeguard the gains the Tunisian people have achieved, including the presence of the labor union as a popular mass organization, respected, unified, and independent, as a national benefit:

1. Express solidarity with the labor organization in defense of the rights and benefits of the workers and their just demands.
2. Bring to the attention of the authorities the danger of the path they pursue in their dealings with the UGTT, and the severe consequences which could befall the nation.
3. Demand that the government put an end to its campaigns and attacks against the UGTT in particular and against freedom in general.
4. Consider the resolution of internal issues within the union to be under the purview of the trade unionists, who owe their allegiance to the union alone.
5. Call upon all national forces and public opinion to stand up to all threats to the democratic gains of the country, among the most important of which is the UGTT.
6. Advocate the solution of the current differences between the union and the government by means of a responsible dialog and rational mutual understanding, bearing in mind the higher national interest.

Tunis 28 October 1985

The Movement of Socialist Democrats Islamic Tendency Movement, Tunisian Communist Party, Popular Unity Party, and Progressive Socialist Grouping.
12815/9435

CSO: 4504/94

TUNISIA

DISSIDENT ORGAN QUESTIONS INCONSISTENCIES IN RULING PARTY

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 22 Nov 85 p 1

/Article: "Think About Tunisia!"

/Text/ During the severe crisis it has been experiencing for some time, the country has witnessed events which contain signs of substantial significance:

1. What Mr Mohamed Mzali, in his capacity as the secretary general of the Destourian Socialist Party, expressed in his speech in Sfax, when he justified the destruction of the regional federations as the party's right to bring the workers' organization back to its jurisdiction.
2. The escalation in the positions of the temporary committees, which are now pursuing a new style of action which is serious and based on giving warnings and restricted grace periods.
3. The intrusion into the headquarters of the People's Unity Movement, seizure of its contents and summons against Mr Brahim Hayder, the movement's coordinator, not to speak of the seizure of the fellow publication AL-TARIQ AL-JADID, organ of the Tunisian Communist Party.

What adds to the seriousness of all these events is that they came after the prime minister's speech before the Chamber of Deputies. In it, he asserted his government's determination to continue the democratic option by issuing the law on parties, limiting preventive detention and guaranteeing clean legislative elections from which a chamber "more credible and representative of the Tunisian people" will arise as well as asserting his belief in the independence of the trade union organization and the belief that the policy of the big stick would not solve the problem. These are things we can only bless and hope will be practically translated into actual reality, since the developments which are occurring now in the country clearly contradict the government's official, declared speech and give the impression that the Destourian Socialist Party is determined to be alone on the Tunisian political stage, so that it may remain the master of the situation, alone in administering affairs, preparatory to the coming rounds of elections, be they for parliament or anything else.

Instead of dealing with the suffocating social crisis the country is now passing through as a result of the clash with the Tunisian General Federation of Labor and the economic crisis which is marked by a state of near financial impotence and a deterioration in the citizen's buying power through the system of responsible democratic dialogue, recourse has been made to the logic of force, which cannot solve any of the problems which have been raised but might rather make them more complex and violent, and in effect will not strengthen Tunisia's independence, not to speak of threatening the republican regime as a regime based on the law and institutions.

Realization of the political program the prime minister has declared, which is aimed at implanting true political pluralism and guaranteeing respect for human rights, cannot be achieved by the methods followed in the current circumstances, because the connecting road demands the purification of the political and social climate and continuation of the dialogue with the legitimate representatives of all organizations, including, in particular, the Tunisian General Federation of Labor, especially since the executive bureau has expressed a readiness and good will which will have the effect of paving the way to transcend the crisis.

11887

CSO: 4504/98

TUNISIA

ISLAMIC TENDENCY DEPLORES DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ISLAMIC DRESS

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 22 Nov 85 p 7

/Article by Rached Ghannouchi: "How Long Will the Aggression Against Islamic Dress Go on?"/

/Text/ For more than 4 years, hundreds of women of various ages and social levels (students, nurses, teachers, government employees and workers) have been subjected to severe harrassment ranging from insults to pressure, threats and expulsion in departments, schools and factories by the supervisory authorities. The departments often decline to accept them to begin with and they express resentment toward them out of disapproval over their conduct or their production level. Their only crime is that they have chosen to oppose the Western tradition of revealing dress and have awarely and out of choice replaced that by a modest form of dress which is appropriate to the demands of the morality of Islam and its legal precepts regarding women, which they have understood and become won over to. By what justification in law, common usage, morality or security are these citizens harmed and deprived of the right to study or the right to work, as has happened in many areas of the country, in Monastir, Le Kef, Sousse, Kalaa Khasba and Marsa? The most recent example is Marsa, where about 40 teacher candidate students were subjected to dismissal and pressure on them intensified on the part of the administration after the period of expulsion. Most of them are poor and far from their homes, and have been thrown out into the street at night and compelled to abandon Islamic dress. The dismissal of women who insisted on adhering to their freedom regarding dress has continued and they have been handed over to the disciplinary council, which has handed their file over to the ministry after charges of causing disturbances were trumped up against them. Two days ago, they started receiving expulsion orders from all institutes.

We in the Islamic Tendency Movement might point out:

1. Islam takes a clear position, which the texts of the book and the sayings and doings of the prophet have articulated, regarding the morality which must be observed concerning men's and women's dress, and those who are ignorant of this morality need only learn about it. In the country there are official religious institutions to which one can refer for learning, guidance and the settlement of disputes, such as the Faculty of Islamic Law and the Department of Rulings, and the matter is not left up to caprice.

2. Edict 108 calling for the prohibition of Islamic dress, on grounds that it is "factional dress," is lacking in any legality. Indeed, that is arbitrary action against religion, the law and personal freedom, since, even assuming that such dress concerns a specific faction, there is nothing in the law which prohibits that; Christian nuns choose anything they wish, and no policeman stands in their way. This confirms the political coloration of this edict, since everyone knows that it was issued during the trial of the Islamic Tendency in 1981 as part of the liquidation campaign, although not everyone wearing Islamic dress belongs to the Islamic Tendency, since this is a religious observance, not a party slogan.

3. For further information, the Destourian Party adopted a position against provocative dress in the past. Has a new revelation come, making provocative dress permissible? The strange thing is that the government still insists on the principle of women's freedom; is this one-way freedom, the freedom to westernize? When was freedom one-way?

4. For all this, out of defense of one of the observances of the religion and inviolability of the sacred tenets of Islam, and in defense of the citizen's freedom of belief, we severely condemn the aggression which has been perpetrated, and is being perpetrated, against devout women who are serious about the commitment to their adherence to Islam, and we appeal to the organizations and imams who believe deeply in Islam and defend it, as well as parties, societies and individuals who believe deeply in the freedom of man, to condemn this aggression against religion and against the freedom of the believer and personal freedom and to protect these female citizens from tyranny and arbitrary action.

5. As the leadership of the Islamic Tendency, after all the steps we have taken in contacting the League of Human Rights, whose chairman has taken an honorable position and contacted the minister of education, from whom he has not received any response, and officials, after all the promises which have been made, and after prolonged campaigns of expulsion, we find ourselves in a difficult position, one which compels us to fight with every means in defense of this religious value, whatever that may cost us.

"Whoever holds the sacred tenets of God sacred is a bounty for him."

For the Islamic Tendency Movement:

Rashed Ghannouchi.

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CSO: 4504/98

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

UGTT EXECUTIVE BUREAU MEETING--The Executive Bureau of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) met this past Friday. All members of the board attended, with the exception of Abdesselem Jerad, Ali Romdhane Kheireddine Bouslah, who have been arrested. The meeting made a careful study of the trade union situation in the country and of recent developments that some of the union's regional offices experienced, such as raids and arrests. After the meeting, the following communique was issued: "The Executive Bureau of the UGTT informs all unionists, especially the members of the national council, that the administrative body that met on the evening of Wednesday, 30 October 1985, which issued an important statement, including the position of the union on recent events, especially the occupation, by forces of union offices and the appointment of sham committees in them, has decided to delay the national council that had been scheduled to meet on 1 November 1985 in Amilcar. This is because it is impossible to hold it in a natural manner given current conditions, after the seizure of the Hotel Amilcar, occupation of the union's offices and deprivation of members of the national council of their legal trade-unionist permits. The Executive Bureau will assume responsibility for informing the delegates of a date when normal conditions are available for holding it in a democratic manner, giving it reasons for success." [Text] [Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 4] 12780/9190

COMMUNISTS SUPPORT UGTT--The Tunisian Communist Party issued a communique announcing its strong disapproval of the conspiracy to which the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) has been exposed, which aims at "implementation of a policy which is incompatible with the simplest trade unionist and democratic rights and at freezing the demand movement in order to pass the measures requested by the World Bank, and to burden the workers and all popular groups with the economic crisis." The party expresses "its solidarity with the UGTT and with its legally elected leadership; it calls upon the workers and progressive and democratic forces to support the trade-union organization in defending its existence and its independence, which is an inseparable part of the national gains; and it calls upon them to oppose the hostile attack on the labor movement and democratic achievements and to demand the release of those arrested and to restore full rights to the trade-union organization." [Text] [Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 4] 12780/9190

UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS--Numerous demonstrations were organized in university divisions in various areas of the republic, a large number of

which were broken up by force used to disperse the demonstrators. Likewise a large number of the demonstrators were arrested. The incidents, which the Faculty of Law witnessed last Thursday following a public meeting organized by the Islamic Tendency were distressing and inopportune, inasmuch as a violent confrontation took place at a time during which the country is experiencing a serious trade-union crisis. The students at the Institute for Journalism and Information Sciences held a public meeting in which the general situation of the country and of the institute was studied. They issued a statement supporting the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and demanded termination of guarding the Institute. Last week, a formation called the Democratic Unionist Grouping was created. It brought together the "Democratic Nationalist Students," the "Revolutionary Marxist Militants," the "Revolutionary Trade Unionists," the "Democratic Nationalist Militants," and, also, the democratic nation list students in the university. This grouping affirmed its adherence to rebuilding provisional trade union structures until implementation of the 18th extraordinary congress of the General Union of Tunisian Students. After resumption of studies in most of the university divisions, the Zionist raid on Tunis was criticized. This started with many wall posters prepared by the various political tendencies, which were reinforced with photographs, newspaper and magazine selections and cartoons. [Text] [Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 4] 12780/1910

OPPOSITION LEADERS DETAINED--We have received the following statement from the national opposition movements: "In the area of following development of the conditions in the country and right after issuance of a joint statement, a delegation from the opposition parties, including Rachid Ghannouhi, head of the Islamic Tendency, Ndjib Chabbi, Secretary General of the Progressive-Socialist Grouping, Ismail Boutahia, a member of the political bureau of the Movement of Socialist Democrats, Mohamed Daoud, a member of the political bureau of the Popular Unity Party, and Amor Mesti Mestiri, a member of the political bureau of the Progressive Socialist Grouping, went to the offices of the UGTT, where they had been preceded by Mr Mohamed Harmel, the first secretary of the Communist Party. They tried to enter the offices of the Union, in accordance with a previous appointment with the executive bureau for Thursday, 31 October at 11 o'clock in the morning. When the delegation stopped at Rue de Grece Street, in front of the headquarters of the union, they were summoned by the police to show their identity cards and were then taken to police headquarters, where they were given advisory tickets and released after a few hours. The opposition movements have recorded their strong disapproval of this gross violation of general freedoms and have renewed their firm determination to continue to undertake their duty in support of the issue of freedom, justice and independence for the UGTT. [Signed] Tunis, 31 October 1985. The Islamic Tendency Movement, the Movement of Socialist Democrats, the Tunisian Communist Party, the Progressive Socialist Grouping, the Popular Unity Party. [Text] [Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 4] 12780/9190

CSO: 4505/93

IRAQ

EXPANDED RAILROAD SYSTEM EXPLORED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 26 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Na'im 'Abd-al'Aziz: "A Modern Railway Infrastructure Links East and West Iraq"]

[Text] The desert stretches as far as the eye can see and vision is blocked by a mirage which veils the face of the horizon and blends with an autumn eve whose stillness is disturbed occasionally by sandstorms coming from the depths of the desert, sweeping away sand dunes from place to place. This is the ground over which the railroad linking Kirkuk-Bayji-Hadithah stretches--a feat which demonstrates the ability of national expertise for implementation.

In this infinite horizon, diaphanous joy blends with the soul, releasing it from its shackles, endowing it with peace in an area unchecked by limited measures or narrow borders, and breaking the soul's yoke of routine to which it is inclined and shaped. The desert witnesses sunburnt men fighting the sun's heat, hot winds, and the barrenness of the wasteland, breaking up its cohesion, crushing its rocks, digging in the desert depths, working day and night, exhausting themselves, and finding in their toil a sweet reward. The men are supervising an enormous project, to benefit and link east and west Iraq, connecting many areas and bringing together isolated regions and shortening distance and time. The railway tracks stretch across the desert wastes ensuring safe means of travel and in the burning desert heat stands the Iraqi engineer who supervises, learns from the experience, and participates in order to complete the standard gauge line of the Kirkuk-Bayji-Hadithah railroad.

The Rainy Cloud of the Revolution

When the cloud of the revolution rains at any spot, it benefits Iraq and its people. Any fertile land benefits Iraq, which has been fighting aggression for the past 6 years while building and synchronizing the march of defense with construction. As each support is constructed the building rises. This great project, linking east and west Iraq, will securely connect the Baghdad-Ninawa railroad with Bayji station and the current Baghdad-Akashat railroad with Haglaniyah station and will, in the future, connect the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Irbil-Mawsil railroad with Kirkuk station and the Kirkuk-Sulaymaniyah railroad at the same station.

252 Km Giant Railroad

The giant 252 km railroad traverses the desert, rising among the dunes, wearing against its fearful sands, and stretching over its lowland atop 420 arches and 31 bridges, 3 of the largest spanning the Euphrates, Tigris, and Tharthar rivers. Atop the 840-meter Euphrates bridge we met Mazin 'Abd-al-'Ilah, an engineer, supervising that part of the project. He is used to the desert sand, being lured by the Haglaniyah region with its verdant groves and Euphrates' rapids giving him the determination to redeem the land and his country. He works day and night monitoring and supervising until the Haglaniyah station and the Euphrates bridge is completed.

250 Km/Hr Passenger Trains/140 Km/Hr Freight Trains

Engineer 'Ali Tariq Naji, assistant manager of the Kirkuk-Bayji-Hadithah railroad project, joined us on the desert road built to service the project. At the deepest region the railroad drops more than thirty meters in a harsh, rocky area dynamited and cleared to form a slanted road providing safe and speedy train lines, 250 km per hr for passenger trains and 140 km per hr for freight trains is the speed at the final stages, while initially the speed is 140 km per hr and 100 km per hr, respectively.

The land is barren except for a few small trees here and there. The eyes do not spot any characteristic that defines the landmarks, except for shepherds moving along with their herds, and passing by large piles of stones extracted from the depths of the earth forming mounds, which stem the sand tide and block the view from the railroad. The tracks stretch like snakes moving in the sand until they reach the Tharthar Valley where a 340-meter-long bridge rises, its sides supported by reinforced barriers protecting the bridge from floods.

Iraqi Engineering Supervision

At the Bayji railway station, young engineers in various specialties supervise the large Bayji station, soon to become the meeting point for the Baghdad-Mawsil railroad and the Kirkuk-Hadithah railroad. This station has 3 platforms for trains, a passenger hall, 248 structures and a control center through which train movements on the tracks will be controlled.

Engineer 'Abd-al-Hamid Muhammad 'Ali says the control center has the most modern equipment for controlling the movement of trains. At the residential complex the houses were very beautiful, providing comfortable accommodation and reflecting a civilized way of construction for a housing complex.

The station contains modern shops to repair and maintain trains, in addition to a center for maintaining trucks and passenger cars, designed according to the latest international specifications for water and fuel provisions and technical inspections. In addition to this, there is a wheel maintenance center not requiring disassembly of parts. In all these instances, the engineering cadre undertakes supervision, control, and adaptation to all circumstances.

Transporting Agricultural Products

The myth of the mountain is destroyed. Digging is made to a depth of 50 meters by equipment to form a double tunnel, according to the assistant project manager, Eng 'Ali Tariq. Near the al-Fathah area and over the Tigris River a towering bridge is set up, its length 960 meters, and a long corridor stretches through a mountain, on both sides of which huge quantities of asphalt, sulphur, and other material roll down bringing wealth to Iraq. The railroad then passes al-Riyad station, containing refrigerated storehouses, loading docks for agricultural products, and housing for maintenance and operation personnel.

The last station is at the city of Kirkuk. At two huge stations, one for passengers, the journalists were recording this accomplishment with pride: passenger platforms and tunnels, freight tracks, refrigerated storages, and a center operated by modern equipment, heavy freight loading docks, housing for operation and maintenance personnel, and service buildings. Eng Amin Mamduh never stopped smiling as he outlined the details of this accomplishment.

One Million Passengers and 3 Million Tons of Freight

Positive figures are put forth by this project. In its first stage, it will transport 1.1 million passengers and 3.5 million tons of freight, and in its second stage, after the installation of electric lines, 1.9 million passengers will be transported along with 6.6 million tons of freight.

The total number of concrete pillars that are used totals 700,000. These are produced in Iraq at the Abu Gurayb concrete pillar production factory which falls under the supervision of the modern railway implementation committee. The total number of pillars required are laid at the project site. The rocks used for paving over and under the track are produced from the wealth of Iraq. Thank God for having endowed Iraq with goodness and with vigilant men looking after its interests.

13135/9871

CSO: 4404/68

ISRAEL

F-15, AIR SUPERIORITY CONSIDERATIONS REVIEWED

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew Sep 85 pp 27-31

[Article by Ari'el Goler]

[Text] The facts which I knew in advance comprised one side of the question: this is the squadron which inaugurated the era of sophisticated airplanes in the Air Force, as it was the first Israeli F-15 squadron. Out of it came pilots and planes which made records: the first world downing by an F-15, the first downing of a Mig-25 and, of course, the achievements of the squadron during the war in Lebanon, which included the downing of dozens of Syrian combat planes.

Today, along with its partners, the squadron is located at the leading edge of the air force in the air-to-air area.

In order to discover the other side of the equation, I went to the squadron. During the entire day I spent there and long hours afterwards, one question racked my brain: what did I see there which produces strength, force, professionalism, and air ability, with which few air forces in the world can compare? My thoughts took me far, until I did not even notice that what I was searching for is found in two well-worn words, the man and the machine.

The secret of the F-15 squadron, like that of any other squadron, is hidden in exactly these two things: people and planes, except that here we are speaking of the best people and the best airplanes. And it appears that this combination brings both sides to new heights of achievement, on which a large part of the security of Israel rests.

Lieutenant Colonel M, squadron commander, made it clear, between the lines of what he said, that he would not like to find himself in an article about "supermen." When I asked him about the required qualities, in his opinion, for an F-15 pilot, he responded that there are no qualities which are the sole property of the pilots of this plane: "The F-15 pilot does not have blue blood. He is not unique. There is a list of qualities required from every pilot of a sophisticated airplane and they are a good sense of orientation, understanding and skill in operation of the advanced weapons systems with which the plane is equipped, a high level in the area of decisionmaking and of course, good flight ability.

Along with this, Lieutenant Colonel M does not deny what good logic says: "This is the most expensive plane which the country has purchased and a lot of means have been invested in it. Therefore we tried to give the most advanced, best and expensive systems, the best pilots. Thus we can maximize exploitation of the weapons systems and guarantee that a minimum of such expensive airplanes will be lost."

Major D, deputy squadron commander, acknowledges the image problem of the F-15 pilots compared with other pilots. He says, "I know that in the past the F-15 pilots got a reputation of being snobs. Therefore we have a clear policy here of modesty, respecting the members of other squadrons." Every F-15 pilot once was, do not forget, a pilot of a Skyhawk/Ffir/Phantom. And as to required qualities, says Major D: "You define for yourself that being an F-15 pilot is your life and all there is in your life. Here, by the way, is also the great disadvantage: you become one-dimensional, and deal only with your professional field--until you feel deficient in other areas. The professionalism is divided into two areas: level of flight with emphasis on the area of air-to-air, and level of functioning on the ground--as a combat officer, weapons officer, operations officer, etc."

First Lieutenant G, one of the younger members of the squadron, adds to the list of qualities his officers gave, quick, good thinking ability, which enables speedy analysis and in its wake, reaching the right conclusions. Quick physical reflexes and developed listening sense are also important. He explains: "In the plane there are many sensors and it is possible to get a better status reading, but you have to know how to read it."

In general, the F-15 squadron, its objectives and the challenges which it faces, the three say, are first of all--this is an interception squadron whose principle mission is in the area of air-to-air. In other words: a plane from the squadron is scrambled every time need is created for interception and to down any enemy plane, which is liable to endanger an Israeli target, whether a land target or an aerial target; that is, every other Israeli plane which goes out to bomb, to reconnoiter, or for any other air mission.

To Reach the Pinnacle of a Career

Thus the squadron must maintain front-line operational capability which requires constant readiness, 365 days a year. Emphasis is placed on execution of all training flights and sorties safely and completely. In addition, the squadron also has missions which can be called "non-operational." Here are included the training of new F-15 pilots, and work on development of the flight and combat doctrines of the Air Force--principally on the subject of air-to-air.

Says Lieutenant Colonel M, "In this squadron combat and flight doctrines and standards were developed that in their time were unique. Today there are other squadrons of sophisticated planes and this squadron continues to contribute its share. The combat doctrine must be developed when the threats change and build up all the time."

A final goal on the list, but most important, which the squadron commander sets for himself is the man: pilots and mechanics have to be developed and promoted. Prior to being appointed to his present position, Lieutenant Colonel M served in the Air Force Command. Before that he commanded a squadron of Kfirs, to which he came from the job of deputy commander of the squadron which he now commands. Command of the F-15 squadron is, without a doubt, the pinnacle of his career for Lieutenant Colonel M--in the meantime, of course. In his 14 years of flying, he has become experienced in every airplane which today is found in the operational order of battle of the Air Force, except for the F-16. He says, "As an overall weapons system, I have no doubt that the F-15 is the best airplane in the world for air-to-air missions. If they would let me choose the weapon for the next war--which I hope will not break out--I would choose the F-15. It is the most complete airplane, when you judge all the systems in an airplane."

Major D is the pilot who executed the first downing by an F-15 in the world. This was a Syrian Mig-21 which was downed in Lebanese skies, on 26 July 1979, a little less than 3 years after the first F-15's were received by the Air Force. Immediately after that first historical downing the pilot stated, "In an F-15 you feel just like the king of the skies."

What is Major D's opinion today of that statement? "I try to be a bit less picturesque and more modest in definition but...it is true. This airplane is a technological miracle. It is the best in its field. When you place its operations graph opposite graph of other airplanes--you understand that there is no point in comparison. When it is armed with the eight missiles which it is capable of carrying, it is a flying missile launcher."

In recent years, Major D served as deputy to commanders of Skyhawk squadrons, Phantom squadrons, and F-15 squadrons. He can be called "the most deputy commander a squadron could have," and it seems to him that there is no more veteran deputy commander in the Air Force.

To Work on a Scale of Millions

Generally, a pilot reaches the F-15 after several years' experience flying other airplanes from the order of battle of the Air Force. From this point of view First Lieutenant G is unusual. He is now training officer of the squadron and when he has a little free time--he is also safety officer and historian (responsible for documentation of the history of the squadron). G was born on a kibbutz, is 24 years old, a pilot for 3 years. I try to search for additional examples of people in his age group with such heavy responsibilities for the safety and lives of others, and "work equipment" that costs some \$50 million. It is a bit difficult for me to find such an example.

Before the F-15, First Lieutenant G flew a Kfir. Can you compare? I asked. "It is possible," he responded, "they are both airplanes..." and he added: "There is no doubt that this is a different world. Flying this airplane is like opening up new vistas in your world as a pilot. The operations and the

weapons systems are not at all of the same generation. The interest in flight is greater. The ability of the pilot to grow, to develop, to advance--is greater."

Lieutenant Colonel M is careful to shed light on another side of this phenomenon, which is called "F-15, sophisticated airplane": "With all the improvements, the great advances in airplanes and in their systems--the requirements from the pilots only increase. Operation becomes more difficult. The planes can give more--but it is necessary that there be someone to take it from them."

In the F-15 squadron they work with expensive materials. The costs of the planes, their systems and their weapons reach numbers that the majority of us find hard to comprehend. Sixty minutes in the air translate in "real time" to about \$15,000. The precise figures are classified, but just try to imagine how much money is invested in this squadron in a day, in a month, in a year. In the squadron they are definitely aware of numbers. One of the results of this, for example, is the attempt to get to the most detailed level in evaluation of every flight, in order to produce the maximum from the money already invested in it.

Money makes the world go around--and also the squadron. And when the faucets of the defense budget are steadily turning in the off direction, it leaves tangible and very worrisome signs. Explains Lieutenant Colonel M, "the number of flight hours which a pilot receives today is less than what it was in the past. The decrease has been going on for years. Experience and skill are principally acquired in the air. There are some sophisticated training methods (for example, the simulator, for which every pilot travels yearly to the United States for training)--but flight is flight. A pilot who flies less--flies less well. When one flies a great deal, the effect of reducing the number of flight hours is moderate. But when you fly less--with every hour of flight saved on a pilot--a decrease in his skill level can be felt. The quality of the pilots in the Air Force is still very high--but it cannot be denied that there is a feeling that the quality is being affected.

"I am not qualified to tell the country what to invest and where. But we must take notice--because we always went with quality and not with quantity--and now the quality is being affected."

The Newest Instruments

In the meantime, not one of the squadron members--in the regular service or the reserves--has been asked to stop flying.

How do the F-15 pilots feel about the attempts to cut in "civilian" areas and the difficulty of the civilians in accepting them--as opposed to the cuts which they are seeing in the squadron? Major D says he is very extreme in his views on the cuts, and on this point in particular. He speaks sharply and you hear more than a little bitterness: "Every pilot that you see here could be a computer engineer, work half the amount of time he now works for a salary double the size, with a company car. They fired so many career army

people here. Do the civilians even know about it? Recruiting a pilot costs you blood. You need tens of thousands of dollars to invest in him daily. Do people know that?

The Air Force is not an insurance company that he needs. The civilians must know that if you do not invest as much as is necessary in the army, you will pay for it on the Day of Judgement."

The squadron building is physically surrounded by grass and greenery. The landscaping and interior are most impressive. The cleanliness and order--the dream of every drill sergeant. On the walls, alongside pictures, and wall hangings (one of the squadron's symbol and one of the head of an eagle, like the name of the plane)--are large plaques on which there are "professional" tablets which describe the achievements of the pilots.

In the modern briefing room, alongside the boards, the chalk and the familiar maps, are a number of video devices with monitors attached to them. Such devices have been placed elsewhere in the squadron--a tangible sign of the new methods of investigation and training being used here.

Every flight executed here is documented on a video tape. Two cameras positioned behind the pilot record what he sees on the radar screen and targeting screen. A sensitive microphone picks up every whisper heard in the cabin. After the flight it is possible to sit and reconstruct exactly what happened, to investigate, to clarify, to inquire, to pause at significant points--and principally, to learn and to improve. Yes, admits Lieutenant Colonel G, it does make one a bit nervous to fly when a pair of eyes that see almost everything are stuck behind one's ears. Every one of one's comrades in the squadron will be able to see everything afterwards. But the great advantages to this system outweigh this feeling.

It Will Not Happen Again

In one of the corners are noted, on the all, row after row of round symbols signifying plane-downings. At first, the eye has difficulty perceiving so many marks. Tens of them. Every circle symbolizes an enemy plane downed by the squadron. The majority symbolize downings by the squadron during the war in Lebanon, which Major D suggests should be treated as a passing episode. "I tell people the war in Lebanon should be forgotten as quickly as possible. We must know that it will not happen again."

The expression "enemy airplanes" refers principally to Syrian airplanes. What do Lieutenant Colonel M and Major D feel toward them in their thoughts? Both of them responded with the same expression: "Imagine your enemy to be the best of pilots--prove the opposite."

Major D: "In battle exercises against the Syrians, we present ourselves with a strong opposition. It is forbidden to start with the assumption that at any rate, in this or another field, the Syrian pilot is known to be deficient."

Lieutenant Colonel M: "We cannot depend solely on the advantage in quality, despite the fact that it exists, in our favor, of course. In order to receive greater quality, a lot of money must be invested in systems, in warfare means, in training and in flight hours."

Lieutenant Colonel M is of the opinion that the squadron could offer high tech challenges in matters of maintenance and operation. At the same time, he is aware that the salary alone is not enough to compete with the seduction of the civilian market. There must be added to it the feelings of the importance of the work and the army service, the mission--without quotes--embodied in it and the belonging to the squadron as a unit.

Major H, the technical officer of the squadron, is also aware of the problem. He feels it strongly--when he has to deal with a lack of qualified technicians. The responsibility and the work is passed, without a choice, to the young soldiers, who despite their being talented and willing, are not always up to par.

For the last 3 years Major H was technical officer in a Phantom squadron. He arrived at the F-15 a few days before our visit, but was already at the height of an operation to raise the technical level in the squadron--"greater care to put out better, more usable airplanes," as he described it.

These Are Not Jobniks ["Jobnik" = an easy, usually desk, job]

As to the unavoidable comparison, says Major H: "I have no doubt that it is harder to work in a Phantom squadron: there are bombing missions, and arming is hard work. The F-15 is 20 years more advanced than the Phantom--on the technical side as well. The entire approach is different. Even the human engineering, from the technical aspect--is much more comfortable." We asked Major H, how do you motivate technicians, electricians, and armorers whose work is so difficult? He responded: "Motivation greatly depends on the direct command. If the atmosphere is good, if I succeed in emphasizing to the soldiers the importance of the F-15 on the air front in the region and what a respectable role they play in the success of the airplane. The work in the technical side is difficult, gray and continuous. And when one of my soldiers leaves the base for a vacation in clean clothing, there is always someone to be found to jeer, "jobnik..."

In one of the squadron's hangars, which one F-15 fills completely both length and breadth-wise, we met Ronen, an airplane mechanic. Troubled by completing the details of the work which he had just finished doing on one of the planes. When you talk about people in the technical branch, without whom even the best of pilots could not function--you are also referring to him. For Ronen "unusual work hours" is not rhetoric. Today, for example, they eat in the hangars because there is no time to go to the dining room and come back from there. They always know when the work day will start. Not when it will end. There is no better proof than his blackened hands and the dirt under his finger nails of the difficult and dedicated work that Ronen and his friends do.

The technical branch also has found means of involving women soldiers in the work. Thus, we met Orna, who is in charge of the tools. Every work tool which the various technical professionals use comes from "her" storeroom. She makes everyone who takes any item from her sign for it. At certain times during the day everyone is ordered to bring all the tools to "inspection." Thus, over and over it is made certain that no tool was forgotten and found its way into the depths of one of the airplanes--tragedy-causing neglect.

Lieutenant Colonel G regards the F-15 squadron as a work place he is happy to come to in the morning. Many of his friends enjoy themselves after work. He has work, which is also pleasure. He explains: "I feel that the things which I do are important to the state. The patriotic factor exists--but it comes after the personal challenge and the enjoyment. True, the work hours are long and there is not suitable financial return, but I come back from vacation with a desire to work--and I do not think that in this I am an exception in the squadron."

Lieutenant Colonel G's family and close friends know, more or less, what he does but he cannot tell much due to field security. Lieutenant Colonel G sees this as one of the difficulties in his job. Overall, in his opinion, the world of the pilots "is a fairly closed world and it is hard to share it with those who are not pilots."

Anyone who still wants to try is invited to look at the squadron book. There he will find, alongside a detailed description of the events in the war in Lebanon--including the newspaper headlines, sections of authentic operational telegrams and pictures from the planes' flight cameras--photographs of a trip to the Hermon, a going away party, or parents' day at the squadron. Life with the F-15.

9182/13167
CSO: 4423/27

ISRAEL

ARI'EL SHARON'S CHILDHOOD REVIEWED

Sharon's Childhood, Upbringing

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 15 Sep 85 pp 17, 19-21

[Article by Yigal Sarna: "His Childhood"]

[Text] In the afternoon, following a government session, Ari'el Sharon goes out to his car. Something inside, at the meeting, made him laugh. He moves heavily through the small courtyard, surrounded by bodyguards. He was always fat, or chubby, a great lover of food, not the kind that SHA S eats for a Sabbath meal. Behind him, near the door, stand "Levi, the man from the development towns" and "Shamir, the little man," as he calls them--small obstacles in the path toward Likud leadership. The driver takes him to a fashion show, the closing event of fashion week in Israel. Between sessions, there is nonsense to deal with: industry and trade, taxes, fashion. Time passes slowly: a good concert, a bathing suit--he has a good eye for beauty and a sensitive ear for music. In his shirt pocket, his little notebook is filling up with damaging quotes about his enemies--just in case. During long government sessions, he sleeps, like during the all night session on the economy when he leaned back and dozed off, dreaming about the future. He is only 57 years old. The younger party members fight their battles as he watches: Katz is taking care of the Herut youth; Kahane is inciting the masses.

They call him king, or murderer, and a police barrier divides the two camps. There are those who see him as the first dictator of the Israeli banana republic, while others say that he is the messiah who will get the country out of the mud. He is the real leader of the Likud, a strong and powerful political movement. To the masses, he is Rambo from Commando 101, the man who will revenge the Arabs, the Ashkenazis, the MAPAI'niks and the beautiful people; the man who will wage the forgotten wars of their dreams.

It all began in the village of Malal, a small MAPAI moshav, a labor movement school. Those who hate him cannot deny, nor can his new followers erase, the fact that Sharon is a product of Israel, with deep roots in the red soil of the southern Sharon valley, like the stately trees on the boulevard. If there is any blame, it is all local and it all began here. Sharon is not a crazy man from Brooklyn, a Pole seeking revenge for the Holocaust, or an elegant

revisionist. He is, rather, a child who grew up in Herzfeld's fields, where the oranges fell on the wet ground, the health clinic belongs to the Histadrut, the school is named for Aharonowitz and on the first of May, one wears a blue shirt and a red bandana.

Ari'el was born in 1928 to agronomist Shmu'el Sheinerman and his wife Vera, a young brother for 2-year old Dita. The Sheinermans brought him back from the municipal hospital in a cart, to a hard life with no room for being spoiled. It was hard for everyone then in Israel. For the Sheinermans, it appears, it was more difficult than for most. Even today, they are dispersed around the world: in France, the United States--not here.

In the house where Arik was born, his mother Vera sits alone today ("Dvora," she says, "is just for signing checks"). She is 85 years old, bright and clear like an old Russian woman whom life has taught everything. A steel door, bars, a fence--they were always defending themselves against something on the outside. A small kitchen table, an open issue of DAVAR, a red pass-book from the Histadrut for the health clinic. In her white hair, a braided headband. The little village is napping. "Ziama," she calls, to her brother who was an engineer in Tel Aviv and now, a retiree, helps her out on the farm. "Ziama." She tells him in Russian to do something with the guava tree. Ziama prunes the guava and piles up branches with small unripened fruit. Beneath the mango tree is a stone bench lying on its side. This is the courtyard of the old settlement. "Ah," she sighs in a very soft voice, "the Russian authors, Dostoyevski, were very deep. They had content, life." She is filled with regrets that were never overcome: the stormy Dnieper, the rafters that were carried away with the current, the snows and the forests. A sweet softness resides in her dark face, on her high forehead, beneath the halo of white hair. The hardness disappears, the eyes peer through the hard years to far away Russia.

I do not think she ever overcame that separation. Something about the bitterness and the strangeness of the place she was forced to move to was passed on to the children. Twenty-five years later, at the same age that Vera came here, her daughter Dita would fly to the United States, holding a medical diploma, with Dr Mandel--never to return. Arik would always be dissatisfied, filled with longing for something undefined.

Father with a Violin, Mother with a Knife

Shmu'el and Vera arrived in the village of Malal in 1923. Shmu'el was an agronomist, Vera a medical student who hoped to continue studying here but was disappointed. They came with a knife, a violin and a few personal effects. The violin and knife could be made into the Sharon coat of arms, crossing the symbols. The violin is like a symbol of what was left behind; the knife symbolized what was to come in the tough land of their dreams. At his bar mitzvah, the knife was passed on to Arik, like a call to battle. "Against my will, I was tied to Zionism," Vera was to say years after her husband's death. "Poor thing, I gave him such a hard time then."

Going through the old Malal archive book of several hundred pages--correspondence with Ruppin, with Herzfeld, with the agricultural center, pleas for aid, supplications and heavy debts--I suddenly find the pages marked "S. Sheinerman's Account with the Moshav"--the Sheinerman history. Like an x-ray, these records penetrate the layers of the years: 1923, a small shack; 1927, addition built; 1923, a mule; 1923, a small cart; 1925, two cows; 1923, a used plow, 1923, a 4M plow; and a 7-year old vineyard, 3 dunams of watermelons, 14 casuarina trees, 3 wooden barrels, 140 chicks and one comment--"Sheinerman spends all of his time off the moshav, managing Mo'yal's fields."

Income from outside work: 204 lira a year, five times as much as other residents. It was already 1930, and the whole village was in trouble. "Some of the settlers," wrote Ruppin in July 1930, "are truly suffering and lack the strength to continue. Aid is called for." Sheinerman typed a letter to Ruppin saying: "In 1923, I settled in the village of Malal and I have been through all of its upheavals and the great suffering...For 2½ years now, I have been working on the outside as an agronomist...to earn a living by serving seven men who need my services...Due to these arrangements, the moshav and my family have suffered...I have decided, after a difficult internal battle, to leave my farm in Malal..." signed: S. Sheinerman, agronomist, 23 Nahalat Binyamin Street, Tel Aviv. At number 23 on the Tel Aviv street mentioned above, a crumbling building, the address from which Sheinerman sent his parting letter, no signs of Sheinerman's residence remain. When the letter was typed, Arik was 2 years old, Dita was 4 years old, and Vera, alone, cared for the children on the small, neglected farm: a few dunams of watermelons, a small dairy, a chicken coop and three cows. "The field is covered with grass," wrote an inspector for the moshav about the family land. "Sheinerman has completely stopped working his land, and the danger of destruction exists."

In those days, there was a feeling of insecurity in the Sheinerman home. The fear was felt by the children as well. In addition to the daily hardships of moshav life was added the struggle to leave, the feeling of failure. In the letters that followed, there was a battle between Sheinerman and the settlement agencies. He wanted to leave and had the money to do so, to start again in a new place. On Herzfeld's instructions, the farm was appraised. It was found that Sheinerman's assets would just cover his debts and he would have to leave empty-handed. The entire argument centered around the issue of compensation. Sheinerman wanted 150 lira. They were willing to give him 50. Finally, in the winter, the issue was settled--suddenly. "I hear that Sheinerman has changed his mind about leaving and is thinking about keeping the farm along with members of the family arriving from abroad. Yesterday, he began plowing his fields." The Sheinermans stayed, and the war went on.

The stately trees lining the street that crosses Malal are dying now. Twenty-five meter deep roots are rotting. "The tree," says Vera, "will live until it is ready to die, like me." Sometimes, a light whistling noise is heard at night, as an old casuarina tree weighing a ton falls to the ground. Here and there, a gate falls, mailboxes rust, there are no names outside people's homes in Malal; everyone knows everyone else, even the postman. The moshav is 70 years old. If you put your ear to the ground, you will hear the sighs of the

dead pioneers, as in every veteran settlement. The members whisper: "Look at the Sheinerman's gate, the steel door, like alien corn, the first house on the moshav to have a good fence and a dog that bites." And do not tell the Malalniks that the Sheinermans were castaways. Thirty years after the agronomist's death, they still have not forgotten his aloofness and his haughtiness.

Arik and Dita were in the midst of this never-ending battle between the agronomist and the village. The family version would have it that it was the village against the agronomist. On a moshav of pioneers from second and third wave immigrations, who lived through the hard years together, in small homes without gates, where even the results of health clinic examinations were posted on a public billboard, the Sheinermans remained closed and estranged. On a day to day basis, the children played army in the woods, fooled around in the open swimming holes, chased the public bull that was needed for the 100 cows on the farm but would flee into the fields.

Arik, a chubby boy, not extraordinary, befriended Zubi, the son of the German Walshes from the Ramot-Hashavim border. In the sand on the side of the road, he played spy with Yosef, a neighbor's son. They threw sand bombs, and in the evening they sat on the benches in the front of their houses and chatted about the things children chat about. Few cars passed. When Arik sinned, Vera would say: "Your father will settle the account with you when he comes home tonight." The punishment waited all day. If he came home bruised from a scrap with the children, she would only ask if he had gotten even.

Their father had a sturdy build, not fat, and features like Arik's, with a face reddened by high blood pressure and a stubborn personality. After deciding not to leave the moshav in 1930, the farm became a success story: The first avocado tree, the best tangerines, the white Swiss goat. Sheinerman knew his work. He was thorough and knowledgeable, more an agronomist than a pioneer. When fruit disappeared from the orchard, Vera would say, "Come, Arik." And they would lie in ambush on the damp ground with the wonderful smell of citrus, even when the trees were not blossoming, and wait. One night, Arik caught the Siti brothers, Iraqis and Magdi'el, poaching fruit. One brother got loose. The other was tied to a tree for viewing. Now, the Sitis, still at Magdi'el, deny the story. They do not remember any such thing; they do not want to remember the night with the citrus tree and the barking dog. But the Sheinerman orchard, which grew such good tangerines, remained free of thieves and the warning flashed like neon through the darkness.

Knife and Violin

Moshav veterans say that Sheinerman was a haughty Jew, rude to others, domineering, with a better-than-thou attitude. Toward the outside were the gate and the knife, to protect the fields, to cut more fences, to defend themselves. Inside, was the violin. Sheinerman was a man of culture, an artist, who read and planned new crops. At the age of six, Arik held a violin under his chin. A private instructor came from Tel Aviv to teach him. Dita, a very musical

child, delicate, had more success with instruments. She sat at home because she was not allowed to participate in labor youth activities.

Sheinerman died 29 years ago. In December 1956, his funeral was held in the village. Ashkenazi, the mukhtar, did not eulogize Sheinerman. Arik arrived from the army in uniform. He took a piece of paper out of his pocket, stood at attention, and read the words in memory of his father, after the kaddish. A year before his death, Sheinerman asked that he not be eulogized by any man from the village and that his body not be carried in the moshav's van. Among his papers he left a list of the evil things that the village, in his opinion, had done to him.

What is left for a child who grows with such enmity? A child who played every day with the other children but at night gathered in the closed house for family meetings, angry words, and a feeling of iniquity. What does all this do to the soul? After almost a generation, journalist Nahum Barnea wrote of Sharon: "It appears that to be hated implies strength. You can achieve things that other politicians, afraid of losing popularity, could never achieve. You can thumb your nose at them all and succeed."

What the Teacher Gave...Begin Took Away

The teacher wrote on the blackboard, "Hello, first grade." It was 1934. Little Ari'el Sheinerman cried for 3 days until he gave up. The school opposite Tnuva was very small. Today, the second floor houses Malal's secretariat and the abandoned classrooms are piled to the ceiling with old files from the agricultural bank. Arik, even years later, would tell of his stage-fright which began there, during the closing ceremonies for the first grade, when he played the role of the chalk.

The curtain--two sheets--rose and he stood alone on the stage, unable to remember the single line he had to speak. Teachers whispered and then hurriedly dropped the curtain. Over the years, he learned to overcome this fear. But the tension remained, as did the nervousness and the memory of standing mute before his parents. His teachers were Pnina Pinkawitz, Eli'ezer Tash, Eli'ezer Shmu'eli, Natan Shapira. It was a labor movement school to which Arik, in a blue shirt with a red bandana, came with his sister Dita.

Now, in the new building that houses the school for workers' children, above the secretary, hang photographs of the first three graduating classes. Dita, a very gracious child in a Russian shirt, wearing braids, stands above the teacher, Mr Tash. In the upper corner is the young Rafa'el Ginsberg, her friend and sweetheart who died in the war for independence. The teacher Pnina, now 82 years old, lives in a low house on the Malal border. Pnina still remembers the pretty Dita and her agronomist father. "A handsome man, but very closed and snobbish, like the pope."

They studied with children from Yarkona, Ganne'am and later with the German children from Ramot-Hashavim. The son of the Weil family remembers how Arik,

a stocky, strong boy, called him a "kraut" to hurt his feelings, and they tussled on the floor. Arik, who was a dominant child and a leader, had a small group of cohorts, but others liked him less. He called his teachers by their first names. Natan Shapira was his teacher from the fourth to eighth grade. Sometimes he visited the family at home, or the Sheinerman parents would come to discuss their children's progress. A generation later, Uri Dan, Sharon's emissary as minister of defense, would fight against Muli Shapira, the teacher's son, for Galei-Tzahal's independence.

Now, Natan Shapira is very ill, in the internal medicine department of Ichilov Hospital, and he does not understand how his beloved pupil became a "son of Begin." From a distance of 50 years, the teacher is trying to figure out what happened. "It must have been his home life that influenced him, the antagonism of the family toward the village." Again and again, he comes back to the subject, perhaps for himself, as if he cannot accept the responsibility that weighs on a good teacher who gave his soul and his labor values and watched something else grow out of it. "And we thought he would be a leader of our movement."

A Vision of the Iranian War

On a hot day in August 1985, Mordekhay Horowitz sits opposite me at the Olga cafe in Tel Aviv. An author for the radical right, married to Naomi Shemer, who foresees an Iranian apocalypse, he was a school friend of Ari'el Sheinerman. They studied together for 3 years in Geula High School, class of 1945. "Our generation fell between the cracks. We did not create anything of our own, except for myself and Arik." They sat on the front bench in the class, near the wall: Horowitz, an ETZELnik from Malbas, and Arik, a MAPAInik in a blue shirt from Malal. The instructor's name was Spector. Horowitz talks to me about the possibility of looking through the passing time to see what may transpire. "As far as Arik, I knew there would be an exciting life story." Other Geula graduates from the class of 1945 whom I spoke with hardly remembered Sheinerman. In 1971, when the high school celebrated its anniversary and General Arik Sharon came to the event, few identified him with the quiet student Sheinerman.

"The day of Arik's greatness is yet to come," says Horowitz at Olga. When the Iranians break through Iraqi territory and come here, he will save us and the whole world will applaud."

When Dita and Ari'el successfully completed elementary school, their parents sent them to the Geula High School, a private school founded by the Ministry of Trade which boasts a 100 percent success rate on the baccalaureate exams. Now, the ORT Fashion School occupies the building, surrounded by a 19-year old cross-hatched fence. Then, in 1942, the students lifted their bourgeois heads carefully to see if the pioneer era had gone by. One could become a lawyer, or a tradesman. Recanati and Sacharov sent their children to Geula. The tuition was 35 lira a year, with scholarships for the better students. Riger administered the school with a strong hand. Hofer taught Arabic,

Chaya Picholtz--a dear friend of Bialik--taught English. Yaqobowitz taught history, Spector taught Bible and Almagor taught gym. Later, he was replaced by Yehoshu'a Rozin.

Graduates of the school were killed in the British army. The sea was at the end of the street. Daughters of farmers lived in rented rooms on Allenby Street. Arik and Dita returned home every evening to the farm. Arik began his studies in 1942 and finished in 1945, together with Yitzhaq Moritz, Mordekhay Horowitz, Arye Slotski Shuval, Hayam Stricks and others. Five years before he came, Shimon Perski left the school for the kibbutz. Yitzhaq Morda'i finished in 1943. Generals Har'el and Tzur, the brothers Shlomo and Mordekhay Gazit, and many other illustrious graduates attended Geula in its hey day.

"Cutting Down" a Watchman

The school secretary, Shoshana Hirshbein, remembers Dita well. She was a real beauty, delicate, very different than her brother. The secretary remembers Perski and Sheinerman as MAPAIniks, average students bordering on seven. Peres and Sharon.

It was a stormy era. Sheinerman and other students were more interested in what was going on outside. There were more important struggles than math. How much authority can an old English teacher or even an authoritarian Galician principal like Riger have in times like those? On Lag Be'omer, they burned Hitler, in caves near the shore they hid biscuits, in case the enemy came. The situation was complex. Targets changed rapidly: Nazis, Arabs, British, ETZEL, Hagana. It was a doomed generation, learning math and music in order to die or forget it all in the approaching war. They sang "We Will Trample the Gate" and they came to school tired after activities that the teachers could only guess about.

The labor youth group meeting house was in Grushkewitz's cowshed and later in the grove. Yosef Golobov led the "field" group. Ari'el enjoyed quieting down the troublemakers. At night, they went down the winding path to the Altbeck bungalow. They were wrapped in a conspiratorial darkness, stronger than any adventure novel, and in the closeness of young fighters against the oppressor. With a hand on their guns, they swore allegiance to the Hagana. In Sioma's courtyard they took aim with imaginary rifles. The cleaned weapons, passed notes, bought cigarettes for the grown-ups. In the peacefulness of the village, they wove scenarios that the parents knew nothing of. In every home, there were illegal weapons. One-third of them would die in the War of Independence. Those who survived would know how to kill. There would be a decidedly Israeli country, where practical Hebrew would be spoken, with but a few remnants of European culture and truncated roots. As they grew up, they would face their mothers' disappointment and their fathers' strength.

In 1945, after taking baccalaureate exams in the summer, they went with Rafa'el Vardi to Ruhama, for a company commanders' course--Sheinerman, Slotski and others from the high school group. At night, during the course, they heard

about the bombing of Hiroshima and they understood that the distant war was over and that things would begin happening in Palestine. Arik was a good teacher, very aggressive. When he demonstrated to his pupils how to "cut down" a watchman, his hand was very strong on their collars. Even in training, there were hard blows. While teaching at Mosenson agricultural institute, he met Margalit Tzimerman, who had arrived at the school in 1946, aged 15. His love for Gali kept him there as Gadna platoon commander. When he left, he left Dani Shapira, his assistant, in charge. In his head were already thoughts of the armored corps and the struggle with the dissidents. It was a stormy era.

Magdi'el was an ETZEL center. Kfar Saba and Ra'anana were LEHI hotbeds. The Malalniks, all members of the Hagana, decided to prevent totally the entry of dissident recruiters and adherents. Arik, an officer in the Hagana's "information service," helped keep the southern Sharon clean. They took turns standing guard. Anyone who saw "Franco," "Hioma," Templov or any of the other dissidents, alerted the grown-ups. The first time, they issued a warning. The second time, they took action. The Malalniks broke Hioma's arms when he came from Kfar Saba. They shut Franco in the freezer for 24 hours. Diamonds that were expropriated were donated to the Keren Kayemet. The area was cleaned with blood.

Arik, very thorough, gathered information about the activities of ETZEL and LEHI for purposes of advanced warning. It was a violent period; the game became dangerous. One day, Arik Sheinerman identified a band with a new recruiter in the orchard and reported to Arik Mandel. Mandel went out with three buddies to catch them. They trapped the five LEHI men with a suitcase of tommy guns near the school. There was a fierce struggle. One of the LEHI men managed to fire his tommy gun and wounded Mosi Goldberg. The bullet went through his buttocks and lodged in a main artery. The band fled. Goldberg, bleeding almost to death, was saved by a village nurse. Now, 40 years later, he says with admiration: "Arik did good work. The area was clean of LEHI and ETZEL." Goldberg also has a great deal of admiration for the things Arik accomplished in the army, until the mistake in Lebanon. He was always thorough.

Arik's parents signed him up to study agriculture. Maybe he would turn out to be a good agronomist, thorough, tough with the workers. His mother always hoped that after the next war, he would return to agriculture. But 1948 brought out the best of the fighter, not the farmer. From then on, it was the angry, hostile side that came through. The war pointed the way. The victory of the knife over the violin and the pitchfork.

On a black Tuesday, 25 May 1948, Ari'el Sheinerman--first platoon commander, B company, 32nd Alexandroni regiment--went out for his first battle, Latrun. The first platoon commander of A company was Yitzhaq Moda'i. There on the low hills, his soldiers would be massacred, a bullet would enter his stomach. The wounded fell in the field, and crawled in the terrible heat to their death. There, platoon commander Sheinerman and his soldiers would be victims of what the fighter Rappaport would later describe as "the weakness of the colonels

and majors, students of the "yes-sir" school, who would go against their best strategic judgment in the face of the political phenomenon of a charismatic boss and bring catastrophe to their men."

MAPAI Lost a Man

The boss was Ben Gurion. The sacrificial unit commander was Shlomo Shamir. Thirty-four years after the end of that miserable battle, there would be many who would blame Minister of Defense Sharon for imposing the opinion of a charismatic boss on the "yes men" who brought about the holocaust of our heroic brothers in Lebanon. In the burning fields near Bir Mahsin in the summer of '48, Ya'aqov Bogin, a 16-year old soldier, dragged the wounded Sheinerman from terrace to terrace to a safe place, leaving a trail of blood on the thorns.

In the old Malal cemetery, in the veterans' section, near Sapir, Zilberg, Bogin and Stratzer, a giant pine grows on the grave of agronomist Shmu'el Sharon Sheinerman, who died on the last day of 1956 at age 60. There is a double headstone, with room only for his wife Vera, with no marble cover, with a glas jar for flowers. The reddish headstone leans slightly from the pressure of the pine tree. They wrote that Sheinerman was buried at some distance from his neighbors, but after his death, the graves seem to be closer. Stratzer and Bogin are at his sides. When Sheinerman lay sick in Beilinson hospital years before his death, with blood pressure and heart problems, Dita stood crying by his bedside. The doctor soothed her and noticed her beauty. They fell in love--Dita, who was attending the Levinski teachers' seminary and Mandel, the doctor from Beilinson. Their parents were pleased. They had great hopes for their children. For the wedding, they invited the village to a reception between 6 and 8. Margolit, the neighbor from across the way--the same age as Dita--was her witness. They bought them an apartment in Ramat Gan, but the daughter and her doctor love flew across the ocean, far from Malal, in search of the place they yearned for. They went for training in the United States and never returned. Vera waited and from time to time went to air out the empty apartment. Dita, aged 59, now lives in the United States. During the case against TIME, they met in New York, distant brother and sister, very different.

"Here, in a very small area surrounded by non-Jews," says Vera, sitting on her terrace, with a black cat and a white cat playing at her feet, "you become very lonely and begin looking for what used to be...and you do not achieve what you want. I cannot find the right word in Russian for this feeling and also, I do not want to insult the people living here. Now, I am happy in the village of Malal. I thought we would continue like the Jews we were in Russia, that here we would progress. But the soul holds on to its culture. I never imagined we would be different."

Ziama, her brother, comes by and takes the spray gun. The wind turns the pages of DAVAR. A walnut falls from the tree. Only Vera came to Israel from Russia, out of the entire Shne'urov family. Her parents died there. Many years later, her brother Ziama arrived. Another brother, now 90 years old, lives in France and is still amazed that Vera became so deeply involved in agriculture. In

the United States she has a brother who is a doctor. The Sheinermans, too--her husband's family--are spread around the world. The engineer brother who immigrated with Shmu'el in the 1920's left for France and invented the radios used for communicating between taxi cabs. He made a fortune and in the 1940's fled with his daughter, Maya, from the Germans, to Spain and from there to the United States. His good head helped him become a multi-millionaire in the land of opportunity. He admired his nephew, the Zionist general, and helped him in time of need. Tough like Arik's father, he died a few years ago. His daughter, Maya Rein, comes from time to time to visit Arik and dreams about a "third home."

The Sheinermans were tough people. Either they left here quickly, like grandfather Sheinerman who came at the turn of the century to be a Hebrew teacher in Rehovot and returned to Russia, or they stayed for years, even against their will. "There is a plan," says Vera, "and there is someone who would very much like to change the situation in Israel. They don't always succeed. I do not want to say names."

The old Willis, which was one of the first cars in the village of Malal, and which Vera drove until she was 80, rests on its old bones at the farm. Arik's two sons come to Malal from time to time to take grandma to the farm to be with them. "I am 100 percent sure that my two grandsons, whom Arik is raising like I raised him, will come to live in the village. It is very important to me that there be a continuation of Sheinerman, my husband, and of that which we lived through here."

"MAPAI," says a bearded Malalnik from Arik's class, "lost a man. Now Sharon is head of the Likud. He hates Arabs and MAPAI'niks and tells stories about the village we grew up in to the 'second Israel.'"

In Jerusalem, during the elections, when Sharon passed through Nahla'ot surrounded by his followers, a sweaty supporter shouted in his ear: "Screw their wives, take all the Ma'arahniks' women." Sharon hushed him up angrily, but remembered well that he was now in a different camp. In his race to the top, nothing will stop him, certainly not one man's shouts.

Crush an Opponent, Stroke a Lamb

In Unit 101 and later in the paratroopers, the knife from the family crest was sharpened. The old MAPAI'niks needed knives to protect their settlements from those who came to harm them, or steel pipes. Arik and his friends took the violin children and developed in them the spiritual ability to kill. When all the PALMAH'niks returned to the village, Arik and his friends taught the fledgling army how to fight. They forgot everything else. The killer mentality brought out in them things that could not be erased, a murderous essence in and of itself. When the older folks woke up, it was already too late. Moshe Sharett, shocked, wrote about the unit of paratroopers that had become "a collective tool of revenge for the state...inciting and swallowing up the civil regime." They demanded that the unit be disbanded. They did not allow Arik to climb to the top. But like a powerful river, he dug a new channel, built

a new biography, without MAPAI, and continued to move doggedly toward his goal. Now, the boy from the labor movement is a great enemy of MAPAI. All the old friends are gone, and he is left with stern-faced bodyguards and lonely power, with no moral reservations, connections or other obligations. He is also left with the fortress of his farm, fenced in and lit with security lights. Animosity toward the outside world, internal warmth: the warm family unit--Arik, Lila, his two sons, their good friend Philip from Gedera--and the love of music. There is in Sharon a melody that switches at the end of a philharmonic concert and allows him to go from there to Mahane Yehuda and to give them the hometown image that they love. They would never guess that he had just come from the palace of culture in the rich Ashkenazi suburbs. He has the uncanny ability to give everyone what he is looking for; trouble for those who despair, war for the weak, ETZEL for the veterans, Unit 101 for the fighters, to brutally crush an opponent, to come home and stroke a wounded lamb and ask: "Son, how was school?" Complete separation of his two worlds. Inside him there is a violin, says Mordekhay Horowitz at the Olga cafe. In the end, there will be the Iranian war, Arik will be king of Israel, and blood will be spilled.

[Box on p 20] Father

"Today, Arik's close friends--not for conjectural [sic] reasons--are mature, simple people, farmers like Philip, a very pleasant veteran farmer from Gedera who is over 70, manages his own farm, and sits at the Casit Cafe from time to time. Arik loves him like family. To get what you want out of Arik, there has to be someone above him with authority who knows how to pull in the reins. At first, he was afraid of Begin. Begin said about Arik that he would rather deal with a wild horse, because a wild horse could be restrained. When Begin weakened, Arik lost his fear. The brakes gave out and Arik did what he wanted." (a former friend)

[Box on p 20] Name Change

"There was a whole to-do when Arik went to the army. He was already--I don't know what you call it. He had a little stripe or two. Then Ben Gurion told him to Hebraicize his name so he could get a third stripe. We had a meeting at home to decide what to do. The Sheinerman name was dear to us and we were comfortable with it. We found a connection between Sheinerman and Sharon, and also the Sharon (valley). So we changed." (Vera Sharon)

[Box on p 20] A Caution About the Book

Simon and Schuster, the American publishing company, recently acquired the rights to publish Sharon's autobiography. If they are not careful, instead of a real life biography, they will get--for their \$200,000--a polished version of what has already been published. In '974, Bustan put out a book entitled "Arik, the Path of a Fighter," written by Uri Eban. Uri who? The first part of the book, the style of which is more exciting than its content, describes the Sheinerman saga, the tribulations of a brave family, a little house on the prairie, pitted against a hostile village. "They lived under poor

conditions. Shmu'el was an honest man, and a dreamer...hunger, deprivation, social isolation...honest to the end when they became pariahs." Revisionists against Bolsheviks, a difficult struggle with Kupat Holim, the murder of Arlozorov, a tough mother who cut fences, a dreamer for a father.

This version was published twice, as is, in HAOLAM HAZEH, "man of the year." The person who wrote it intended to create a local myth that would serve Sharon's current political needs. It was not scientific research.

[Box on p 20] The Sheinerman Story

Erikson, the psychologist, once analyzed the childhood stories of leaders, stories of greatness, a modern attempt to create a myth that combines historical fact with meaningful fiction in a way that "sounds true to the ears of certain sectors while awakening jealous wonder and burning ambition."

Since MAPAI's refusal to make Sharon chief of staff, the Sharon childhood story has moved in the direction of Jabotinsky. Menahem Begin, according to a recent update, was brought into this world by the midwife Sheinerman, Arik's grandmother, in Brest-Litovsk, in 1913. Arik's union with the Likud was therefore just the closing of a historical circle. When asked whether they were really revisionists, as the biography states, Vera laughed. "We were not. Who even knew what that meant here? It was just that anyone who looked for a little order was immediately called a revisionist." The Malaniks call the biography fairy stories for the second Israel.

Sharon Replies

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrei 26 Sep 85 p 14

[Article by Ari'el Sharon: "My Father Had No Brother"]

[Text] On the eve of the holiday, 15 September 1985, your correspondent Yigal Sarna published an article, "His Childhood."

I would not even bother to respond to what was printed if not for the harm done to those living and those dead. What follows are some of the errors.

First, the living. The story about the Siti family from Magdi'el is a crass lie. You should apologize to them quickly. You have caused them considerable grief.

I never called Acting Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir "the little man." And, I never in my life called Deputy Prime Minister David Levy "Levy, the man from the development town."

I do not write anything in my notebook except things about myself.

I never served as an officer in the "information service," or in any other capacity in that unit.

The Latrun battle was not the first I participated in. We had already been fighting for half a year before the battle for Latrun took place.

There was no "refusal by MAPAI to make me chief of staff," as you wrote. There was a far more serious affair. They denied my request to serve another year as general of the southern command. That was 3 months before the Yom Kippur War, when the cloud of war was already hanging over our heads. Many tragic events would have been prevented had I continued as general of the southern command during the war.

I was born in Malal, in my parents' leaking shack, not in a hospital as you wrote.

I did not grow up in Herzfeld's orchards, whose memory should be respected, but rather in the orchards my parents worked together with the other moshav members.

Our farm is not surrounded by a security fence.

Uri Eban, the author of "The Path of a Fighter," is a real person, who, to the best of my knowledge, is in the United States today. He is not the person you were hinting about.

Philip, my good friend, is a superb farmer but has never run our farm.

As for those who are no longer with us and who cannot respond to the errors:

My father had no brother, as you wrote, only sisters.

My grandmother, Miryam Sheinerman, was in fact Menahem Begin's midwife, not just according to "recent updates" as you wrote.

My father did not neglect his farm. It was one of the nicer farms on the moshav. Outside work, until the farm was built, was an accepted practice.

Many good people, from kibbutzim and moshavim, worked for many years at outside jobs. Working was a respectable thing.

It is true that at a given point in time, my parents considered moving to another moshav, or buying private land to establish their own farm. The description, "He wanted to leave and had the money to do so," is malicious.

My parents' successful farm, where we all worked hard, gave them the ability to face the antagonism around them. (This antagonism was not general, there were friends, too.)

My father never lived in Tel Aviv at 23 Nahalat Binyamin Street. My grandmother and grandfather lived there, may they rest in peace. What "signs of his residence" could your industrious correspondent have sought and not found, where my father never lived? His only residence was on the moshav.

My parents were not revisionists, but members of MAPAI who fought the chicanery, trickery and duplicity that had even then begun to show its face within the party. I, too, was a member of MAPAI, and have never hid that fact.

After Arlozorov's murder, my parents stood up against the MAPAI bloodletting, and were, therefore, outcasts for years. They were outcasts, but they never surrendered, and never gave up their principles.

My father, Shmu'el, may he rest in peace, in contrast to what you wrote, was not a "haughty Jew," "rude to other people," "domineering," with a "better than thou" attitude. My father was a true pioneer who studied agronomy in order to be a farmer in Eretz Israel. He was a true Zionist, not a businessman. He was a master of much knowledge in the natural sciences, languages, music, art, and, above all, agriculture. He was an innovator in agriculture. He was a man who never advised others to do anything he had not done first, with his own hands, on his own farm. He had a delicate spirit, a spiritual and practical man at the same time. He fought for his ideals relentlessly.

There was indeed a fence, which still stands today, around my parents' farm on Malal. Not out of fear, or anger over the injustice, or a desire to be shut off. There was no fear, but a deep understanding that Jewish property should not be neglected in Eretz Israel.

We did not "gather at night in the closed house" (there were many friends off the moshav, and on the moshav as well, who often filled our home), "for family meetings filled with anger and despair," as you wrote. After a long and tiring day's work, we returned at night to our shack with a feeling of real accomplishment. There were no hidden desires, but dreams and hopes for the future. And, as if the errors and omissions were not enough, there was also the implication of "longing for some other place," and "longings for something intangible." Our family does not, and never did, "yearn for some other place," but there were certainly longings for real creation, real activity (not just empty talk), real pioneering, and real national objectives.

Yigal Sarna Replies

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 26 Sep 85 p 14

[Article by Yigal Sarna: "This Is, in Fact, an Epilogue"]

[Text] 1. The story of the Siti family from Magdi'el was verified by a Malalnik. His name is known to the editorial staff. Arik did not deny the existence of the ambush. I did note that the Siti family denied the story.

2. "The little man, Shamir" and "Levy, the man from the development town" are phrases that more than one person has heard Sharon use, and on more than one occasion. These phrases are often accompanied by the bouncing up and down of the head and a bawling talkativeness. He also calls Shamir "the little one."

3. Since I have never seen with my own eyes the secret, growing content of his notebooks, I relied on statements made by those who had managed to glimpse them.

4. The information about Sharon's role in the Hagana's information service was based on statements from another Malal Hagana member, who related many fascinating facts, filled with admiration, about Sharon's part in keeping the southern Sharon free of LEHI and ETZEL influence by reporting intelligence information.

5. As for the battle of Latrun, the original article included the words, first decisive battle. Sharon in fact had fought prior to that, but this battle, and the fact that he was seriously wounded at the time, constitute a point of reference.

6. "Many tragic events could have been avoided had I continued to serve as general of the southern command during the war..." This is a debatable issue, open to interpretation. Not fact.

7. "I was born in a leaking shack..." I accept baby Sheinerman's version.

8. "In Herzfeld's orchards" was a reference to a philosophy, not to the physical ownership of the land.

9. I did not write "security fence" but rather "fenced and lit with security lights." There is no arguing this point. The lights shine.

10. I do not know who Sharon is hinting at when he refers to Uri Eban. I asked, "Uri who?" because of the total anonymity of the author of the biography "The Path of a Fighter."

11. As for the secrecy surrounding the farm and its internal functions, I relied on two sources of information who told me that Philip, who often stays on the farm, also ran it.

12. As for the father's brother or sisters, the rich American uncle Misha Yardeni, father of Maya Rein, is in fact not Sheinerman's brother, but his sister's husband.

13. The story about Sheinerman's grandmother being Begin's midwife in Brest-Litovsk is in fact a recent "update" which was not known to the public during Sharon's MAPAI period.

14. The neglect of the farm during a certain period is totally validated in the Central Zionist Archive. Arik's argument, when he was 2 years old at the time, is with the documents in the settlement department, not with me. The argument centered around money. In the exchange of letters found in the archive, money alone is discussed. This is a fact, not an "arbitrary" description.

15. As for the claim "My father never lived at Nahalat Binyamin," I have in my possession a copy of a letter written by S. Sheinerman to Dr Ruppin, which, in the father's handwriting, was closed with the words: "My address is Tel Aviv, 23 Nahalat Binyamin Street, signed agronomist S. Sheinerman."

That covers the material issues. I regret a few errors that fell within the hundreds of details describing Sharon's childhood. Everything I wrote was based on thorough investigation, statements from members of the village where he grew up, members of his class, former friends, conversations with his mother and many others, and on dozens of archival documents. I am also very familiar with the quasi-biography of Sharon concerning the animosity, the outcasts, the battles, etc. I would not even bother to reply if not for the serious harm it does to people living and dead, pioneers from the hard days on Malal, and others. The minister of industry and trade's letter of reply, by its own tone, is, in my eyes, like an epilogue to my article, an unexpected confirmation for which I can only be thankful.

9811/12795

CSO: 4423/23

ISRAEL

ARAB KNESSET DEPUTY VIEWS CURRENT SITUATION

Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 12 Oct 85 pp 25-27

/Interview with Knesset Deputy Muhammad Mi'ari by 'Adnan Fa'ur: "The Palestine Liberation Organization, Headed by Abu 'Ammar, Is the Sole Legitimate Representative of the Palestinian People"/

/Text/ /Question/ How can the Arabs inside Palestine reconcile their Palestinian identity with their Israeli nationality?

/Answer/ The first fact is that the Arabs in Israel are part of the Palestinian Arab people. In light of the conditions of the Palestinian people and their dispersion, the Arabs in Israel happened to become citizens and are now in a strange situation. They belong to a people who were expelled from their nation while they themselves have continued to live on the soil of their nation, but as citizens in the state of Israel. No doubt this sort of situation has its political and personal ramifications as well. It is worth pointing out that the Arabs in Israel did not choose such a situation but that it was imposed on them by force, as a result of well known developments and events.

/Question/ Who represents the Palestinian people?

/Answer/ The Palestinian people have chosen themselves legitimate leaders in the course of actual practice in the political arena and through their legitimate institutions, which they established by themselves in accordance with the circumstances the Palestine National Council is going through. Their sole legitimate leadership is the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by our brother Abu 'Ammar. As regards the Arabs in Israel, from the official standpoint, in accordance with the existing situation, the people who represent them are their national political bodies and movements such as the Committee of the Heads of Local Arab Authorities, the Progressive Peace List and the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, each representing the segment which he considers has something that expresses his views and programs.

/Question/ What is your opinion about Hafiz Asad's position on the Palestine cause?

/Answer/ The Syrian regime, represented by the factional clique at whose head stands Hafiz Asad, has taken and continues to take positions which are actually hostile to the Palestinian people, their cause and their legitimate leadership and have reached the point of slaughter and extermination. This is the actual result of the behavior of the Syrian regime, in spite of the provocations this regime is disseminating about extremist positions or what it calls the general national position, which is not in any way related to actual practices, at a time when the Palestinian people want the fraternal Syrian people's friendship and brotherhood. In my estimation, what represents the nationwide nature of the struggle is the Palestinian leadership, while the current Syrian regime represents factionalism and class affiliation in its vilest forms. This regime has been condemned by our Palestinian and Arab masses, including the Syrian people.

/Question/ What is your position on the Palestinian-Jordanian agreement?

/Answer/ The legitimate Palestinian leadership has the right to pursue the practices and steps it considers suitable and feasible for serving our Palestinian people's cause at a specific stage and in the light of the balance of forces and alliances in the region and each regime's position on our sacred cause, which is the Palestinian cause. I consider that the Palestinian-Jordanian agreement involves a political step which was required by circumstances so that the legitimate Palestinian leadership could exercise its activity and struggle to attain the goal to which no alternative exists that would satisfy any sincere Palestinian, namely the right of self-determination and the right to establish the Palestinian state on his national soil. The issue, in my opinion, is one of confidence. A person whose confidence in his cause, his leadership or his martyrs is shaken will try to spread baseless gossip and will thereby be casting doubts on the Palestinian people's ability, their legitimate leadership and even their just right to establish their independent state.

/Question/ In the Israeli independence document, there is a phrase which states "Israel will not discriminate between one citizen and another because of religion, color or race." To what extent in your opinion is this phrase being honored by the Israeli parties?

/Answer/ The story of the Israeli independence document is a strange one. Many people refer to it as a document regulating relations among the country's citizens. However, what has happened is that absolutely all Israeli parties have ignored what is cited in this document. For example, it talks about relations between the state of Israel and the Palestinian state which ought to have been established on the basis of the partition resolution the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1947. It also talks about the right of citizenship for Arabs within the state of Israel and total equality of rights among all citizens. Where are the Zionist parties which today recognize the Palestinian people's right to establish their state in accordance with what is stated in this document? Where are the rights of citizenship for Arab citizens? The most recent law stipulates that the state of

Israel is the state of the Jewish people. Where is the equality among all citizens? Regardless of the assessment of this independence document, it is the Israeli parties and successive Israeli governments that have ignored all the principles stated in it.

/Question/ What problems are the Arabs inside in particular suffering from?

/Answer/ The Arabs inside are suffering from a number of basic issues. First of these is the political one, in the context of the nature of their relations with the Israeli authorities, as citizens and people with rights and land. Everything related to their right to organize and administer their cultural affairs and Islamic religious endowments and develop their areas in various spheres is derived from this. The second issue is an everyday one related to their personal and collective security, especially recently, in light of the spread of extremism and racism among broad segments of the Jewish people and even among the ministers and the major parties. Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the matter is that Jewish racism has become an ideology practiced by a number of parties, covertly or openly in the introductions to declarations. This is in addition to the absence of equality, job opportunities and many other vital problems. The Arab masses inside are facing these problems with heroic perseverance and a bold stand, thanks to their faith and their hope of creating a better future for themselves and for the Israeli people and the peoples of the region in general.

/Question/ What about the restriction on your immunity in the Knesset?

/Answer/ The Zionist establishment has not yet grasped the role the Palestinian masses inside can play, especially in the political area, on behalf of influencing events. Its enmity toward the Progressive Peace List from the very beginning has been harsh and violent, and I am not just talking about Geula Cohen and the Hatahiyah Party. Rather, this position includes most existing parties. The Knesset committee decree restricting any parliamentary immunity was an expression of the hostile position toward everything the Progressive List represents, which is total equality among all citizens in Israel then the creation of a peaceful just solution to the Palestinian cause and the Progressive Peace List's assertion that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole vehicle of representation for the Palestinian people and their just cause. If I can go on, I have been struggling on behalf of these principles since the time I was under house arrest for many years. I will continue along this road with or without parliamentary immunity. However, my basic immunity as I understand it has been given to me by our Palestinian masses, to the point where they sent me to represent them in the Knesset.

/Question/ Israel's leaders have condemned Kahane's movement, but they have not taken the practical steps that would guarantee that this pestilence is uprooted.

/Answer/ Kahane's movement actually arises from conditions and from practices the Zionist parties have engaged in over a long period of time. All these parties have talked about "ridding the earth"--the question is, ridding it of whom? The policy of the "socialist" Histadrut raised the slogan of "Hebrew labor." Hebrew labor in exchange for what? Doesn't that slogan mean the absence of provision of job opportunities for Arab workers? The examples are very numerous.

In my estimation, Kahane's movement is the Zionist movement's problem, and it has happened that it has revealed many cards which many people have tried to hide, along with all the risks that might arise from this racist ideology. By the way, I am not the only person as far as this opinion goes.

/Question/ Does the government aspire toward peace or toward a condition of stalemate?

/Answer/ As far as the government goes, I believe that there is no single government in Israel and that what is called the government of national unity is in reality two governments, one of which makes decisions and the other of which contests the decisions. Perhaps the only issue the government agrees on, with both its parts, is its enmity toward the Palestinian cause, the Palestinian leadership and our people's right to self-determination. Also, with everything related to a just peaceful solution, it is a government that is hostile, or at least paralyzed. As far as war, aggression and the pursuit of organized terrorism against the Palestinians go, as happened in Lebanon and Tunisia, it is united, although some opposition voices are heard from some ministers from time to time.

/Question/ If the Palestinians strike at Israeli command headquarters in Tel Aviv, the Israeli government will declare that that is an act of sabotage, but if Israeli planes strike at the Palestinians' command headquarters in Tunisia, Israel says that that is to be considered resistance to terrorism. What is your opinion on this contradiction?

/Answer/ As you point out, the restriction of my immunity in the Knesset was due to my rejection of what they called Palestinian terrorism. They do not want to realize that there is a difference between terrorism and the right of a people whose rights have been usurped to fight to regain this right, as is recognized by international laws and documents. We are against terrorism, whatever body it might come from. The terrorism a government engages in may be more dangerous than any other. A person who wants to put a limit to violence must only recognize the rights of others and not oppose the exercise of this right in actual conditions. History has taught us that everyone who has been called a terrorist in the course of his struggle on behalf of his people's freedom eventually became a head of an independent state, and the Palestinian people's situation has not been different from other fighting peoples' cause for the acquisition of their legitimate rights.

/Question/ There are numerous racist laws in Israel, the most important of which is the law of the return, which allows Jews who exist in all areas of the world to come to Israel, while the original people of the country who were expelled from their homes by military force are prohibited from doing so. How does Israel reconcile its "racist" laws with its claim that it is the oasis of democracy in the Middle East?

/Answer/ The great lie which holds that Israel is the oasis of democracy in the Middle East is refuted by all the facts in actual conditions. There is no doubt that the regime in Israel is built on the basis of the model of democratic rule recognized in the countries of the West, but practice confirms that this democracy might find its way to the streets of Tel Aviv and Ghafa'tayim but it stops when it gets to Sakhnin and Wadi al-Nasanis in Haifa. The law of the return is one proof of this. It is a racist law which contradicts the most minor human rights and the resolutions of the United Nations, which have granted the Palestinian refugees the right to return to their homes.

/Question/ The ratio of Arab citizens in Israel is 17.5 percent of the total population. What do you tell them?

/Answer/ It is true that the ratio of Arab citizens is large. There are about 700,000 people out of Israeli's total population of 4,255,000. To the element of quantity one should add the element of quality, since the ratio of young people among Arab citizens is very high. These include workers, educated persons, intellectuals, artists and so forth. If we add quantity to quantity, the Arab citizens in Israel are a political and economic force, if they can assume concrete form, organize themselves and put their strength and weight behind everyday national demands once they have specified their domestic and national affiliation and commitment. What cannot be doubted is that they can turn conditions around to their advantage and that of a just peace.

/Question/ How can one obtain further cooperation among the various left-wing political currents in the Arab environment?

/Answer/ That will come about by putting the interests of the Arab masses and their attempt toward equality and the solution to the Palestinian cause above all other considerations, and having the commitment be to the cause, not to the party or organizational framework. If that is done, all the other problems will preferences, personal theories and ideological premises open to discussion and adoption of suitable decisions.

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CSO: 4404/117

ISRAEL

PROFILES, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON FUTURE POLITICAL LEADERS

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 15, 20 Sep 85

[Article by Eliyahu Hasin: " Before the Collapse"]

[15 Sep 85 pp 43-45, 47]

[Text] One of the most critical problems facing an Israel already burdened with problems is that of the people at the helm. More tritely, but more precisely, the question of national leadership. There is a good case to be made that this is the problem or the crisis. The root cause of many other crises. Were our political system capable of spawning leadership that was wiser and/or more far-sighted and/or braver and/or more inspired, we would be spared many of our other crises. For example, the war in Lebanon or, for example, the present economic crisis, not to mention the question of national morale, which finds its expression in the large and growing emigrant communities of New York and Los Angeles.

There is, of course, no single, agreed-upon yardstick by which to measure the stature of a particular leadership. Certainly not in real time or over the short haul. What, for example, was the dominant public opinion concerning the leadership of Begin, Sharon, and Rafi in the first euphoric weeks of the Lebanon war--and what is it with regard to the conduct of that war now? Despite the disclaimer of lack of sufficient perspective, there is still the factor of a predominant general feeling, the continual evaluation by the public of those who are likely to be its leaders.

There is no mistaking that dominant evaluation in today's Israel: Israel's leadership curve since its founding, above and beyond the periodic rises and falls, has been in a state of continuous decline. It could be said, and there are those who say, that the most conspicuous turning point was during the Yom Kippur war, which struck low two prestigious leaders: Moshe Dayan and Golda Me'ir. It could be said that the onset of the crisis occurred at the end of the Six Day war, with the "decisions not to decide" about what would follow. And it could be said that the break in leadership came when the reins passed from the veteran generation to the Israeli generation in the Labor Party, in 1974. But it is hard to find anyone arguing enthusiastically that the leadership curve is moving up, or is even stable.

With the exception of one man, Yitzhaq Shamir, the upper echelons of Israel's national leadership are today composed of people from the second shift of the second generation of founding leaders. The large majority, from the generation of 1948. The process of passing the baton, in the race of leadership runners, is very clear and obvious in the parties of the Labor movement. The last members of the first generation and their immediate successors--those who stood at the helm and fashioned the country's course during the first 25 years of its existence--passed from this world or from the political arena a decade or more ago--Ben Gurion, Tabenkin, Ya'ari, Sharett, Eshqol, Golda, Lavon, Sapir, Galili, Ben-Aharon, and their contemporaries.

Even two of the "crown princes," Yig'al Alon and Moshe Dayan, are no longer among the living. In the forefront today, in their sixties, are the successors of the successors: Peres, Rabin, Navon, Bar-Lev, and their contemporaries, who have already once lost the throne that they inherited from their predecessors, in May 1977, and only managed with difficulty to get it half back in the 1984 elections.

On the right flank of the map, in the Likud, the picture is less sharp. The founding generation of the Herut movement was younger than that of the Labor parties, and the authority figure of Menahem Begin dwarfed all of its members until recently. Here the rules of the game were different, and the levels of leadership, less clearly defined. But in the main, the picture in Herut, and certainly in the Liberal party, is similar. Menahem Begin, Yohanan Bader, Ya'aqov Meridor, Arye Ben-Eli'ezer, Hayim Landau, and their contemporaries in the leadership of the Irgun and Herut are either no longer in politics or no longer alive. Personalities such as Peretz Bernshtein, Yosef Sapir, Israel Roqe'ah, and Elimelech Rimalt--the heads of the General Zionists and the Liberals in their heyday--are now history, for anyone who is interested in it.

Except, as we said, for Yitzhaq Shamir, now 70, the upper echelons of Likud are now composed of men of the next generation: Moshe Arens, Ari'el Sharon, and even David Levi, the youngest of them by a decade--from Herut; Yitzhaq Moda'i, Avraham Sharir and Gid'on Patt, just the way they look--from the Liberals. These latter, in the last elections, lost half the throne that Begin had bequeathed them.

Only a fool would today predict the fate of the existing leaders, Labor and Likud, jointly or singly, over the next few years. But we can say with high biological certainty that in the course of the next 15-20 years, around the year 2000, the picture of Israel's national leadership will change completely, at both ends of the spectrum. Peres, Rabin, and their contemporaries will, in the best of circumstances, then be retired leaders, almost 80, listened to or not. Arens, Sharon, and their contemporaries in Herut will be close to 75 and will, in the main, be in the last stages of their political careers. Even those who remain, if any, from the Liberals' upper echelons, will be looking forward to retirement.

At the beginning of the 3d millenium the national leadership will be manned by the next generation. In fact, they can already be discerned. If, in the meantime, Israel's democratic system does not crumble; if we are not inundated by then by the nationalist-fanatic-Fascist wave surging from the camps of the

religious and right wing; if no revolutionary tremors occur in the meantime to surface completely new personalities from the Zionist left or the moderate right; in short, if the political system in the next 15 years remains more or less what it was in the previous 37 years--then we can already point to the "young politicians" who will form the backbone of our leadership in the year 2000.

The political machine has already spawned most of them and emitted them into the circuit. The large majority of them are already on the field. These "young politicians" are the main topic of this series. Who are they and what are they like personally and politically? How did they get to where they are? How does the public feel about them, as a group and individually? How does the public evaluate them in comparison to the existing leadership? What do Dr Yohanan Bader and Yitzhaq Ben-Aharon, two of the most senior, experienced and respected leaders of the previous generation, think of them and their politics? Who is considered more successful by the public--the young politicians of Labor or of Likud?

This series will deal with these and similar questions in a number of sections. First of all, we will try to clarify presuppositions and ground rules.

In every election the political system produces a new cycle of regular public activists, duly certified by seal and title. In the general Histadrut, in the local councils, in the Zionist Histadrut, in the party apparatuses, and above all else, and more desired than all else, in the Knesset. That is the national arena which drains the most agile from the other sectors.

Anyone looking for the leadership spawned for us by the political system for the year 2000 must turn to the Knesset and must survey its younger members, though not all of them. It is difficult to imagine that you can get to the top today from RAKAH or SHAS or the National Religious Party or KAKH or TAMI or Morasha or even from the Citizens' Rights Movement or Shinui or Tehiya-Tzomet. If things continue in politics more or less as they have, we can suppose that most of the leadership will come from the young MK's of the two large blocs, the Labor Alignment and the Likud.

The concept of "young" must be clarified for our purposes. In the current Knesset there is no one under 35, and only one person, MK Hayim Rimon, is actually 35. There are a total of six MK's between 35 and 40, including Charley Biton of the Democratic Movement for Peace and Equality and Yosef Ya'akov of SHAS.

The real spread of MK's begins at age 40 and above, and even more than that, at 45 and above. It is only at that age that the table really becomes crowded. Thus having to decide which ages are "young" is not so simple. Any dividing line will necessarily cut across very close ages. If the line is drawn at 51, for example, it will divide Gad Ya'akov and Professor Shevah Weiss, who would be included among the "young," from Edi Amora'i and Avraham Katz-Oz, who would be excluded, and Moshe Nisim and David Levi, less than 51, from Yoram Aridor and Gid'on Patt, who are over 51.

There is thus no avoiding some arbitrariness in making the distinction. According to the spread of ages among the MK's and in consultation with some non-politicians who know a lot about politics, we drew the line, for the purpose of this series, at 49 years and 364 days

MK's who were not yet 50 in 1985 were included among the "young." Anyone born before 31 December 1935 was left out--with all due respect to Edi Amora'i, Gad Ya'aqovi, Sheva Weiss, David Liba'i, Moshe Nisim, Yoram Aridor, Hayim Kaufmann, Benny Shalita, and other good people, who came into the world, for our purposes, a year or 2 or 3 too early.

In the 11th Knesset those under 50 are a third of the body--39 men and 1 woman, 17 from Likud, 10 from the Labor Alignment, 4 from SHAS, 2 from the Citizens' Rights Movement, 1 from Shinui, 1 from the National Religious Party, 1 from MAPAM, 1 from Tehiya, 1 from TAMI, 1 from the Progressive List for Peace and 1 from the Democratic Movement for Peace and Equality. In terms of the upper echelon of tomorrow's leadership, as we said, there are 27, Likud and the Labor Alignment.

Not even all of them. At the narrow summit of the political pyramid there is no room for so many. Some of them, we must assume, will be left on the ladder. Some of them will drop out and look at politics in the year 2000 from the sidelines. For our purposes, with consultation, as we said, we have selected 12 of them, in rank order from the present national leadership, with 2 more from the reduced cabinet. Generally they are the ones who have managed to advance in the political hierarchy more than the others. Quite properly today they are the "successful dozen."

From Likud:

Deputy Prime Minister, David Levi, 48
Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, Moshe Katzav, 40
Chairman of the La'am faction of Likud, Ehud Ulmart, 40
Former Treasury Minister, Yig'al Cohen-Orgad, 48
Former government secretary, Dan Meridor, 38

From the Labor Alignment:

Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, Moshe Shahal, 49
Minister of Absorption, Ya'aqov Tzur, 48
General Secretary of the Labor Party, Uzi Bar'am, 48.
Chairman of the Labor Alignment faction in the Knesset, Rafi Adri, 48
Chairperson of the World Na'amat Movement, Na'ava Arad, 47
Coordinator of the Labor Alignment faction on the Finance Committee, Hayim Rimon, 35

In choosing these 12 there was also a consideration of fairness. Were we to talk about new MK's who have not yet made the newspaper headlines or captured a few seconds on TV, it would be unfair to put them up to a public opinion test. They are not yet sufficiently recognized. But when the group chosen includes 4 members of the government, a former minister, a deputy minister, the general secretary of a large party, and key people who are rising in public life--it is another story.

Many of the dozen have probably not yet reached their peak. Certainly they would think so. But they have already had a fair opportunity. Most of them have been on the playing field enough time. They can already show, more or less, the stuff of which they are made. The general public already has a basis for rendering an opinion about them even if it has not heard as much about them as about the people currently at the top.

One more note of clarification that should be obvious. It may well be that on the road to the start of the 3 millenium, most of the top political positions will be taken, at least in the beginning, by people in the middle age group, currently 50 and above--Mordekhay Gur, Isra'el Qeysar, Gad Ya'aqovi, and their contemporaries from the Labor Alignment, and Ari'el Sharon, Yitzhaq Moda'i, Yoram Aridor, and their contemporaries from Likud.

Even more, it is almost certain that the transition from one age group to the next, differing by about a decade, will not be so sharp and smooth. We can assume that the stronger and healthier of the older group will be mixed in with the more mature and agile of the younger group--as in the case of Yitzhaq Shamir and Yosef Burg. On the other hand we can assume that the more mature and successful of the younger group will penetrate the leadership ranks of the older group, as in the case of David Levi. Finally political life does not move in fixed rank, and we do not mean the regular age cycles of a recruitment base.

A newspaper series, of course, will not be able to go into all these possible combinations. And no one could predict if and how they might turn out. Of necessity, we must limit ourselves in this framework to the distinctions and suppositions described above. When we say the "young politicians" we mean those MK's under 50, from the Labor Alignment and Likud factions who have gotten a lot farther in politics than their contemporaries, the "successful dozen" who around the year 2000 will be in their sixties, plus or minus a few years. This is generally the age of maximum political influence and power in terms of Israeli politics.

Next Friday: Who is the preferred politician among the successful 12? Who is at the bottom? Interviews with Yohanan Bader and Yitzhaq Ben-Aharon, reactions, analyses. Will the 12 be up to the challenge?

[Boxes on pp 44, 45]

Moshe Shahal--Will Shahal Turn Grey?

Fifty years old, married, 2 children. Education: Academic--political science, sociology, law. Profession: Lawyer. Military service: ? Hobbies: collecting pipes and matchboxes. Views: a political dove. Socio-economically: lives on the right and thinks on the left. Patron and mentor: Abba Hushi, former mayor of the city of Haifa. Career track: 1964-1971 member of the secretariat of the Haifa labor council and member of the city council. 1971--member of the Knesset. 1974-1976, chairman of the Israel Consumer Commission. 1977--chairman of the Labor Alignment faction in the Knesset, chairman of the committee on constitution, legislation and law. 1981--deputy chairman of the

10th Knesset. 1984--minister of energy in the National Unity government. Specialty: economics, society, foreign affairs. Stated political achievement: the project for the rehabilitation of the Wadi Salib housing developments, bringing down the Likud government in 1984, drafting of the agreement for the National Unity government. View of his supporters: brilliant, pragmatic, quick to respond, diligent, will go far. View of his detractors: manipulative. Motte Gur calls him a neighborhood lawyer. Ambition: Prime Minister. Stated age of retirement: 70.

Shahal served in the capacity of chairman of the Labor Alignment faction in the Knesset. From then until 1984 not a day passed without Shahal and Peres planning some strategem on how to unseat Likud by means of some sort of parliamentary ambush.

Shahal is considered a political wheeler-dealer, fundamental, diligent, a strategist, very sharp with words, a man who knows every jot and tittle of the rules of the Knesset and the coalition agreement inside out and uses that knowledge for his own good and the good of his party. In the present Knesset term Shahal took a position of secondary importance and turned it into a seat of power. When the Energy and Infrastructure portfolio was offered to Gid'on Patt, Shahal was thoroughly insulted. Patt wound up with Science and Development. There should be no misunderstanding--Shahal does not limit himself to Energy and Infrastructure. He handles that in addition. There is no important question on the agenda that does not elicit an opinion from him.

Shahal is competing for first place, the prime ministership, in order to finish second. Shahal advanced, and will continue to advance, through the system: the committees on appointments, agreements like those above and others, etc. Unless there is a change in the election system, Shahal's future at the top is assured.

The Ministry of Energy is Shahal's springboard to the Foreign Ministry or Justice Ministry. Patience and perseverance are the name of the game. Shahal will get there. He will survive, he will overcome, there is no getting rid of him.

Dan Meridor--The Crown Prince

Thirty-eight years old, married, 3 children. Education: academic--law. Profession: lawyer. Military service: armor--captain in the reserves. Hobbies: Stamps, classical music. Views: Political hawk. Socio-economically: on the right. Patron and mentor: Jabotinsky; Begin; his father, MK Eliyahu Meridor, may he rest in peace. Career track: Member of the Herut central committee since 1968, member of the movement leadership, member of the administration of the Jerusalem branch. 1982--government secretary. 1984--member of the Knesset. Specialty: foreign affairs, economics, defense. Stated political achievement: his appointment as Menahem Begin's government secretary in 1982. View of his supporters: leadership qualities, seriousness, loyalty. View of his detractors: well-"connected", a second generation appointee who has yet to prove himself, got everything on a silver platter. Ambition: according to his confidants, the prime minstership. Stated age of retirement: does not know.

Meridor was exposed to public awareness in 1982 when he was appointed Begin's government secretary. Meridor was very successful in that position. His predecessor was Arye Na'or.

Meridor is the son of former Herut MK Eliyahu Meridor, may he rest in peace. As the scion of the fighting family, Meridor is considered a prince in his party. He is particularly close to the leader, almost an adopted son. During the period of Begin's withdrawal, Meridor was the only one, apart from family members, to come and go in his house. If Begin's biological son Binyamin Ze'ev did not go into politics, his adopted son has done it instead.

There is no denying Meridor's talent, only that his advancement came relatively easily. His one failure thus far was not making it into the Knesset in 1977. Meridor is not pushed, he is called upon.

Against a background of sparkling personalities in Herut, Meridor appears out of place. A kind of Amnon Rubinshteyn, or, more precisely, Moshe Arens. Meridor does not draw huge crowds in the plazas. It is doubtful if he would even go there.

Meridor replaced Milo as Shamir's political advisor. Should the Arens-Shamir faction win out in the party's internal power struggles, Meridor's path is clear. If not, he will have a problem. Meridor is no flash in the pan and therefore finds it difficult to switch loyalties.

Another critical question mark about his future is what will be in the year 2000 with the disappearance of the fighting family from the map. Who will provide Meridor's cover then? In that kind of situation, assuming Likud forms the government, they predict an honored second-line spot for him--minister of Justice, for example.

David Levi--Only Levi Can Stop Him

Forty-eight, married, 12 children. Education: high school. Profession: builder. Military service: exempt for health reasons. Hobbies: family. Views: politically, a moderate hawk. Socio-economically, a socialist. Patron and mentor: Arye Ben Eli'ezer. Career track: 1963--elected to the construction workers federation under the auspices of MAPAI. 1965--joined the Herut branch in Bet She'an and was elected deputy council chairman. 1966--member of the movement's central committee and its administration. 1967--joined the Blue-White faction of Histadrut. 1969--elected to the Knesset. 1973--head of the Likud faction in the Histadrut. 1977--minister of absorption in the Begin government. 1979--minister of housing and construction. 1980--Likud candidate for general secretary of the Histadrut. 1981--deputy prime minister and minister of housing and construction. 1984--deputy prime minister and minister of housing and construction. Political specialty: economics and society. Stated political achievement: the project for housing development rehabilitation. View of supporters: charismatic, erosive, consistent in his struggles, political acumen, a gambler. He built his career with his own two hands. View of detractors: bombastic, overblown, uneducated, devoid of substance. Ambition: the prime ministership. Stated age of retirement: 70.

Arye Ben Eli'ezer, a life-long friend of Menahem Begin's and one of the founders of Herut was the first to give Levi a push forward. In 1967 Tamir resigned from the movement and set up the Free Center. With him went Avraham Teier, and a vacuum was created in the movement. They were looking for someone at the time to take over Teier's functions: a North African, from the north of the country, from the Blue-White leadership. Levi had the credentials. Levi got to where he is now while Teier tried recently to contest the mayoralty of Ramle under the Likud banner.

Ben-Eli'ezer gave Levi the push into the Knesset and the Histadrut. Begin gave him the push into the government when he appointed him minister of absorption over Shamir, Landau, Arens, and Aridor.

In any possible constellation, Levi's position is assured. He is an ethnic candidate in an ethnic party.

If he can be patient and over the next few years get close to Yitzhaq Shamir and accept his leadership, with all the difficulties that that entails, the leadership would be his upon Shamir's retirement. But Levi chooses to kick and wear down his strength and prestige in superfluous fights. At this stage he is the only one who can bring himself down.

Ehud Ulmart--Going for the Whole Pot

Forty, married, 4 children. Education: academic--philosophy, psychology and law. Profession: lawyer. Military service: military columnist for the newspaper BAMAHA. Took the officers' course while a member of the Knesset. Hobbies: sports and music. Views: a political hawk. Socio-economically: on the right. Career track: 1976--one of the founders of the Free Center party together with Shmu'el Tamir. 1973--elected to the Knesset at the age of 28. In the present Knesset, a member of the foreign affairs and defense committees. Head of the La'am faction that recently merged with Herut. Political specialty: matters of health, hospitalization, foreign affairs and defense. Stated political achievement: his struggle against organized crime at the end of the 70's. View of supporters: ambitious, diligently charismatic, goes over well in the media, sticks to his goal. View of detractors: an opportunist. Ambition: foreign minister. Stated retirement age: in 20 years.

Ulmart is returning to Herut at the right time from his point of view. Apart from Dan Meridor and Roni Milo, within the 35-40 age group there is no other candidate of his stature. He is a 4-term veteran of the Knesset and had he not wasted them in factions like the Free Center and La'am, he would be a minister today. But Ulmart thinks big; i.e., leadership. He has no interest in being permanent minister of health, a position which he could have as head of a 3-man Knesset faction. Because Ulmart pushed so hard for the merger of La'am with Herut as far back as 1981, he will go for the whole pot in Herut.

Ulmart is from the same mold as his teacher and mentor, Shmu'el Tamir. Ulmart surpasses him in everything having to do with his function as a politician. He does not have Tamir's penchant for self-destruction. If Ulmart decides to

split off, he will do it when the timing is right. If he should do it at the wrong time, he will not make the same mistake twice. If he decides to merge, he will merge with an appropriate body. Ulmart is polished, a good speaker, does well in all forms of the media. You can certainly see him on a platform in the center of town with crowds of admirers around him. On the other hand, Ulmart knows how to prevent the formation of massive nests of opposition around him, something that Tamir did not know. Thus the Herut movement which had pushed out Tamir, the initiator of the split in 1967, took back Ulmart--who had gone along with him--with open arms.

Uzi Bar'am--Were the Country a Political Machine

Forty-eight, married, 3 children. Education: academic--political science and sociology. Profession: employment counselor. Military service: armor. Teacher of Israeli geography. Hobbies: sports, cinema, classical music. Views: political dove. Socio-economic: socialist. Patron and mentor: Berl Katznelson. Career track: 1965--establishment of the young guard in the Labor Party. Secretary of the Jerusalem district, chairman of the Jerusalem district. 1977--elected to the Knesset. 1981--chairman pro tem of the faction's administration. Member of the current Knesset on the following committees: interior, income, and immigration and absorption. Specialty: immigration, absorption, foreign affairs. Stated political achievement: negotiations for the establishment of the National Unity government, the election of the last two presidents, Navon and Herzog, his victory over Mika Harish in the elections for general secretary of the party. View of supporters: expresses himself well, the best of the party's manipulators. View of detractors: unstable, rash, switches loyalties. Ambition: according to his associates, the prime ministership. Stated retirement age: 60.

Uzi Bar'am is a second generation member of Labor Party politics. His father, Moshe Bar'am, was MAPAI secretary in Jerusalem, served as MK from 1959 until 1977 and as minister of labor. Bar'am inherited the qualities of political activism from his father: he learned to consolidate his strength, what a political machine is, and how to operate within it.

His family connections did not help him, at least not in the beginning. In the 1969 elections Golda and Sapir moved him down to position 63, claiming that it was not healthy for a father and son to be on the same Knesset list. Bar'am supported Dayan at the time. In fact, you will always find Bar'am behind someone. In 1965 Bar'am supported Eshkol; in 1969, Dayan; in 1974, Rabin; in 1977, Peres; in 1984, Navon.

Bar'am, at this juncture, does not enjoy the support of party leader Shim'on Peres, who has not forgotten that Bar'am was chosen general secretary by just six votes, despite the fact that Peres supported his opponent Harish. On the one hand this can be considered an accomplishment for Bar'am, but, on the other hand, who is Harish?

With Bar'am's ability to provide the leader with a well-organized, obedient party, his path is ready and waiting. Shruga Netzer did that for Ben-Gurion. But Bar'am refuses to be Shruga Netzer. He wants to be leader, prime minister. His potential is more suited to minister of labor and welfare.

Na'ava Arad--In Eccentricity She Reminds You of Golda

Forty-seven, married, 1 child. Education: a master's degree in social work. Profession: social worker and teacher. Military service: welfare sergeant in the paratroop NAHAL. Hobbies: reading, cinema, the sea. Views: political dove. Socio-economic: socialist. Patron and mentor: Professor Richard Titmouse, British social philosopher and ideologue; Pinhas Sapir; Yitzhaq Ben Aharon. Career track: secretary of the Socialist Labor Federation, chairperson of the Labor Party's corporations branch, member of the Histadrut central committee, general secretary of NA'AMAT, member of Knesset. Political specialty: society and foreign affairs. Stated political achievement: results of the 1981 NA'AMAT elections. The Labor Alignment, under her leadership, took almost 70 percent of the votes, as compared to the 63 percent the faction got in the Histadrut elections of that year. View of supporters: courageous, intelligent, ambitious. View of Detractors: impatient, poor parliamentarian, her strength is in NA'AMAT. Ambition, according to her associates: prime ministership. Stated retirement age: when she wears herself out.

In 1969, when she entered political life, Na'ava Arad accused the leadership of her party of insensitivity on social issues. The party was then headed by Golda Me'ir, a prime minister around whom ministers walked on tip toe and spoke in quiet tones.

It seemed that after years in which the Labor Party spawned female politicians of very local stature such as Nuzhat Qetzev, Shoshana Arbeli Almuzelino and Ora Namir, it had now produced a female leader of national potential.

In 1981 Arad led her faction to a big victory in the NA'AMAT elections, was considered a rising power in the Labor Party, sat on the appointments committee that drew up the list for the Knesset, and was included among the top 12. Had the party won the Knesset elections that year, she would have been appointed a minister in Peres' government. Because Likud formed the government that year, Arad had to make do with the position of member of the Knesset. In the Knesset, without her divisions in the women's organizations, Arad was lost. Her contribution to parliamentary life has been minimal; the fact that she supported Navon for party leadership before the elections was duly noted. At this point the careers of Ora Namir and Shoshana Arbeli Almuzelino, both striving for membership in the government, seem more promising.

Moshe Qatzav--Slowly and With No One Looking

Forty, married, 5 children. Education: academic--bachelor's degree in economics and history. Profession: politician. Military service: communications corps. Hobbies: stamps and coins. Views: politically, a moderate hawk. Socio-economically: left of most of the members of his party. Patron and mentor: Menahem Begin. Career track: 1969--joined the Herut central committee. 1970--elected to the chairmanship of the Qiryat Malakhi council. 1977--elected to the Knesset. 1981--elected to a second term and appointed deputy minister of housing and construction in charge of the project to

rehabilitate the housing developments. 1984--minister of labor and welfare. Specialty: society, education, construction and housing. Stated political accomplishment: the project for the rehabilitation of the housing developments. View of supporters: authentic, honest, modest, intellectual, a doer. View of detractors: steers clear of controversy. Ambition: in the short range, the Ministry of Education. Stated age of retirement: does not know.

Qatzav makes his way quietly and slowly. He prevents friction and the formation of nests of opposition and enjoys the support of the veteran establishment of the movement. Today he is minister of labor and welfare, tomorrow's objective is minister of education. Qatzav kills his turkey and stops. He is not pompous or fanatic, and in that sense is the antithesis of David Levi. Where Levi demands the leadership here and now and, when necessary, kicks the underbelly of the movement's veteran establishment, Qatzav seeks legitimacy.

In 1981 Begin appointed him deputy minister of housing and construction in charge of the project to rehabilitate the housing developments, in part, to get David Levi's goat. There have been sharp confrontations between Levi and Qatzav. Qatzav has demonstrated the ability to survive; he handled the project successfully, they say, and has gathered strength via political appointments.

In terms of steering clear of controversy, Qatzav is second only to Burg. The forecast is that Qatzav, at the height of his career, will be among the top two or three of the party's movers. Between him and the leadership is the community of voters, whom Qatzav does not easily attract. He will continue to represent the nice ethnic element in politics. A kind of Sephardi Dan Meridor.

Hayim Rimon--The Academic Reserve

Thirty-five, married. Education: academic--law. Profession: lawyer. Military service: Air Force, reserve captain. Hobbies: basketball, cinema, theater. Views: political dove. Socio-economically, a socialist. Patron and mentor: None. Career track: 1975--coordinator of propaganda and education for the young guard in the Labor Party. 1977--national secretary pro tem of the young guard. 1978--elected national secretary. 1983--entered the Knesset. In his first term he was a member of the committee on constitution, legislation and law and on the finance committee. In the present term, he heads up the faction in the finance committee and fills in for the chairman of the committee. Specialty: economics and society. Stated political accomplishment: the push to establish an investigative committee on bank stocks. View of supporters: leadership ability, fair, works well with the media. View of detractors: devious. Ambition: according to his associates: minister of the treasury. Stated age of retirement: does not know.

Hayim Rimon is the only young MK from the Labor Party in the present Knesset. In contrast to others of his age and generation, Yosi Beylin and Isra'el Peleg, who prefer to take shelter under the wings of Peres, Rimon has built himself an independent power base in the party. He is close to the prime

minister and maintains contact with Mordekhay Gur. Rimon is deeply entrenched in the party and enjoys support from all directions.

With Yosi Sarid's defection to the Citizen's Rights Movement and Professor Ze'ev Shternhall's move to MAPAM, Rimon is considered the outstanding dove of the party, who is looking for a good place in the middle. There is little prospect of his being forced to resign from the party because of his dovish views. He will not go out on a limb before making sure that he has a ladder with which to get down, or that it is the consensus of the movement that he do so or that he will be on special assignment.

Rimon is considered a good MK. He was, in fact, the main force behind the push to establish a committee to investigate bank stocks. Rimon fought to the bitter end on that, but it was a good war with broad public backing. There is much narrower public backing for his dovish views. In this case, no drastic steps are expected from him.

Yig'al Cohen-Orgad--Dependent Upon Arens

Forty-eight, married, 4 children, 4 grandchildren. Education: academic--economics and education. Profession: economist. Military service: NAHAL. Hobbies: swimming. Views: a political hawk. Socio-economically: on the right. Patron and mentor: none. Career track: active in Herut student cells at the Hebrew University. 1964--one of the founders of the Blue-White faction of the Histadrut. 1966--left Herut with Shmu'el Tamir to set up the Free Center. 1975--Returned to Herut. 1977--elected to the Knesset and served as a member of the finance committee. 1983--appointed minister of the treasury in place of Aridor. Specialty: economics. Stated political accomplishment: his period of tenure as minister of the treasury. View of supporters: analytic ability, diligent, consistent. View of detractors: has difficulty making contact with activists in the branches, not active in movement institutions, keeps a low profile, does not invest. Ambition: minister of the treasury. Stated retirement age: there is no such thing.

In 1966, when Shmu'el Tamir's big revolt against Menahem Begin led to a split in the movement and the establishment of the Free Center, Cohen-Orgad was the oldest of the young Herut people, senior to Aridor, Ulmart, Nof, and David Levi. Had he not gone with Tamir, Cohen-Orgad would in due course have reached the leadership level of the Herut movement.

In 1974 he left the Free Center and returned to Herut. There he discovered Moshe Arens. Cohen-Orgad was the driving force in getting Arens the position of chairman of the Herut jurisdiction in Tel Aviv, after he defeated Yosef Kramerman. He sat in the Knesset in 1977 and 1981, in remote seats. It became clear in the Knesset, and even before, that he was an extreme hawk. Orgad opposed the peace treaties and went to live in Ari'el. In 1983 he was appointed minister of the treasury, after he had long made life miserable for the minister at the time, Yoram Aridor. How did it happen that Cohen-Orgad, a man of the back bench lacking party support, was appointed to such a high position? The Likud had simply exhausted all its candidates.

Orgad does not invest a lot in the Knesset; he maintains a low profile and claims that he is in a holding pattern. Orgad's future rests on Arens. If Arens should some day become prime minister, Orgad will return as his number 2 man and get the Treasury portfolio. At this stage, Orgad looks like a has-been. He may have a serious problem getting into the next Knesset.

Rafi Adari--The Representative of the Middle Class

Forty-seven, married, with 3 children. Education: high school. Profession: bookkeeper. Military service: armor. Hobbies: swimming and skiing. Views: a political dove. Socio-economically: socialist. Patron and mentor: Hillel Landsman, may he rest in peace, head of the Hazor local council. Career track: treasurer of the Galilee Hazor council, chairman of the Galilee Hazor council. From 1964--member of the party central and all its institutions. 1976--appointed deputy director of workers' housing and, in the same year, director. 1981--elected to the Knesset. Today serves as chairman of the Labor Alignment faction. Political specialty: economics and society. Stated political achievement: making the workers' housing corporation profitable. View of supporters: diligent, bright, inspires confidence. View of detractors: sly, haughty, forgot where he came from. Ambition: minister of housing and construction. Stated retirement age: does not know.

In 1976 Adari was appointed director of workers' housing. The company was at its nadir, and within a short time Adari had made it a going concern. His opponents say that Adari sold company land and ploughed the money back into the empty coffers. Adari says that he is simply a successful manager. From his success in managing the company and from his Moroccan ancestry, his party concluded that it had finally found an answer to David Levi: both a Moroccan and a miracle worker in housing and construction. Adari was his party's ethnic card in 1981 and traveled with the party candidate for prime minister, Shim'on Peres, to a folk gathering in Qiryat Shemoneh. Both of them were thrown off the platform. It turned out that Adari cannot deliver the merchandise as an ethnic leader. On the other hand, Adari turned out to be an excellent party mixer.

In the last elections, Adari hoped to become a minister. He competed with Shahal and Bar'am for the last portfolio. Shahal, of course, won, and Adari took over his position as chairman of the faction in the Knesset.

Adari knows that his power base is in workers' housing and was therefore loath to give up his seat as director despite the decision of the party central concerning double dipping. Adari appointed himself chairman of the company, prevented the election of a director and, in fact, rules the company. Such activities are characteristic of financiers of the stature of Dov Ben Amir.

Adari is considered a good politician. His administrative-economic talents will one day make him a minister. He does not get a lot of votes and is not an ethnic leader. Magen, Shitrit and David Levi remain, for the present, without an adequate response from the Labor Party.

Roni Milo--Wherever the Wind Blows

Thirty-six, married, 2 children. Education: academic-law. Profession: lawyer. Military service: exempt from the draft because of illness. After his university studies, he was drafted as a military attorney. Hobbies: music and chess. Patron and mentor: Jabotinsky. Views: a political hawk. Socio-economically: a right-wing populist. Career track: Chairman of Tel Aviv's youth town. 1971--chairman of the student federation. 1973--member of the Herut movement administration. 1975--chairman of young Herut members. 1977--member of the Knesset. In the National Unity government he was appointed deputy foreign minister. Political specialty: propaganda, foreign affairs, education. Stated political achievement: management of the Likud propaganda apparatus for the 1984 elections. View of supporters: sly, crafty, master artist of inner party deals. View of opponents: shallow, an ideological weather-vane, not to be trusted. Ambition: foreign minister. Retirement age: cannot be forecast.

The younger generation of Herut--ages 30 and 40--is generally divided into two groups: those who come from the development towns and oriental communities and the north Tel Aviv Ashkenazis: Reiser, Kleiner, Etan and Milo.

Milo is the outstanding member of the north Tel Avivians. He has family ties to Menahem Begin. Begin's daughter Hasya is married to his brother.

Milo gambled on Shamir relatively early, when the latter was still an uninfluential Knesset chairman. The gamble paid off. Were the year 2000 to come tomorrow, Milo would come out on top from that gamble. But since Shamir was a short-term securities certificate, Milo will have to gamble again. He will manage it without any pangs of ideological conscience or redundant inner conflict. The selection of Arens as Shamir's successor will probably assure Milo's position. The selection of Sharon would complicate it. Milo has already had more than one serious confrontation with Sharon. In the elections for chairmanship of the movement 2 years ago, he said about Levi: "If he is elected, I will resign from the Knesset and from politics".

Milo is considered a populist demagogue. Give him a war of words, preferably with Shahal. By the year 2000, Milo will have six or seven Knesset terms behind him. He will also have served as minister. He will have to be taken into account, since every leader will need Milo on his side. He will be able to provide his services to any of his party's leaders.

Ya'aqov Tzur--The Shoes Are Too Big

Forty-eight, married, 4 children. A member of Kibbutz Netiv-Halah. Education: academic--history and Bible. Profession: teacher. Military service: NAHAL. Hobbies: family, gardening, cooking. Views: moderate political hawk. Socio-economically: a socialist. Patron and mentor: Yig'al Alon, may he rest in peace and Isra'el Galili. Career track: 1976-1980--secretary of United Kibbutz, 1981--member of the Knesset, 1984--minister of immigration and absorption in the National Unity government. Specialty: education and settlement. Stated political achievement: unifying the kibbutz movement. View of supporter: diligent, down to earth, loyal. View of detractors:

lacking glamor and charisma. Ambition: a leading public position. Stated retirement age: the kibbutz will decide.

When Ya'akov Tzur was a seventh-grader in the Haifa high school of science, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion organized a congress in Shaykh Mu'annis to establish a national youth movement. Tzur was a member of the "immigrant camps"; he and his friends came to the congress in blue shirts. When the congress ended, the participants sang the national anthem "Hatiqva." When the singing of "Hatiqva" was over, Tzur and his friends remained standing and sang the Socialist Internationale. That impudence cost them a 2-week suspension from school. It was also the last time Tzur was to kick the establishment.

The various currents of the kibbutz movement have always been very influential in the Labor Party. The kibbutzim have contributed such masters and teachers as Yig'al Alon, Isra'el Galili, Pinhas Lavon, Qadish Luz, Yitzhaq Tabenkin, Yitzhaq Ben-Aharon, Me'ir Ya'ari, Ya'akov Hazan, and others.

The present leadership includes Dani Rosolio, who went to the workers' cooperative, Avraham Katz-Oz, Edna Soloder, Nahum Raz, and Ya'akov Tzur. Musa Harif, may he rest in peace, a gadfly of a fellow, was the most promising of them.

Of those who remained after Harif's death, Tzur is the most outstanding and the senior man in the leadership. Considering the special stature of his predecessors, Tzur may have put on shoes that are too big for him. To his credit, it must be said that he very much wants to succeed and therefore gives his all.

[Upper box p 47: The Threat]

There is a great internal danger hanging like a black cloud over the entire political system these days. A dark threat to unseat democracy, to uproot it from its foundation. The name of the threat is well-known: Rabbi Kahane and his movement KAKH. Even more serious is Kahanism. Even people who are not prepared--yet?--to give Kahane their votes, even in mock ballots for public opinion surveys, support his racist-Fascist views, largely if not entirely. Large numbers of these people can be found in the camps of Likud, Tehiya, SHAS and the National Religious Party.

The latest surveys show that KAKH's electoral potential hovers around 10 seats. Were elections to be held now and were all those who voted for the movement in the surveys to vote for it in the actual balloting, the KAKH faction in the Knesset would be 10 times larger.

The main struggle against Kahane centers today on blocking his movement, denying it public legitimacy, setting up a front line against it. In order to accomplish that, a law was enacted in the Knesset against racism. The Education Ministry deals with it as best it can. But, as was shown by the poll conducted for HADASHOT by the DAHAF Institute, it is a front that, in the eyes of public opinion, has already been breached.

The question asked in the poll: In your opinion, to what extent will it be necessary in the future to bring Kahane and the KAKH people into the country's leadership?

The answers, from the four possibilities presented to those interviewed:

Rabbi Kahane and the KAKH people should be at the head of the country's leadership--7 percent.

They should participate in the country's leadership in proportion to their strength in the Kneset--29 percent.

They should not be brought into the country's leadership--18 percent.

They should not be allowed in any public leadership, local authorities, etc--40 percent.

The political significance of the answers is very clear, as well as their ethical point of view. Only 40 percent of the respondents objected totally to granting political legitimacy to Rabbi Kahane and his friends. Only 4 out of 10 fully rejected their participation at every level of public office.

On the other hand, in addition to those who want to see the KAKH people leading the national government, no less than 29 percent feel they are as fit to participate in the national leadership as any other party. The remaining 18 percent give Kahane and his people --still?--a kind of partial legitimacy. In the national leadership, no!. In municipal and other forums, perhaps, yes. Another finding from the survey is also important: it is not only among the well-known groups that Kahane draws support or legitimacy. Those who support him exclusively and see him as a fit partner for national leadership derive mainly from those with little education, the young, and the Sephardim. Among these groups, the answers to the first two questions above oscillate between 45 and 50 percent. But even among those considered far from Kahanism, the level of full support for KAKH is far from being simply nominal: 20 percent among those who are highly educated; 15 percent of those 60 and above; 21 percent among the Ashkenazim. All of these see Kahane and his followers as a legitimate partner in national leadership.

Over all Kahane and KAKH enjoy the support, whether full and open or partial and hesitating, of 54 percent of the public at large--despite the law and despite any kind of rebuke or warning.

This is the great internal threat that feeds, among other things, on the weakness of the established political leadership. All the politicians from all the other parties are ready to participate in the campaign against him with all their strength and all their might. This is also one of the weighty challenges facing the groups of "young politicians"--right now or when they come into their own, if they come into their own. It is impossible to know today with any certainty if they will have the strength and talent to meet that challenge, but we may learn more about that from this series of articles and its findings.

[Lower Box p 47: "Declining Steeply"]

After a few words of clarification about the assumptions and content of the survey--and a review of the names of the dozen young politicians one by one--those interviewed were presented with the following question:

In comparison the political leadership of the country today (Peres, Shamir, Rabin, Weizmann, Navon, Moda'i, Arens, Sharon, etc.), does the group of "young politicians" (the 12 mentioned) seem better or worse to you?

The breakdown of the answers in whole percentages is as follows:

The young group is much better--7 percent
A little better--21 percent
A little worse--44 percent
A lot worse--16 percent

Overall: 28 percent preference for the young group, 60 percent preference for the existing group. (The rest abstained from answering.)

There is, of course, the factor of advantage that the current upper echelon in the political hierarchy has along with its media prominence. But even if we take that into account, the significance of the findings is very telling:

Whatever the public evaluation of the current political leadership may be, the group that is striving to replace it in the future seems, to a large majority of the public, less worthy by a decisive factor of more than 2 to 1. In graphic language, a very sharp decline.

This conclusion gains added strength when we look at the breakdown of opinion among the group that is generally more on top of things, that is, more critical and perhaps more influential than others: the highly educated. Here the results were even more striking:

Preference for the group of young politicians--22 percent
Preference for the current leadership--67 percent

A ratio of 3 to 1 in favor of the existing leadership.

With regard to the young group by itself, without comparison with any other group, those interviewed were more forgiving.

Question: Without taking into account political opinions, considering only personal talents and capabilities, how do you rate the group of young politicians within the upper echelons of Israel's future leadership?

The responses, in whole percentages, were as follows:

The group is better--5 percent
Pretty good--46 percent
Not as good--34 percent
Very bad--7 percent

Overall: 51 percent positive, 41 percent negative. (The remainder abstained from responding.)

Apparently, from a statistical point of view, not a very bad split. Few extremely positive, few extremely negative, the large majority in the middle. A slight majority are positive, a slight minority, negative. The general picture is lukewarm. Something akin to the widely held opinion that "this is what we have."

But on second thought, politically, it is not at all positive. Only half of the entire mature Jewish population believes that the young leadership group nurtured by our political system is worthy of serving in the future at the level of national leadership. Even these, by a large majority, have a very lukewarm feeling about it.

Again, among the educated, opinion is more sharply focused in this direction. Here the majority goes the other way:

51 percent negative evaluation, of whom 10 percent were extremely negative.
44 percent positive, of whom 40 percent were only mildly positive.

In fact, the higher the educational level, the less popular the young group is. The survey was conducted by the DAHAF Institute under the direction of Dr Mina Tzemah from 28 July-2 August of this year. The survey is based on a sample of 1,242 men and women, 18 years and above, within the Jewish population. All of the participants were interviewed face-to-face.

[20 Sep 85 pp 29-31]

[Box on p 39]

Fifteen years in politics is an eternity, especially in Israeli politics. Who can forecast today where and how Israel will stand around the year 2000? There are too many unknowns and the pace of developments is too rapid for any real forecast.

As in a thick fog, it is possible to discern only with difficulty the near end of the threads that stretch into the future. The twists and turns to come are unpredictable, except, perhaps, for the biological inevitable. People, even politicians, will continue to be born, to mature, to age, and to depart this world. In political translation: leaderships will come and leaderships will go. For that reason, perhaps, it is worthwhile to try a real experiment, not to paint what will be in the next generation, but to examine what the existing political system is working to bring about. Who and what is the political system spawning on the checkerboard of future national leadership?

In this series, "Leadership in the Year 2000," HADASHOT is attempting to do just that, to examine as closely as possible the image, the public standing, and the leadership abilities of the class of young leaders that the political system is producing for the next 15-20 years. To that end, we have included a special public opinion survey, conducted by the DAHAF research institute under

the direction of Dr Mina Tzemah, candid discussions with two of Israel's most outstanding veteran leaders, Yitzhaq Ben-Aharon and Dr Yohanan Bader, political profiles of the young politicians themselves and, of course, editorial material.

In the preceding chapter we examined, via the DAHAF survey, the 12 young politicians as a group, as a class of potential leaders. The 1,242 people interviewed were not yet asked their opinion about each of the 12 individually. We can therefore assume that the most popular and outstanding of the dozen pulled the group evaluations upward, just as the less popular pulled them in the opposite direction.

In this chapter, the "young politicians" are examined one by one. Because we asked that not only the positive points be taken into consideration, but also the negative ones, the analysis was performed in a complex way. There is no room here to go into details. In any case, the weighted considerations included by Dr Tzemah take into account both points of support and points of rejection, and they can be summarized in two findings. The first:

31 percent of those interviewed do not see any of the 12 as fit to serve in high national office in the future.

38 percent see only 1 as fit.

46 percent see only 2 as fit.

16 percent supported all 12 as fit to serve in national office in the future, a little less than the rate generally found in all surveys of those who accept in advance "what is available."

The second finding is the personal ranking of the 12 (detailed in the accompanying photos), from which 2 main conclusions are derived:

1. There is no doubt that the formal positions of those being considered, especially those who are media personalities, influence the results. But it stands to reason that that influence is rather selective and limited. Those ministers who today have the greatest media exposure, David Levi and Moshe Shahal, are at the top of the ladder. But the two other ministers on the list, Moshe Qatzav and Ya'akov Tzur, are in the lower half of the table. As another example, Rafi Adari, the chairman of the Labor Alignment faction, gets as many seconds on TV and lines in the newspapers as Dan Meridor and Yig'al Cohen-Orgad, but lags far behind them in the standings.

2. The six Labor Alignment people among the dozen lag way behind the six from Likud. The upper half of the table is filled with five Likud "young politicians" and just one from the Labor Alignment. Over all, the Likud people got 62 points, the Labor Alignment, 38.

Another question about the "young politicians" was intended to fill out the group picture in the public eye. Those interviewed were asked the following: Where would you prefer the national leadership in the year 2000 to come from--from the "young politicians" or from other circles (such as high-ranking officers in the reserves, businessmen, professional union activists, university people, etc)?

The breakdown of responses from the entire sampling was:

8 percent--the entire leadership from the "young politicians"
39 percent--the majority of the leadership from the "young politicians"
35 percent--the majority of the leadership from other circles
6 percent--the entire leadership from other circles
the remainder did not respond

Like the question published in the preceding chapter of the series, the overall picture here, too, does not seem at all bad at first glance. But on second thought, it is far from being rosy when, on the one side there are well-known names that constantly appear in the media--ministers, an acting deputy minister, the general secretary of the Labor Party, senior MK's--and on the other side, nameless, faceless abstractions. The former, of course, have an automatic sizable advantage in public opinion surveys. We might suppose, for example, that if instead of the words "other circles" we had cited some prominent names in those areas, the picture might have been more than a little different. In any case, only 8 percent of all those interviewed were prepared to hand over the future leadership to the group of "young politicians" alone. Eight percent want to see in that leadership, whether in the majority, or in the minority or exclusively, people who today are outside the political system, whose names are not even known to those interviewed.

On this question, too, the highly educated speak out more sharply. In their responses, the majority is on the other side. All of the leadership to the "young"--4 percent; the majority to the "young"--36 percent; the majority to other circles--45 percent; all to other circles--5 percent.

If it is impossible to see in these findings massive lack of confidence in the "young politicians," it is certainly impossible to see in them an expression of confidence in the product that our political system is providing us.

[The personal rankings in the accompanying pictures]

Levi--20 points
Shahal--17
Meridor--10
Ulmart--9
Milo--8
Cohen-Orgad--8
Qatzav--7
Bar'am--7
Tzur--7
Rimon--6
Adari--2
Arad-1

"6 Uzi Bar'am's in Exchange for 1 Moshe Bar'am"

"...Please read the list again". "David Levi, Moshe Qatzav, Ehud Ulmart, Roni Milo, Cohen-Orgad, Dan Meridor, Moshe Shahal, Ya'akov Tzur, Uzi Bar'am, Rafi Adari, Hayim Rimon and Na'ava Arad."

A moment for contemplation. "None of them is a real leader. There is no candidate here for a Ben Gurion, a Sharett, a Lavon, an Oren, an Eshkol, a Golda, a Sapir, an Alon, a Begin, a Ben Eli'ezer, a Hayim Landau. Nor for an Eliyahu Meridor, a Herzfeld, a Qadish Luz, or many other names that could be added". Those are the words of Dr Yohanan Bader--who this summer celebrated his 84th birthday--one of the founding fathers of the Herut movement and number 2 in its list for the Knesset until he retired in 1977. He watched the rise of the Likud government from the sidelines.

In his 19 active years in the Knesset, he became a "parliamentary tradition" unto himself, and not only in the areas of his specialization--economics, budget, legislation, and law. At least twice he kept Menahem Begin from retiring. He is one of a lonely handful who have left their personal imprint on the design of the Israeli parliamentary system. He is esteemed and respected by political friends and foes alike. In his long years of activity, he got to know directly all of Israel's leaders of the last 60 years, from Jabotinsky, Ben Gurion, etc. Anyone he did not know was not worth knowing.

A scorcher of an August day. A senior citizens' housing project in Ramat Gan. On the porch of his house, sloppily dressed, his glasses sliding down his nose, Dr Bader is as sharp as ever. A man with a Polish accent and a slight speech impediment, his words are full of quotations, allusions to different places, and flashes of brilliance. His conversation is loaded with names. Suetonius, Jabotinsky, Clausewitz, Jabotinsky, Heine, Jabotinsky, Parkinson, Jabotinsky, Silone, Jabotinsky.

His political views have not become blurred over the years. He is a brilliant Herutnik, and not one of the moderate ones. When he speaks about current issues, his pronouncements are sharp. The impression he gives is that perhaps politics has been weaned of the institution of Dr Bader, but Dr Bader has not yet been weaned of politics. While his wit shoots out sharpened barbs, his caution is quick to apply cotton to the wound, especially when it has to do with living people whom he might run into tomorrow.

Two meetings, 6 hours of Bader. Most of them were a fascinating monologue that had only the most indirect connection, if any at all, to the topic at hand. In the final analysis, his opinion is absolutely clear: the graph of Israel's political leadership is dropping sharply. What the current system is producing is not only inferior to its predecessors, but there is serious doubt as to whether it will be able to cope with the country's future problems.

Dr Bader himself prefers to state it somewhat differently. "By journalistic convention," he says sarcastically, "I should begin with serious worries and conclude with mock optimism." He starts off talking about his great political opponent David Ben Gurion.

"Ben-Gurion, in typical fashion, was a pessimist at heart," Dr Bader relates. "He was full of worry for the country's future, its fate, its very existence. Everything that he did was a consequence of that worry. Dr Nahum Goldmann once told me: 'It is amazing that a man so sick at heart could be so strong in

deed.' The entire first generation was that way. Things have changed since then.

The first Knesset was characteristic of the leadership in that first period; it was mainly composed of people who were prominent in life: pioneers, fighters, emissaries, labor leaders, immigration activists, managers. In those days people had to have public life, public service, and public accomplishments before anyone would suggest that they run for the Knesset. They entered the Knesset with the baggage of life, experience, and accomplishments. Despite the fact that the large majority of them never attended a university, they were a lot smarter. They were of the knowledge and culture of life. They tried to get people like that into the following Knessets, but were less and less successful.

Today it is less a matter of talent and more one of connections. In all the parties there is too much 'ancestral privilege' or 'ethnic privilege.' One of the most serious phenomena in our political life today is this kind of scenario: a young man, having completed his service obligation, having learned a couple of things at the university, becomes active in his party and, sometimes also due to his family background, gets elected to the Knesset. He has chosen himself a career in politics, without any previous baggage, without any prior experience or accomplishments. A career".

How would you appraise the current group of leaders, say the 10 cabinet members:

"Maybe it is an optical illusion, but they are not of the same stature as their predecessors. It is not the same thing. There has been a decline in leadership, but perhaps not enough time has gone by yet".

What about the current Herut leadership in comparison to its predecessors?

Bader would prefer to get out of this minefield with a big circumlocution. "I read in a Russian book about English literature," he says, "that the English are very mediocre in literature, but they had one Shakespeare and are very rich. One man at the top can change everything".

With Begin has gone, do you see that man?

"Overall the situation is much better than I feared and much worse than what it was under Begin...in any case the people who the Herut movement are no worse than those who head the Labor Alignment. With the Liberals, it is another question. A party that does not go to the elections is lost. That happened to MAPAM and it happened to the Liberals."

I read Bader the names of the 12 "young politicians" one by one. He asks me to read the names again. "All of them," he says, "may have successfully completed high school. None of them has gotten a degree in the political university. None of them has yet demonstrated the required ability. Some of them have demonstrated greed or lack of responsibility. In any case, they do not have what their predecessors had. I would trade six Uzi Bar'am's for one

Moshe Bar'am. In comparing Likud's six to the Labor Alignment's six, I prefer the six from Likud, but that does not mean that they are good."

Dr Bader does not believe that those produced by the political system today will in fact be the country's leaders 15-20 years from now. "I do not believe," he says, "that those people will lead the country in the year 2000. The situation could not continue that way until then. It is clear to me that there will be revolutionary changes before the year 2000--political, military, and economic. Those changes will also bring about a revolution in the makeup of the upper political echelons and even in their existence. The situation is extremely dynamic, and to the extent that one can be sure, I am sure that something will happen in this period. What exists today", he repeats, "cannot continue."

"It could be that by the year 2000, people whom we do not even know about today will make it to the key positions. We hear too much about the names that appear in the newspapers. There could be enormous strength in the community, great people who do not enjoy publicity, and they may make it to the top of the political ladder in the future."

The relative passion with which Bader speaks about this question can, perhaps, be attributed to another sentence that he voiced elsewhere in the conversation. "The leadership," he says, "has tremendous influence. Bad leadership can destroy the country."

Why is the country's leadership in decline?

"The nation and the people have matured too quickly. It would have been better had they remained young in spirit, with a feeling of freedom and independence, for another few decades. The people have accommodated too quickly to the accomplishment of nationhood, the miracle of the state, as if it were something self-evident."

How does that tie in with the leadership that is supposed to lead, to direct, to guide?

"In the final analysis every people gets the leadership it deserves, a leadership that befits it, that it can accept. It is a matter of the general atmosphere. Anyone too different from the average will not be accepted. Why was Shlomo Lavi never a candidate for prime minister? It is said about the Roman caesars that they used to choose successors worse than themselves so that the people would remember them fondly." Bader lets you make of that what you will.

Dr Bader characterizes Israeli democracy in general as a "sick democracy." Sick because of a lack of responsibility, sick because of the haughtiness of the system, sick because of a press that is entirely against the elected officials without knowing how good the press has it in a democratic regime.

Here the man who had once coined the term "Bureaucratistan", seemed to be putting on the professional uniform of politicians of all ages when he said: "I see a danger, a great danger, in the use that people make nowadays of the

word 'politicians,' in the campaign being waged against politicians. Every policeman, every police investigator lords it over the politicians. Lately the government's judicial advisor has been doing the same thing over and over. The police commissioner at the time of the 'peach' affair refused to turn over the file to his minister, Dr Burg, on the grounds that he was a 'politician.' The system pretends to be responsible, intelligent, omniscient and teaches the people to scorn politicians. Yet the politicians are the masters of the system. They are elected while the others are merely officials."

Why was it not that way 10-20 years ago? Are today's politicians entirely guiltless?

"Every people gets the elected officials it deserves. But they are elected".

What do you think about drafting people from outside the political system for the country's leadership?

"It is not healthy and even dangerous when people from the military jump right into high political life. Clausewitz wrote that any government that had more than one general was a weak government. I think he was right. We have a particular reason for that. We do not have 70- or 80-year old generals. In our system, when a man reaches 50, he is already old for the military. Thus we automatically created a reserve of relatively young men, experienced in certain fields, generally good. As a matter of principle we have to distinguish between drafting political people, members of the parties who are not professional politicians, like Hayim Tzadok or Ya'akov Shapira, for example, as opposed to bringing in 'VIP's' from the outside, who have no connection with political life. In the first case, it is proper and useful to do so. In the second, it is not only not right, it is also stupid. When Begin took Levi (the judge) or 'Ezer Weizmann, that was crazy. And he wanted to take more such names, but we stopped him. The Knesset and the government are not the stepping stone to the party, but the other way around."

What are the desirable characteristics of a man in political leadership? What kind of man would you want in leadership?

"A. A man with independent life experience, who was successful, who has accomplishments.

"B. Who has an objective--an objective that has an element of sacrifice. A man who will not come to politics, as, for example, he might come to law, to make a career.

"C. Who will be loyal to principles, to a world view.

"D. And, most important, who will have character, a higher level of ethical standards than the average person."

And do those young politicians we talked about approach those qualities?

"Each in his own way. Without expressing lack of confidence, we could say that there is no easy bridge between those desired qualities and the names

mentioned. I long ago gave up suggesting names. I made mistakes both in making suggestions like that and in opposing them. That is my life's experience."

"The Young Group From Likud Is Much More Promising"

"In terms of what 'leadership' means, Israeli politics has not spawned anything since the days of what is called the 'historic' or 'archaic' leadership. Politics, in fact, got its leadership from the field, from other disciplines--settlement, defense, Histadrut, the economy, from the entire creative system of Zionism and Zionist Labor. By itself, politics is barren."

The speaker is Yitzhaq Ben-Aharon, 79, former secretary of the Histadrut for 4 years, former member, for 4 years, of two Ben Gurion governments, former Knesset member for 25 years--in the 1st Knesset and in the front ranks. He is also a former volunteer and officer in the British army in World War II.

In Ben Gurion's biography, he is described, among other things, as: one of the heads of the United Kibbutz, Ahdut Ha'avoda and the Labor Alignment. But above all, an original philosopher and authentic leader whose opinion was respected far beyond the bounds of his party. An iconoclast. His famous tract published in 1962, "The Courage To Change Before Catastrophe," served as the ideological trail blazer in the process of unifying the parties of the Labor movement in that decade.

At the end of 1973 Ben-Aharon cut himself off from regular activity in establishment politics. Only here and there, on special occasions, does he let loose with his chastisements and admonishments.

He does not show his 79 years. He is as erect, clear-headed and incisive as ever. Every day, from morning till noon, he does physical work in the orchard of his kibbutz, Giv'at Hayim.

At dusk, in his kibbutz apartment laden with books and greenery, he gets up again. As always, he does not weigh his words on the scales of political considerations, whether it helps or hurts. For his explosive temperament, Ben-Aharon paid a heavy political price on more than one occasion. But he is always expansive, will always find another, unexpected angle. Names are not so important, rather, phenomena; not isolated details, but tendencies.

Ben-Aharon, in dealing with the present leadership as compared to its predecessors, said: "We are talking about the public's elected officials, who are, in fact, the senior echelon in our socio-political system. Not just here, but in the whole world. Is President Reagan America? Is the president of the United States, who grew up in Hollywood, the man who reflects the spiritual and material strength of the greatest of the creative superpowers? We are living in the era of bureaucracy. An era of revolution in leaders throughout the entire world. This is the greatest shake-up that has occurred in the world since World War II, and there is no point in making value judgments about it. All of the enormous strength that has always been concentrated in the hands of the national apparatus in all regimes is now in the hands of the bureaucrats, the leaders, the managers. They are equipped

with education, knowledge, and technology, including the technology to manipulate people drawn from the military, economy, etc. The bureaucracy is the incarnation of power without a face, without responsibility, without a mission.

Here, since the leadership, or most of the leadership, has transferred from the hands of people of the 2d or 3d waves of immigration, a new kind of leadership has emerged that is completely different from its predecessors. The leaders of the 2d and 3d waves were attracted to politics out of revolutionary ideological considerations. They constituted an ethical, principled, missionary leadership. Today, for example, there is no one in Israeli society of the philosophical and ground-breaking character of those days. People like Berl Katznelson, Tabenkin and Aharonovitz would today be completely unemployed. Certainly they would not be in the national leadership."

Alongside these incisive pronouncements, Ben-Aharon points to something that sounds like ameliorating circumstances. "Shim'on Peres", he says, "certainly wants to be worthy successor to Berl Katznelson and Ben Gurion. But not only does he not have what it takes, times have changed. One of the great advantages of Tabenkin, Berl, Ben Gurion, and their associates was that they were less limited by existing reality. They could deal more with prognostic kinds of questions. Today we are stuck with a harsh reality. Not only locally and regionally, but worldwide. Today there is no province, no people that can get along by itself. There is no romance or embracing of roots. Perhaps the greatest source of creativity in the world was the intimacy of the province."

What qualities were required in the past to succeed in politics as compared to those required today?

"Once the business of politics was indirect service to the public. It was the mission of people who were not numbers or abstractions. A man had to enjoy the confidence of the real, concrete community that he spoke for and served. An emissary was supposed to speak for the existence and dreams of those who elected him. This was the dominant reality of life in Israel, even in the 60's. Thus public figures, those whom they called politicians, had to possess not only qualities of conscience and ideology, but also rhetoric and dialectic skills. He also had to have courage and character. Because of the intensity of political and party life, because of the endless struggles of ideology and passion--yes, there is no politics, just as there is no art, without passion--he also had to cultivate qualities of cruelty, not just idyllic qualities, much more than today--the ability to crush people, the ability to confront and push aside those who stand in the way.

"In our days, the business of politics is a kind of professional service. The profession of political and human manipulation. Of course there has to be some kind of inclination to lead people, to rule them--some kind of belief or delusion that in politics you mold society, decide fates, lead a country--the gateway to history. But on the other hand it also requires the willingness to eat the 'bitter bread' of politics, to pay the price, which, despite the rewards of position, control, power, etc is a heavy price. Many good people

are not willing to pay that price. It has been said that political service today is composed of 'dropouts,' of people who could not succeed in other areas. There are those who perceive in a large portion of the young politicians the trait of dropping out of the individual struggle in other career tracks. I will not make any judgment as to how correct that claim is, but it was not pulled out of thin air.

"Everyone of the country's leaderships until now was derived from other areas. The economic development of settlement and country is what caused people to move from their previous area to national activity functions. They made a kind of 'professional switch,' including the present leadership. Shim'on Peres grew up in the defense field, as Ben Gurion's weapons' carrier--in purchasing, in military industry, and in nuclear research. Yitzhaq Rabin was nurtured in military and defense activity and is less a creature of the political system than anyone else. As a political figure, as the head of a party building himself a party base, Rabin was a total disappointment. He has no feel for that side of politics. Even what is called the 'Rabin camp' was not his creation. To a large extent it was 'window dressing.' Similarly Motte Gur and Hayim Bar-Lev, who were also raised in the military cradle, to this day have little concept, if, indeed, any at all, of the political sense required to organize people, bind them to you, and lead them to a goal.

"Politics would always draft the elite from other fields. As long as there were other fields that were wide awake, authentic, with a sense of the public, they would produce the people from whom politics would benefit. The poverty in leadership today is testimony to a decline in those sources from which politics drew in the past. From a public point of view, the areas of settlement, defense, economics, etc. have ceased to produce. They have become conformist, narrow-minded, lacking in social vision and tension, all absorbed in personal gain. In so doing they impoverish the political system that, in the final analysis, cannot do without them.

"When the political system is subject to bureaucratic control," says Ben Aharon, it does not open itself to good men from the outside. Certainly not to people of spirit, philosophers or social tinkers. Rather it recoils from every new, revolutionary spark. It becomes closed into itself and has no attraction for successful people from other areas. The latter can find better occupations and goals for their talents outside politics."

How do the 12 "young politicians" seem?

"They are no worse than the existing leadership group. There are even some bright spots, particularly on the right, in Likud. Their young group is much more promising, more popular, in part, more closely tied to its origins. On the right there is a striking change for the better, and likewise, on the left. In the Labor Alignment 'there is nothing worse than what exists now'."

Are the six young people in the Labor Alignment of the same caliber as the current ruling group?

"Basically, yes. The young group is notable for precisely the same lack of ability as the existing group. As pathfinders, as movement leaders, the

people of the current leadership are the ones who lost the hegemony of the labor movement in 1977. If there were something that could be expected of this group that could not be expected of Galili, Giv'ati, Hazan, and myself, it would be the capturing of the spirit of the young generation for the labor movement. It is quite proper to expect that they, as natives and students of Israel, would do what my generation did by means of youth movements, the Hagana, and the Palmah when they were the young generation--that they would represent, integrate, and attract to the movement the young of this generation from all ethnic groups. In fact, they are the ones who have lost us the younger generation.

"Even on the national plane, in national leadership, I do not see any great things that they have done. Not in economics, not in society, not in the peace process. On the contrary. By their own doing they have tied their hands to the Likud wagon, and even if they have ideas for solving Israel's basic problems, they cannot carry them out. In so saying, I am not hinting that they in fact have such solutions. Therefore if I equate the existing Labor Alignment leadership with the above group, it is not that I am optimistic about the young people, but rather that I am pessimistic about the existing group."

Are the "young politicians," in your opinion, the people who will make up the country's leadership in the next political generation?

"I doubt that very much. I really see a possibility that new personalities will break into the leadership, people that we do not even know today. The three major problems that have faced us since the beginning of Zionism are still far from a solution: the problem of the continuity of Zionism, relations between Israel and the Jewish people, and the problem of peace and security. Israeli society, so crisis-ridden, is in fact imprisoned in a terrible existential dilemma. The political system as it is and in terms of the people it produces is incapable of overcoming the crises engendered by this dilemma. Unsolved crisis situations, by their very nature, produce new leadership personalities and new movements. Therefore I expect that under the pressure of this unsolved crisis and dilemma, new movements and leaderships will arise that will bring us through.

Do you see signs of such a leadership, of such a movement?

"Not in the political system as it is and not in the generation of politicians active today. Perhaps I am talking from distress, but I am convinced that the successor generation, the second generation of the great Zionist revolution, does not have the strength to make the basic change required. They still live in the shadow of the first generation and are trying to preserve the leftover energy of that fading revolution. They are continuing with what they have and are not up to innovations. It may very well be, and there are those who claim, that only the third or fourth generation of the first revolutionary wave can free itself of the shackles that bind it to its fathers and stand independently on its own feet to face the problems of the new reality. I feel that the generation of grandchildren or great grandchildren is free of the push to identify with its predecessors. It can skip over them or search for

deeper sources. It is that generation, I expect, that will forge new systems and bring about the change so badly needed."

The change before the calamity or after it?

"The calamity that I foresaw in that tract more than 20 years ago has already been felt and is being felt. The change--not yet. We have been living a continuous calamity for over 20 years. The great expectation is for change."

9794

CSO: 4423/48

JORDAN

NEW PRESS STATUTE ISSUED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 17 Sep 85 p 18

[Text] For the first time in Jordan, journalists working in the local papers will be given a chance to share in the ownership of papers on which they work, on the basis of an arrangement the government intends to adopt to expand the base of participation in ownership of the two papers AL-RA'Y and AL-DUSTUR, which are private companies.

According to studies currently taking place, which are expected to begin being carried out at the end of this month, 10 percent of the journalists' shares are to be allocated following the new modifications and determination of the value of each paper.

The current owners will retain from 40 to 45 percent of the shares of the two new companies, 35 percent will be allocated to the retirement, social insurance, savings, Jordanian University and al-Yarmuk University funds, and the rest of the stock will be offered up for public subscription through the present Amman market.

As regards the newspaper SAWT AL-SHA'B, that will not be subject to the new arrangements because its current situation is compatible with the new orientation, as all the funds share in it, stockholders from the private sector own a large number of its shares and they are traded on the securities market.

The government attributes this tendency to an increase in demand for daily newspaper circulation; since the costs of issuing daily papers come to about 1 million dinars, the government has the right to learn about the sources of financing, a complex process into which numerous considerations enter. Therefore, in light of this, since the local market is not large enough for new papers to be issued, and in order to give the opportunity to people who want to make investments in the press, the government considers it appropriate that they should enter in as partners in the two papers AL-RA'Y and AL-DUSTUR.

It is commonly said that there is a tendency to establish a national advertising company in which the newspapers, the government and existing advertising agents will take part in order to offer service at a reasonable level to advertisers who complain that the activity of the existing advertising agencies is nothing more than the intermediary role of submitting advertising to papers and is reflected in the mediocre level of advertising service.

The funds' participation in the newspapers will also give the government the opportunity to appoint its representatives to the boards of directors, as is the case with the newspaper SAWT AL-SHA'B, "Guaranteeing that supervision over the preservation of financing sources of integrity continues," as Mr Muhammad al-Khatib, the Jordanian minister of information, said at a meeting he had with members of the League of Jordanian Writers last week.

It should be pointed out that there are three daily Arabic papers in Jordan, as well as a daily paper issued in English by the AL-RA'Y organization, the JORDAN TIMES. A weekly English newspaper is issued by the AL-DUSTUR organization, the JERUSALEM STAR. There is talk that the newspaper SAWT AL-SHA'B will issue an Arabic magazine as part of its existing concession. One should bear in mind that Jordan lacks a high-level magazine of this sort.

11887/9365

CSO: 4404/125

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

ABU AL-'ABBAS DESCRIBES ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT

Beirut LA REVUE DU LIBAN in French 2-9 Nov 85 pp 20-21

[Interview with FLP [Palestine Liberation Front] leader Muhammad Abu al-'Abbas by Dobrica Pivnicki in Belgrade; date not given]

[Text] After the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, which was followed by the rest of the Palestinian commando group to be put on trial in Italy shortly, FLP leader Muhammad Abu al-'Abbas succeeded in getting from Italy to Yugoslavia, which enraged Washington and led to the fall of the Craxi government.

In fact, persuaded that Abu al-'Abbas was directly involved in the Achille Lauro hijacking, the American government seized the opportunity to demand his arrest. But, probably to avoid making relations with the Arabs more difficult, Italy insisted that sufficient proof of his involvement was lacking, and he was released.

On his arrival in Belgrade, Abu al-'Abbas stayed at the home of a friend, where Yugoslav journalist Dobrica Pivnicki and SIPA Press Agency photographer Jadran Lozic were able to meet with him. However, several days later, following an official extradition request made by the U.S. government to Yugoslavia, on the basis of bilateral agreements between the two countries, Abu al-'Abbas was forced to leave the country again, bound for an unknown destination.

In the course of this interview, Abu al-'Abbas gives his own version of the hijacking of the Italian ship, and took the opportunity to make further charges against the United States and Israel which, he says, is nothing but a "federated unit of the United States."

[Question] What, according to you, are the reasons for the new wave of violence which has beset the Middle East in recent weeks?

[Answer] Following the Israel attack on Lebanon in 1982, and the effort to destroy the FLP in 1983, and following these harsh blows dealt to our people, we have succeeded in stabilizing our ranks, reestablishing and confirming our political position in the world. The pirate attack against Tunis (Yasir

Arafat's headquarters) was precisely the result of the fact that we had not been destroyed in Beirut, as the enemy hoped we would be.

We have made important changes in our structure and have renovated our military and political cadres, while on the international level, the FLP has given evidence of unusual flexibility, which the enemy could not predict.

The attack on our headquarters in Tunis was designed to liquidate Yasir Arafat, and thereby eliminate any possibility of peace talks. In short, this blow was targeted on the political flexibility of the FLP. We expected such an attack, or something similar, following the failure of the Murphy mission in the Middle East. It was in fact a declaration of war on the Palestinian people, through an attack on their leaders. The broad sympathy the Palestinian struggle has enjoyed in recent times upset the Israelis and the Americans.

[Question] The hijacking of the Achille Lauro took place after the Israeli attack on Tunis. The hijackers are Palestinians. It has been generally assumed that these individuals belong to this or that Palestinian faction. Following your talks with them, do you know to which organization they belong?

[Answer] It is well-known that Palestinian fighters do not have Phantoms or advanced war technology, but only light weapons and their own bodies. Parallel with the struggle of the partisans in the occupied territories, the combatants sought to respond to the enemy after his pirate attack, in which their comrades fell. We, the leaders of the FLP, have closely followed the concern provoked within our people by the attack on Tunis. We could presume that an event like the hijacking of the ship might occur. To speak the truth, we expected that a group might try to hijack an airplane, but we did not by any means think that they might take a ship!

The fact that the ship was Italian surprised everyone, because in our ranks, everyone knows that we have very good relations with the Italians. When we learned that a Palestinian group had hijacked the Achille Lauro, we thought it could not be true. Then we tried to learn to what organization this group belonged. The only source available to us was the list of the Palestinians being held in Israeli prisons, and whose liberation was being demanded by the hijackers. One of these individuals, Samir Kantar, an FLP combatant who has been in Israeli prison since 1979, suggested to me that I talk with the hijackers as president of the FLP.

Having received the order to do so from Yasir Arafat, I made contact with the Egyptian authorities. During the 3-hour trip by car from Cairo to Port Said, and during the following 2 hours, we tried to establish radio contact with the Achille Lauro, but without success. During this time the ship continued to proceed toward the north.

[Question] It is known that you were exclusively in charge of military matters until 1982. To what extent does the negotiator's role fit you?

[Answer] I was helped by the fact that the combatants knew me as a soldier, and I know a good number of them personally. Above all, I know the psychology

of our soldiers and I know that the moral factor is of great importance to them. In the first message the hijackers received, I made reference to a glorious Palestinian commander who fell during the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. This commander was named Abou Khaled, and at that time he had been for many long years the superior of Samir Kantar precisely, whose release was being demanded by the hijackers. They understood that the message was being sent to them by Palestinians. Abou Khaled enjoyed great moral prestige among our people, and by using his name, we were able to make contact. They felt that it was someone close to them speaking. They responded and returned to Port Said. During the discussion, we succeeded in persuading them to abandon their initial demands. They then demanded only safe conduct for themselves personally.

[Question] Later reports said that the Palestinian group did not intend solely to hijack the Achille Lauro, but also wanted to reach the Israeli port of Ashdot.

[Answer] The Achille Lauro travels the same route every 10 days. The hijackers told me that for them, the ship was only a means, not an end. They did not want to begin their action until the ship was approaching the Israeli port. But they were discovered too soon, 3.5 hours before arrival in Port Said. What exactly happened? We still do not know. But they say that they were discovered.

[Question] The Egyptian plane headed toward Tunis. According to reports at the time, it was expected that the four hijackers would be tried by an FLP court. Later, a dramatic upset occurred.

[Answer] For my part, I thought it was an error to use the plane. I warned the Italian and Egyptian representatives that something might happen during the flight. At that time I was thinking of the Israeli enemy. My fears were borne out by the way events developed. Only 5 minutes after the control tower in Tunis refused the request for permission to land, we continued on our route toward Greek airspace. At a given moment, we heard a series of unusual sounds, and saw the flashes as the guns were fired. The pilot informed us that we were surrounded by planes. The attackers refused to respond to requests that they identify themselves, and threatened to shoot us down if we changed course. We could see very clearly through the window that these were combat planes. Still persuaded that they were Israeli aircraft, I asked the high-ranking Egyptian official who was with us in the plane to intervene with his government. He told me: "You are in an Egyptian plane and you are under our protection." After an hour and 20 minutes of forced flight, and having failed to establish contact with the control tower at the airport in Cairo because of the confusion, we were forced to land in Sicily. It was not until then that we could see who the pirates were.

[Question] According to later reports, you were met at the airport by American soldiers.

[Answer] We were met by the commander of the neighboring American base, but the landing itself involved some misunderstanding. The Italians in the control tower in Sicily did not want to allow us to land. In the cabin, we

listened to the conversation between the American pilots and the tower. I must say that they spoke to the tower in particularly rough language, and that despite the opposition of the airport, they said that this was a decision by the American government and that those on the ground had to carry it out without question.

[Question] Later, at the airport, did relations between the American soldiers and the Italians become tense?

[Answer] Yes. When the American base commander used a megaphone to demand that we disembark, the American soldiers and the Italians drew their weapons, ready to fire at each other. The American commander made threats, referring to his "200 planes, 500 tanks and nuclear weapons," and demanded that everyone submit to his orders. In this tragicomic situation, we proposed that he begin with the nuclear weapons first!

[Question] The United States demanded your arrest. It appears that you now head the "most wanted list"?

[Answer] I must say that there is a particular distinction for me in these demands. But don't think that the Israelis and the Americans want to capture me because of my so-called involvement of the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. My only role in that occurrence was as a negotiator. It is well known that my organization, the Palestine Liberation Front, has not taken part in armed activities outside the occupied territories. But we are particularly active within these territories, which worries the Israelis the most. I must also add that thanks to the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, and then the interception of the Egyptian plane, we Palestinians now know, through this fortuitous event, that the true enemy is the United States, while Israel is nothing but one of the federated units of the United States of America.

5157

CSO: 4419/9

QATAR

GOVERNMENT CONDUCTS CENSUS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

Doha AL-'AHD in Arabic 19 Nov 85 pp 6, 7

[Excerpt] Muhammad Ma'yuf al-Nu'aymi says that the goal of the census is to reach every family in the country to obtain all the essential statistical data from them and from each individual. It also seeks to reach every organization to collect data on its characteristics. Until every individual and organization is included in the sense that none of them is overlooked in the census or is counted more than once--and this must be done comprehensively--then the divisions will be continued.

Administrative: municipalities, regions, and districts. The buildings in all the districts and the contents of these buildings in the way of housing units and organizations will then be counted. Finally there will be visits to the families or organizations to collect data on them. Qatar will be divided administratively into nine municipalities clearly demarcated from each other by natural boundaries. Every municipality will comprise a number of natural administrative regions. These regions will be arranged in an orderly fashion and given numbers serially from 1 to 98. These two lists are:

Municipality of Doha:

Includes the city of Doha with its new expansion. It is bounded on the north by the municipality of Umm Salal, on the west by the municipality of al-Rayyan, on the south by the municipality of al-Wakrah, and on the east by the Arab Gulf. The regions constituting the municipality are 1 to 49 and 60 to 68. Halul Island falls within the boundaries of the municipality.

Municipality of al-Rayyan:

Includes the city of al-Rayyan with its old and new sections and the adjacent waterways, housing developments, and villages. The industrial region and central market lie within the boundaries of the municipality. The municipality is bounded on the north by the municipalities of Umm Salal and al-Jumayliyah, on the west by the municipality of al-Jumayliyah and Jiryan al-Batnah, on the south by the municipality of al-Wakrah, and on the east by the municipality of al-Dawhah. The regions constituting the municipality are 1 to 56, 80, and 81.

Municipality of al-Wakrah:

Includes the cities of al-Wakrah and Umm Sa'id and the adjacent housing developments. It is bounded on the north by the municipality of al-Dawhah and al-Rayyan, on the west and south by the municipality of Jiryan al-Batnah, and on the east by the Arab Gulf. The municipality embraces regions 90 to 94.

Umm Salal:

Includes the city of Umm Salal Muhammad and Umm Salal 'Ali and the adjacent villages and housing developments. It is bounded on the north by the municipality of al-Khawr, on the west by the municipalities of al-Jumayliyah and al-Rayyan, on the south by the municipalities of al-Rayyan and al-Dawhah, and on the east by the Arab Gulf. The municipality embraces regions 80 and 81.

Municipality of al-Khawr:

Includes the cities of al-Khawr and al-Dhakhirah and the adjacent villages and housing developments. It is bounded on the north by the municipality of al-Shimal and the Arab Gulf, on the west by the municipality of al-Ghuwayriyah and al-Jumayliyah, and on the south by the municipality of Umm Salal. The municipality embraces regions 74 and 75.

Municipality of al-Shimal:

Includes the cities of al-Shimal, al-Ruways, and Abu al-Daluf and the adjacent villages and housing developments. The municipality is bounded on the north, east, and west by the Arab Gulf and on the south by the municipalities of al-Ghuwayriyah and al-Khawr. The municipality embraces regions 77, 78, and 79.

Municipality of al-Ghuwayriyah:

Includes the city of al-Ghuwayriyah and the adjacent villages and housing developments. It is bounded on the north by the municipality of al-Shimal, on the west by the Arab Gulf, on the south by the municipality of al-Jumayliyah, and on the east by the municipality of al-Khawr. It contains a single region, region 76.

Municipality of al-Jumayliyah:

Includes the cities of al-Jumayliyah and Umm Bab and the adjacent villages and housing developments. It is bounded on the north by the municipality of al-Ghuwayriyah, on the west by the Arab Gulf, on the south by the municipality of Jiryan al-Batinah, and on the east by the municipalities of al-Rayyan, Umm Salal, and al-Khawr. The Tawr Islands fall within the boundaries of the municipality. The municipality embraces regions 72, 72, 84, and 86.

Municipality of Jiryan al-Batinah:

Includes the housing developments and villages situated in the southwest of Qatar as well as boundary points in Abu Samrah and Sawda' Nathil. The municipality is bounded on the north by the municipalities of al-Jumayliyah and al-Rayyan, on the west by the Arab Gulf, on the south by Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., and on the east by the municipalities of al-Wakrah and al-Rayyan. The municipality embraces regions 82, 83, 95, 96, 97, and 98.

5214/12795

CSO: 4404/103

SAUDI ARABIA

VARIOUS GOVERNMENT BODIES DESCRIBE WATER DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Al-Dammam Area Projects

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 2 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Yahya Abu Radas]

[Text] The al-Dammam area is considered an urban geographic subdivision that is part of the geographic makeup of the Eastern Province located on the east coast of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It contains major urban and development subdivisions, the cities of al-Dammam, Khubar and Dhahran, in addition to areas which have been or are being developed among these towns, which it has become customary to call the al-Damman-al-Khubar-Dhahran triangle. In the course of development, this area has experienced development in all industrial, commercial, developmental, demographic and educational areas, thanks to generous sacrifices on the part of our upright government, which has allocated large sums of money for spending on citizens' requirements. It was necessary that development plans to restudy the area's infrastructure, including facilities related to water and sanitary drainage (sewers), accompany these. A number of urgent projects were carried out with the goal of providing the citizens' requirements for such facilities in a simplified, rapid manner out of concern for public health and the citizens' welfare.

In 1973, the Eastern Province's Water and Sewer Department embarked on its responsibility for providing potable water, building sanitary drainage (sewers), carrying out operating activities and requirements and maintaining existing projects, while preparing and carrying out expansion projects to newly-established areas.

The execution of these projects continued from 1977 to 1983, in addition to the plan to replace the old systems in order to increase their absorptive capacity and sustain the increasing pressure on them.

Development, which has gone beyond bounds, has now shown the essential, pressing need for preparation of a comprehensive study for the region as a whole as a single urban area, in order to pursue all present and future expansions by suitable technical means.

There is a Water and Sewer Department branch in the city of al-Dammam which supervises and monitors projects carried out in the city of al-Damman, operates and maintains projects which have been completed, collects revenues and submits them to the general department. The department has followed the information storage

method with respect to consumption and the formulation of invoices by computer, which has saved time and organized a method for easily, smoothly and accurately producing invoices.

Water Wells in the Area

The department has drilled a total of 22 wells in the city of al-Dammam, pumping an average of 992 liters per second. These wells are considered reserve sources for regions supplied by desalinated water. The water systems in the city of al-Dammam are supplied by mixed water which is pumped into a ground-level tank 2,300 [cubic] meters in capacity by main pumps in the central water station, whose capacity comes to 8,000 meters a day. A new elevated tank with 30,000-meter capacity has also been erected in the new mixing plant for the purpose of storage and maintenance of stable pressure in the existing systems. In addition, 13 elevated tanks have been erected at the sites of some wells, with a capacity ranging from 50 to 170 meters.

Sewer Water Discharge

In the city of al-Dammam, a project has been built to purify and discharge sewer water (sewage water purification basins). This plant contains eight aerating tanks and eight settlement tanks with a capacity of 89,500 meters per day. The sewer pump stations total five, in addition to two main pumping stations and a station for the industrial zone. The pump station's capacity comes to 90,000 meters a day.

The department also operates and maintains all the wells and stations belong to it, conducts observation of the water and confirms its quality before pumping it to citizens by carrying out medical, chemical and bacteriological examinations on the department's drinking water to learn its characteristics and purity from the health standpoint, determine its potability and purify everything where pollution has been established. The department's health engineering department carries out all these tests, and inspections of sewer water samples are carried out in the sewer purification units before, during and after treatment with the objective of proving the competence of the treatment process and determining the optimum means for operating sewer purification units with the requisite competence. New potable water lines in newly-established areas are also flushed and cleansed and the level of chlorine remaining in the water is examined.

Supplementary and Developmental Projects Being Carried out

Replacement of sewer systems (95 percent of the old system).

Main parallel connection lines.

The drilling of six wells, in zones seven, 91, 77, 194 and 55 of the central reservoir in al-Dammam.

The construction of six elevated concrete tanks in the Talal, al-Mazru'iyah, al-'Anud, 77 and al-'Aziziyah zones. These tanks will be prominent throughout the city of al-Dammam, being 30 meters high.

The determination of water systems in zones eight, 75, 76, 37, 148, 145, 162, 78, 77, 18, 85 and other newly-constructed zones with a total of 981,151 meters, in addition to 1,545 water tanks and 159 fire hydrants.

The project to construct water and sewer systems in al-Khariji and al-Mu'aybar.

The sewer and rainwater discharge project and expansion of the West al-Dammam and al-Jiluwiyyah potable water project. The project is about to be completed.

Completion of the study to construct a water tank (the locality of al-Dammam).

A study of water system, household hookup and sewer construction for zones and newly-constructed areas.

The planting of trees in the al-Dammam purification stations. This project has the objective of increasing the agricultural area. In addition, the department has drawn up an integrated project to establish, farm and irrigate green belts around the sewer water purification basins and use those as sand barriers and barricades against odors emanating from the basins, out of concern for the citizens' public health.

Replacement of the old water systems in al-Dammam.

The study and design of replacements for the old water system which was constructed before 1972 and was made of asbestos pipes of diameters incapable of absorbing the increasing pressure on them because of the expansion and construction of large numbers of floors in buildings. This project will help eliminate numerous problems related to maintenance methods and low water pressure.

Replacement of the old sewer lines in al-Dammam.

Nationwide Drinking Water Programs

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 4 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim al-Kulayb]

[Text] The water services department of the Ministry of Agriculture and water has been performing work in 91 locations in various areas of the kingdom during the current fiscal year, 1985-86. The equivalent of approximately 50 percent of these projects have been awarded, and the remainder are in the final awarding stages.

This was stated to AL-RIYAD by the director general of water services in the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Qurayshi.

He added that these projects include 13 operations related to the present system of wells the ministry has drilled as support wells in certain existing water projects, 21 operations related to the expansion, improvement and development of existing drinking water projects and 37 operations related to the construction of small-scale water projects and the creation of resources for the desert areas. These do not include activities authorized for the Western Province and 'Asir, since these have their own allocations.

In his statement, the director general of water services added that the ministry was providing water by tank trucks to villages and agricultural settlements where potable water is not available. Recently, irrigation area awards were made for almost 720 town, villages and settlements in the kingdom. The total cost of these awards comes to more than 32 million covering a 3-year period. The contract will include a total of 180,000 refunds a year.

He stated that an award would be made very soon for the operation and maintenance of drinking water projects for a 3-year period; thus, the projects being operated and maintained will come to 1,146, improving the yield in the citizens' behalf. In addition, a better level will be realized in regard to the operation, management and maintenance of potable water projects.

At the conclusion of his statement, he pointed out that small-scale projects have been carried out in the past 4 years along with the supply and installation of 246 pumping units including work related to the system of wells in existing water reservoirs, the expansion and improvement of existing water projects and the erection of some installations on the wells drilled such as tanks and systems in order to supply citizens with water.

Massive Nationwide Water Projects

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 5 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Rihan al-Harbi]

[Text] More than 3 [billion] riyals have been allocated to finance water projects in the kingdom. About 1.1 billion of these have been awarded and the rest is in the process of being awarded.

In a statement to AL-RIYAD, Mr 'Uqayl Muhammad Khan, director general of projects in the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, declared that the Ministry of Agriculture and Water projects have in no way been affected by the recession and that the sum of 3 billion riyals has been allocated for the construction of a number of comprehensive water projects in various provinces of the kingdom. The costs of those projects which have been carried out have come to 1.1 billion riyals, and the remaining projects, whose costs come to 1.9 billion riyals, will be carried out in coming months, with God's permission.

He added that these projects include the al-Washm water project, which was designed to cover the water needs of Shaqra', Sirat, Tharmada, Uthaythah, al-Qara'in, Ushayqir, Qusur Marrat, Marrat, Qusur Shaqra' and al-Ra'ah. This project will be supplied by water from five wells which were all drilled near the town of 'Usaylah 60 kilometers to the west of Shaqra'. Production from these wells comes to 10,800 cubic meters a day.

There are in addition a second project in al-Washm, the al-Hufuf and al-Mubarraz project and nine others, including projects which have been carried out and ones which are under construction. Work has been completed on the al-Hufuf and al-Mubarraz water project, whose total costs have come to 125 million riyals. The project has the goal of providing additional water for the al-Hufuf and al-Mubarraz water project to meet increasing water needs arising from the development

and expansion that have occurred in these two towns. The project's capacity comes to 60,000 cubic meters a day, and consists of a well zone where 14 wells have been drilled to an average depth of 200 meters. Their location is 60 kilometers southwest of al-Hufuf.

Twelve downhole pumping units have been installed on the wells. These pumps run on electricity and are operated by a control room in the water gathering station. Each well's production comes to 1,200 gallons per minute. The pumped water is transported by a main transmission line 1,000 millimeters in diameter to the water gathering station 13 kilometers away, where there is a tank with a capacity of 2,500 cubic meters. The water is then pumped by pump stations through a transmission line 47 kilometers long and 100 millimeters in diameter to the water tank erected at Mount Abu Ghanimah. The station includes a workshop, six housing units for workers in the station and additional housing set aside for supervisors and guards. The water is distributed from the tank erected on Mount Abu Ghanimah to all areas in the two towns. The tank has a total capacity of 16,500 cubic meters. The project also contains electric transmission lines and a long distance control system to facilitate operation of the project. In addition, a system has been set up for telephone contact between the wellsites and the water gathering station.

Concerning the Sudayr area water project, Mr 'Uqayl Khan said that that project was being constructed in accordance with five contracts because of its large size. The first contract included the installation of water transportation pipelines from the two purification plants to various towns and villages in the region. The length of the lines comes to about 450 kilometers. This contract was carried out at a cost of 185 million riyals.

The second contract concerns construction of two water purification plants in Ghunayman with a capacity of 30,000 cubic meters a day. The contract includes the supply of 6,000 cubic meters to al-Hass, well pumps, a power distribution system and a system for conveying water from the various wells to the two purification plants.

The third contract is related to the supply and installation of distribution and booster stations, service warehouses and distribution systems. The value of this contract comes to 97 million riyals.

The fourth contract concerns housing communities in Ghunayman and al-Hass, each of which contains 15 homes as well as a mosque, a rest house, a lecture hall, a small market and a guard room. These communities were built at a cost of 22 million riyals. The fifth contract concerns the construction of two reverse pumping stations in Ghunayman and al-Hass. The contract also includes administration and chemical buildings and a salt wastewater evaporation pond. The Sudayr water project will cover the Sudayr and al-Mahmal areas and is planned to supply more than 62 towns and villages in a sector stretching from Harmala' and al-Hifnah north of Riyadh to Jawi south of al-Mahjafah. It involves important an economic yield which will accrue to inhabitants of this area. The project will be carried out in two stages. The first stage will cover daily requirements to 1990 for an estimated population of 100,000, while the second stage will be on a par with an estimated increase in popula-

tion to 210,000 by 2009. The region's daily water requirements are estimated at 36,300 cubic meters in the first stage.

In the project design, attention was also given to converting the whole system to blending and absorbing desalinated water when that is made available by the General Saltwater Desalination Organization.

Mr 'Uqayl Khan added that there is a fourth project in al-Muzahimiyah which also will supply Khurma', al-Ghatghat and adjacent villages such as Juww, Qusayr al-Muqbil and al-Zamamat. This project will include four surface wells with two deep wells drilled in the village of Juww and the water will be pumped from the field of wells to villages alongside the distribution tank with a capacity of 3,400 cubic meters and an elevated tank 35 meter high with a capacity of 600 cubic meters erected in Khurma.

The first stage of this project has been completed at a cost of 65 million riyals. The second stage consists of the purification plant, which was approved this year and on which work will begin as soon as its design is completed.

Concerning the Hafr al-Batin and al-Qaysumah area and the extent to which it will benefit from this project, Mr 'Uqayl Khan said, "This project will supply all the sections of Hafr al-Batin and al-Qaysumah with water. In view of the magnitude of this project, it has been broken up into a number of contracts which it will be easy to carry out. The project will consist of a number of wells; of these seven productive wells and an observation well have been drilled. The average production per well is 1,400 gallons per minute. The field of wells is situated 60 kilometers from Hafr al-Batin on the al-Muhajjah road. The project also includes transmission lines, a system and the installation of pipes at a cost of 153 million riyals. The overall length of the pipes will come to 402 kilometers.

"Seven drinking water units have been constructed for sheep, five drinking water units for camels and 16 units for filling tank trucks, in view of the concentration of tribes and grazing in the region. The construction of work on the systems has been completed and they are now in operation. The project also consists of a purification plant and annexes to it; the ground level tanks, housing for employees, an administration building, a building for electric generators, warehouses and a workshop."

Concerning the stages the 'Afif and al-Dawadimi water project has gone through following construction of the first stage some time ago, the director of water in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mr 'Uqayl Khan, said, "The first stage is now close to being completed. This project has the objective of bringing water to 'Afif and al-Dawadimi and adjacent villages which a large number of people inhabit. These are the villages of the al-Qusaym and al-Mawliniyah, Afqara, al-Rifa', al-Khawan, al-Munif, al-Faqara, al-Wadi, al-Jabiriyah, Qarinah, Mustajaddah, al-Shararah, al-Hazm, al-Bajadiyah, al-Barnaran, al-Badi'ah, al-Safrah, 'Afif and 10 other villages. The study of the project has been made to cover current water requirements as well as future requirements to 2012. This project will be carried out in two stages. The first has been put in general application to respond to the region's requirements to 1992. The second will be to respond to requirements to 2012.

In view of the vast size of the project, it has been broken down into eight contracts, and the project will be supplied from the field of wells situated 37 kilometers northeast of al-Dawadimi.

"In addition to the foregoing, the project includes 12 pumping stations, stations for the field of wells, 17 concrete tanks and 28 water wells in addition to buildings, warehouses, a shop, administration and operation offices, employees' housing buildings, drinking units for the inhabitants and special drinking units for camels and sheep. The remaining parts of this project are being awarded and competition for some of them is underway. The cost of this project comes to 442 million riyals."

He added that there were the Nafi water project, the al-Ta'if and al-Hada water project, the al-Rass project, the al-Bukayriyah-al-Khubara' project and the al-Asyah project.

As far as the al-Asyah project goes, its importance lies in the transmission and distribution of water to an area which has suffered from a shortage of water because water is not available. The project contains five sites, Nafi, al-Qurayn, Dakhnah, Awdah and al-Athillah. These are the five main towns in the area. The second stage includes about 34 villages dispersed among these towns. A start has been made on the execution of this project, since supply and installation contracts have been awarded at a cost of 300 million riyals for the first stage. With respect to the al-Ta'if al-Hada project, in past years before completion of the water project there, the region suffered from a severe shortage in the necessary drinking water for its inhabitants. This has been the object of special attention from the government in haste to find an urgent, decisive solution. Following a special study on aquifers in the region, it was decided to supply this region with water from the reserves of an aquifer beneath Wadi Turbah 195 kilometers from the city of al-Ta'if. The construction of this project cost 345 million riyals. It was completed in mid-1979. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water is now carrying out the first stage of the water distribution system in the al-Hada area. Work on the systems and the construction of a tank with a 5,000 cubic meter capacity has been completed, and that will be followed by the second stage, which is now under study.

With respect to water sources, a start has been made in construction of the second stage, since groundwater dams have been constructed to expand the reservoir.

With respect to the wells, these have been put up for bids for construction. When the second stage is completed, the project's output will double. With respect to the water project for al-Rass and the villages adjacent to it, the first contract is now being carried out and the other remaining contracts are in the course of procedures. The project includes a number of sites and residential buildings.

The al-Asyah water project is being designed at the present time. It will supply the villages of Hunaydah, Aba al-Dud, Hunayzil, Hudaybah, al-Burud, al-Tanumah, Turayf, Maqarr 'Abdallah, 'Ayn Ibn Fuhayd, al-Barqa', al-Ja'lah, al-Bandariyah and al-Nabaqiyah.

SAUDI ARABIA

NEW WATER RATES TO GO INTO EFFECT ON LUNAR NEW YEAR

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 11 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Sa'd al-Huwaymil: "Application of the New Water Consumption Rates To Start on 13 September"]

[Text] The application of the new water rates will start on 13 September, following an increase in levies to make citizens sense the importance of water and guide water consumption in the kingdom.

The deputy minister of agriculture for water affairs, Mr 'Abdallah al-Musa'id, pointed this out to AL-RIYAD, stating that the increase in the rates accounted for nothing in maintenance or execution compared to making citizens feel their responsibility and guide them in water consumption, although they were token rates.

Al-Masa'id said that the rates would escalate, starting at the previous ordinary rate from zero to 50 cubic meters, that is, half a riyal per cubic meter, considering a quarter of a riyal the cost of a ton of water and another quarter the cost of sanitary drainage. He added that this would cover a large proportion, especially ordinary houses, apartments and small and medium-sized villas, and pointed out "The rates from 51 to 150 cubic meters will be 2 riyals per cubic meter, a very small proportion, for people who misuse water and owners of very large gardens who squander water in homes without any other deterrents or rules. More than 150 riyals [sic], which in my notion will not go beyond a minor percentage, will apply to citizens concerning the quantity of water they consume and that is to be considered a large percentage." He stressed that the new rates had been presented previously to the higher bodies, since they had submitted requests for information to confirm that they would not harm the citizens' interests. It was a fact that they would not harm the citizens as much as they made them feel their responsibility and national duty toward this water. Al-Musa'id requested the citizens to cooperate in this area because of the volume of water waste and abuse in its use, so that Riyadh would be as beautiful as we have known it, although the water had an effect on other projects, such as electricity, telephones and so forth, and he hoped that they would give positive results.

On a question about covering Riyadh with a desalinated seawater project, Mr 'Abdallah al-Musa'id replied by stating, "I believe that the city of Riyadh's share is greater than any other city in the kingdom. God be

praised, more than 80 percent has now been covered. This does not mean that some areas have not been covered so much as that when the planning was set out and it was agreed to for submission to bidding, we had prior knowledge of the presence of inhabitants there. What happens now, for example, is that there is a plan in the eastern area on which more construction is begun than in the western area, and unfortunately we started with the western plan while construction had not been anticipated in the eastern plan. In general, there are many areas in Riyadh to which water has been supplied although there is no construction there, for the reason that we have gone several stages beyond the construction, and there are areas where systems have been started, bearing in mind that a direct hookup is made for every home that is constructed. As regards the desalination of seawater, which has been coming to Riyadh for years and is pumped to Riyadh according to need, there still is the western portion of the circular route which is awaiting completion so that the link in the circle will be completed and arrive, and consequently the desalination system is being put in general application, since it has now reached south Riyadh and southwest Riyadh. A minor segment remains, the western segment, awaiting completion of the circular line. The contract for that has been awarded and as soon as the line is built the pipes will reach it and consequently the system will be in general application in all parts of Riyadh with its desalinated seawater." Concerning the plan the ministry is intending to establish concerning desalinated water consumption guidance, Mr al-Musa'id said that there were a number of aspects to guidance and that serials would appear on television concerning water consumption guidance. He requested the Ministry of Information and the local papers to take the initiative of offering something specific to guide consumption. In addition, the ministry has prepared posters, small books and forms which have been distributed, requesting cooperation with the ministry in its plan aimed at guiding consumption, while taking into account the new rates which will go into effect, not just for the sake of money and accumulating money so much as to make citizens and housewives feel that water costs a great deal if it is to reach the citizen with complete ease and facility.

Concerning the giant projects the government, represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, has drawn up in order to convey water to remote villages, towns and agricultural settlements, Mr 'Abdallah said "These projects exist, and these are what we call the comprehensive projects. In the al-Washm area, a large project was carried out 3 years ago covering more than 14 locations from a single source and its single reservoirs, serving Shaqra', Ushayqir, Marrat, Tarmida, and so forth. In addition, we have another project covering more than 60 locations in the Sudayr area from south al-Mujamma'ah up to Huraymila' to the north. They are all integrated since desalination plants are erected, wells are drilled and systems are laid. It is anticipated that this will be ready in the next 2 years, God willing."

Al-Musa'id pointed out that there was another project which had started operation experimentally in al-Qusaymah and Hafr al-Batin, and other projects in al-Qusaym and the southern and northern areas.

On a question concerning the effect of dams in saving groundwater in the kingdom, al-Musa'id said "These have a substantial effect. In the recent past, flood and rainwater went to waste, to the sea or into the sand. At the present time, however, control over this has become very much in being and

use is being made of most of the watercourses in the kingdom. We now have more than 170 dams in various areas of the kingdom, ones that have already been erected and ones that are under construction, storing up quantities of water where the level of reserves in some comes to 86 million cubic meters, situated in Najran, as well as the Bishah dam. The necessary designs and studies have been set out for this; its reservoir capacity will come to 300 million cubic meters. Without a doubt, these dams have given great positive results. For example, the Abha dam has for more than 15 years been supplying the city of Abha with fresh water, because Abha is a mountainous area which cannot benefit from rainwater. Likewise, the Sudayr area had been suffering from a shortage in water and palm trees were ruined when the rains did not come or came late, while at the present time water has returned to its courses, water has been available in surface wells, and agriculture has returned to its previous state, as in the other areas of the kingdom." He added that the Ministry of Agriculture and Water had made great efforts by means of this experiment and these studies and emphasis had been placed on dams in all areas and of all sizes and for all purposes, be they dams for storage, drinking water or the diversion of floods from farms and soil erosion.

Regarding a question concerning the expansion in dam construction, he went on to state "There is no doubt that there is a long-range program and we have constant lofty directives which stress the need to concentrate on dams. All the officials in the government, headed by his majesty, have become fully aware that the dams provide a great yield for farmers and citizens, make constant savings and divert floods from land or in accordance with the regulation of the flow of water, as is happening now in Najran, where it is open for periods to supply the clay strata, and as is also the case in Jizan, because of the presence of a dam regulating an irrigation system irrigating farms in a constant, automatic fashion.

"In addition, underground dams have been built on the water source in al-Ta'if, Wadi Turbah, saving a large quantity of the water needed for al-Ta'if in an organized manner, permitting nothing except what is surplus to al-Ta'if's needs to flow behind the watercourse."

Concerning the studies that have been made to learn about groundwater in the kingdom and whether there has been a shortage in groundwater sources following the paucity of rains and the large seepage of this water through wells, Mr 'Abdallah said "The agricultural development which has taken place in the very recent period, that is, in the course of 6 years, has been founded on abundant studies of water in all areas of the kingdom, since a preliminary geological study was made which was then followed by detailed studies, more than 24 contracts with a number of American, French, Italian, English and Canadian companies. They all provide great optimism about the presence of large good water sources but there are some people who anticipate that these sources will not be subjected to any drop in levels, and they are not available. There is no doubt that agricultural development, which has made great strides, will use up some water, which is what has happened to some areas, but this drop was expected and taken into consideration in the studies which were made and it was calculated in the reserves of each geological stratum in the areas of the kingdom and agricultural development which has occurred wherever there has been water and promising formations in which water was available."

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CSO: 4404/100

SAUDI ARABIA

NEW AL-DAMMAM-RIYADH RAPID TRAIN SERVICE INAUGURATED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 11 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim al-Kulayb: "The New Train's First Rapid Rail Run from Al-Dammam Reaches Riyadh"]

[Text] The first run of the train coming from al-Dammam by the new rapid line, which the Saudi General Railway Organization started operating yesterday morning to shorten the period of the trip between the two cities to a record time, just 4 hours, reached Riyadh on schedule in the morning yesterday, Tuesday. Meanwhile, new rapid locomotives of the General Motors type were inaugurated. The organization had bought 10 of these as well as modern passenger cars from France and West Germany, of which the organization had bought 40, equipped with all the necessary services and means of recreation in the form of television and video sets, comfortable movable chairs and a restaurant. The organization now has 47 locomotives, 58 passenger transportation cars and 2,165 freight cars. The prices of passenger tickets have been amended to 60 riyals for first class and 40 riyals for second class.

The train set out from al-Dammam yesterday morning in the presence of his excellency the general chairman of railways in the kingdom, Mr Faysal al-Shuhayl, and a number of officials in the organization.

On this occasion, His Excellency Mr Faysal al-Shuhayl made a statement in which he said:

"The directives of his majesty the king and his devoted crown prince have been influential in advancing the resurgence of development in various fields in our precious country. The great attention which his majesty has devoted to the sector of railways, in their capacity as part of the transportation sector in our country, has had a great effect in developing the railway sector, since a large number of freight cars and modern passenger cars outfitted with the most up to date means of security, equipment and recreation have been purchased."

Al-Shuhayl pointed out that the new train had reduced the period between al-Dammam and Riyadh to 4 from 7 and a half hours. He stated that the organization had expanded and developed workshops so that they would be compatible

with the requirements of the new trains, and new stations had also been built at a total cost of 250 million riyals.

Al-Shuhayl added that among the projects the organization intended to carry out was the establishment of traffic signals for trains, reinforcement of communications systems and development of the vocational training center belonging to the organization to provide trained technical personnel in a manner in keeping with the coming stage, and that there was a study to establish a railway between al-Dammam and al-Jubayl.

He said that the trains would soon be outfitted with booths for telephone calls in hard currency.

On a question about the most recent studies related to the construction of a route linking Riyadh to the city of Jiddah, he said that studies to determine the economic feasibility of this project were still underway. Concerning the construction of a railway route linking up Cooperation Council countries, he replied that the study had been completed and that execution of the project depended on the decision of the council countries' higher council, in accordance with a recommendation which would be presented to it by the council countries' ministers of transportation and communications.

Concerning a question on private vehicle shipping activity, al-Shuhayl said that this project would be carried out soon, since it had been approved earlier this year.

Al-Shuhayl said that attention would be given to train movement on days off during the week, and the number of cars in the trains would be increased or reduced according to need. In addition, four trains would be put into operation soon, God willing.

The new rapid route, which cost 1.2 billion riyals, was put into operation after the organization had provided all the necessary preparations and equipment. There would be a single daily train, starting yesterday, Tuesday, from al-Dammam to Riyadh, and another from Riyadh to al-Dammam, to transport passengers, in accordance with this schedule, from al-Dammam at 0730 hours and from Riyadh at 0750 hours in the morning. Three modern stations were currently being built which were designed in a distinctive Islamic style with halls for arriving and departing passengers, restaurants and offices for rail and all other services.

On the occasion of the operation of the new railway, inauguration of the modern locomotives and cars and the arrival of the first run of the train from al-Dammam to Riyadh by the new route, the director general of the Saudi General Railway Organization's branch in Riyadh, Mr Muhammad Zafir al-Qahtani, talked to AL-RIYAD about the comprehensive development and modernization activities the branch in Riyadh was witnessing and what the organization was doing.

The Most Modern Railway Station in Riyadh

He stated that great strides had been made on work on building the passenger station in Riyadh and that the work on it would end in the next few

months, with God's permission. It had been built in accordance with the most up-to-date modern specifications, which were in keeping with Islamic architecture. The organization had also constructed a large locomotive shop as well as another shop for machinery and equipment maintenance within the terminal and another customs inspection shed, and it had also built a number of facilities such as a residential building for single employees whose activity required that they be close to the work area.

500 Passengers Arriving and Departing Daily

Concerning the approximate daily number of passengers arriving and departing via the train to and from Riyadh, he said that that came to between 400 and 500. Concerning the number of train journeys prior to the operation of the new route, he said that that was a single one a day for passenger trains in each direction and two for freight trains in each direction also.

Increasing Popularity among Railway Passengers

Following the operation of the new rapid route, passenger train runs have been increased to two a day. As for freight trains, the organization has the resources and when need calls for an increase that will be made, God willing. He stated that there were no problems related to passengers' affairs except congestion and the large number of runs, which was a result of increasing popularity among train passengers, Saudis and others. The proportion of Saudis is more than 50 percent of the total daily passengers.

Record Time in Transporting Freight by Train

Concerning the period of time the operation of moving freight from the port of al-Dammam to merchants in Riyadh takes, he said that that did not exceed 3 or 4 days at the most and pointed out that there were no problems in the field on the job. With respect to cooperation between the organization and merchant clients, that existed and was in being, and the organization always tried to reduce all the difficulties in its way and always took their views and constructive recommendations.

The Terminal Receives 190 Containers a Day

Mr al-Qahtani said that the terminal had been equipped and established in order to receive the greatest quantity of cargo, and it was recently expanded by the equivalent of 30 percent of the total terminal area. As regards daily loading and unloading, the rate differed from day to day and week by week. In general, it was about 180 to 190 containers a day.

He said, "As is well known, the terminal's activity started in the customs railway station in Riyadh with the start of its operation approximately, as of 6 April 1981, and it was officially inaugurated on 25 May 1981 under the supervision of His Royal Highness Prince Salman Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the governor of Riyadh Province. The large response of importers in the form of merchants and others toward dealing with the Riyadh terminal and importing their cargoes through it has become obvious now, as a result of the facilities they have received in money and effort, since transport by railway is

much cheaper than that by other means of transport, and the acceptance and release of cargoes by customs and conclusion of procedures for them in Riyadh has saved them much of the bother of traveling to Riyadh and other difficulties they encounter in their way. As a result of that, there has been an extreme response on the part of importers and an effort on the part of the organization to create better facilities and services for clients. Cargo receiving activity has greatly increased, since the total cargoes imported by the terminal from the time it was put into operation to the present have come to the following: the grand total for containers, 133,923, the grand total for cars, 824, for common 20-foot containers, 1,193, for ordinary ones, 88,285, for refrigerated ones, 931, for cars, 799, for 40-foot common containers, 475, for ordinary ones, 42,333, for refrigerated ones, 706 and for cars, 25."

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CSO: 4404/100

SAUDI ARABIA

FOREIGN EMPLOYMENT PATTERN IN WESTERN PROVINCE ANALYZED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 11 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Razin: "In a Report by the Workers' Importation Office in the Western Province: 45,000 Applications in 6 Months"]

[Text] Labor in our country, on its various levels, has acquired special, vital importance, as a consequence of the needs of construction and building imposed by development requirements on numerous sectors which ultimately will lead to the attainment of welfare and comfort for citizens by providing facilities for them. Because the need for development in our country has been and still is extremely immense, a substantial number of foreign workers have started going back to their own countries so that another work team might constitute an alternative to them, made up of purely domestic personnel. Pursuant to that, the responsibility for replacing foreign workers with capable Saudis, which is actually happening and which we see now, has become greater.

Citizens have started taking their positions and assuming their roles among personnel in construction, work, and workshops operating and dealing with national construction and development projects, thanks to the motive forces, training locations and other things that have been provided to develop domestic manpower which has received abundant technical training so that Saudi workers may be worthy of the responsibility devolving upon them and may constitute its foundation as an inevitable necessity. Various signs affirm that domestic workers will take their desired role as is expected of them.

Through the report it issued for the period 27 September 1984 through 30 March 1985, the Workers' Importation Office in the Western Province opened on 11 October 1980 defined the objective in its establishment as reducing the pressure that had been put on the main importation office in Riyadh on the one hand and facilitating clients' tasks on the other.

Numerous areas are under the Western Province Importation Office -- Tabuk, Madinah, the Jiddah area, the Mecca area, al-Ta'if, al-Bahah, Bishah, Jizan, Abha and Najran. All these areas, whether companies, organizations or farmers, submit their applications bearing on importation and applications for servants or for foreign workers. When the office was opened there were eight

employees. Now, however, they number 24, of whom one has a master's degree, 13 have bachelor's degrees in administration, five have the commercial secondary [diploma] and two have the general secondary.

The breakdown of work in the office's various sections has taken place as follows:

Administrative affairs: Its task is to follow up on employees' affairs, in terms of promotions, raises and holidays. The files of the importation of- fice in the Western Province are considered among the most up to date in terms of organization and equipment, since it is possible to obtain any file in seconds. These files have 11 electronic facilities for retaining files and this equipment can accommodate about 8,000 pocket files. There also is a facility for indices which has more than 80,000 index files for all groups of clients, by means of which file numbers and information are obtained. The Western Province files contain 71,570 files for this period, broken down into five groups: 25,815 files for an organization, 13,000 of which have been sent to Riyadh, while the rest, 21,815 [sic], are now present in the Jiddah files, going up to the end of late March; 47 government files bearing on applications of government departments and general organizations; 21,933 files bearing on applications of male and female household servants and dri- vers; 19,565 files bearing on applications for agricultural labor; and 18,210 files bearing on applications for non-Saudi wives and children, in- cluding 90 group files for families and children of people on contract with government bodies, general organizations and companies.

Productivity

The office clients during the period from 27 September 1984 to 30 March 1985 came to 45,938 in number; 21,908 of their applications were accepted, and these were broken down among the six months, as Table One, a table repre- senting the number of clients and applications broken down by month, shows:

Number of Applications Accepted

Month	Number of Clients	New	Old	Total
September-October	7,792	1,780	1,892	3,672
October-November	7,442	1,857	1,758	3,615
November-December	7,887	1,829	1,788	3,617
December-January	7,595	1,752	1,864	3,616
January-February	7,362	1,780	1,818	3,598
February-March	7,860	1,970	1,820	3,790
Total	45,938	10,968	10,940	21,908

Reference to this table will show that the number of clients is roughly equal in all months, because of the office's resources and number of employees and the clients' failure to procrastinate, since they are all given a single period within which to appear, which is a week for Western Province applications and 20 days in the case of applications sent to Riyadh. We also find the number of applications accepted in the same period to be similar; although they were greater in the month of February-March, the reason for that may be that the spring holiday, when the public has an opportunity to visit, especially from remote areas such as Najran, Jizan, Tabuk and so forth, falls within it.

Visas

During the past 6 months, the office issued a total of 46,591 visas, broken down among four classes, organizations and companies, farmers, servants and families, as the following table shows:

Table Two: Breakdown of Visas by Groups

Month	Group			
	Organizations	Farmers	Servants	Families
September-October	3,060	1,068	991	484
October-November	4,018	1,645	980	1,121
November-December	3,864	1,942	1,077	1,784
December-January	4,474	1,794	903	1,472
January-February	3,132	1,767	1,081	3,251
February-March	3,523	1,793	1,123	1,614
Total	22,071	10,009	6,155	7,998
Percent	48	22	13	17

Reference to this table and the previous one shows the following:

Organizations and companies: 8,000 applications, of which 2,877 were submitted for the first time and the rest for the second time, were accepted [from] this group during the abovementioned period, producing a total of 22,071 visas, or 48 percent [of the total].

Farmers: 5,277 applications were accepted [from] this group, of which 2,712 were submitted by persons who had not previously had files in the importation [office], while the owners of 3,105 had had old files and had submitted them for the second time as departure allowances or to make up for their failure to make use of previous visas. A total of 10,009 visas were submitted to them, that is, 22 percent.

Servants: A total of 6,546 applications were accepted, of which 3,873 were submitted for the first time and 2,673 for the second time. A total of 6,155 visas, or 13 percent, were issued.

Families: During this period this group accepted 2,086 applications, of which 2,046 were submitted for the first time and 40 for the second time; 7,998 visas were issued to this group, that is, 17 percent.

The nationalities applied for covered most countries of the world, but there were nationalities which appeared repeatedly. These were:

Those of Egyptian nationality, with a total number of 16,055 visas; those of Pakistani nationality, with a total of 8,056; those of Indonesian nationality, with a total of 6,281; those of Indian nationality, with a total of 2,042; those of Bangladeshi nationality, with a total of 2,552; those of Turkish nationality, with a total of 2,107; those of Filipino nationality totalling 1,626; those of Sudanese nationality, totalling 998; and other nationalities, totalling 4,515, for an overall total of 46,222. The demand for these nationalities was broken down among the first 6 months of this year as shown in the following table:

Table Three, Showing the Number of Nationalities Broken down by Months

Month	Nationalities						
	Egyptian	Pakistani	Indonesian	Indian	Bangladeshi	Filipino	Turkish
September-October	1,838	960	1,015	369	258	290	235
October-November	2,641	3,241	934	873	423	207	456
November-December	3,145	1,529	1,093	710	430	262	335
December-January	2,889	1,506	998	1,019	478	529	305
January-February	2,268	1,316	1,104	493	468	372	244
February-March	2,784	1,523	1,137	578	496	447	251
Total	15,965	8,075	6,281	4,042	2,553	2,107	1,626

Reference to this table shows that demand for the Egyptian nationality exceeded that for all other nationalities, since 15,965 visas were issued, followed next by the Pakistani nationality, which came to 8,075, then the Indonesian, Indian, Bangladeshi, Turkish and Filipino nationalities. The nationalities have also been broken down into the four groups (organizations, farmers, servants and families).

Table Four: Breakdown of Nationalities by Classes

One: Organizations

Month	Nationalities						
	Egyptian	Pakistani	Filipino	Indonesian	Indian	Bangladeshi	Turkish
September-October	779	707	142	340	191	279	215
October-November	936	773	103	685	369	202	229
November-December	1,007	923	147	529	338	210	231
December-January	895	1,010	194	796	349	499	282
January-February	656	834	152	310	349	339	220
February-March	703	971	140	397	398	402	228
Total	4,976	5,228	878	3,057	1,993	1,931	1,405

From this, it is apparent that receptivity of employers has concentrated on the Pakistani nationality, since 5,228 Pakistanis were brought in for purposes of work in organizations, followed by the Egyptian nationality, where the numbers of workers of this nationality brought in accounted for 4,976 visas, followed by Indian nationality in third place, while Indonesia occupied seventh and last place. That indicates that there are three main sources of labor -- Pakistan, Egypt and India. It should be noted that demand for these nationalities has not changed from month to month, except for increases or decreases that are almost not worth mentioning.

As for agricultural employers' foreign labor, the table shows:

Two: Farmers

Month	Nationalities						
	Egyptian	Pakistani	Indonesian	Indian	Bangladeshi	Turkish	Filipino
September-October	755	215	21	16	38	2	17
October-November	1,167	337	6	78	29	2	16
November-December	1,136	468	28	72	51	38	103
December-January	1,183	373	68	83	23	2	2
January-February	1,180	360	39	61	80	21	1
February-March	1,176	415	53	54	57	17	--
Total	6,597	2,168	185	349	338	103	139

From this table it is apparent that farmers' applications were concentrated on the Egyptian nationality in a noteworthy manner, since the number of visas of this nationality issued for this activity in the first 6 months of this year came to 6,597, followed by the Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi and finally Turkish nationalities.

Three: Servants

Month	Nationalities						
	Egyptian	Pakistani	Indonesian	Indian	Bangladeshi	Turkish	Filipino
September-October	96	8	850	--	1	2	--
October-November	91	13	821	3	5	3	6
November-December	106	5	911	3	3	3	1
December-January	84	17	764	7	1	--	3
January-February	94	17	911	4	1	1	4
February-March	102	20	941	6	--	1	4
Total	565	80	5,198	23	11	10	16

This table expresses one conclusion, which is that 88 percent of the servants brought into the country are Indonesian by nationality.

According to the above tables, 45,938 clients visited the office in the period 27 September 1984-30 March 1985; from them, 10,968 applications were accepted that had been submitted by persons who had applied to be brought in for the first time. The remainder were submitted by persons who had files with the importation office. Their applications were either in excess of the volume of labor or in place of people who had left or were not employed. It should be noted that the number of applications submitted for the first time were no fewer than those submitted for the second time, proving that the propensity to apply for foreign labor is still continuing in a noteworthy manner.

During this period, the office issued 46,591 visas, broken down among the four groups -- organizations, farmers, servants and families. The organizations' share was 22,071 visas, that of farmers 10,009, servants 6,155 and families 7,998. This proves that most of the workforce was more numerous in the months of October-November and November-December than in the other months.

The Egyptian nationality occupied first place in the order of nationalities applied for, since 16,055 Egyptians were brought in, followed by the Pakistani nationality (8,056), then the Indonesian nationality (6,281) and the Indian nationality (4,042). Receptivity to the Pakistani nationality on the

part of organizations and companies was greater than the others. For this purpose, 5,228 people bearing visas of Pakistani nationality were brought in followed by those of Egyptian nationality (4,976), then Indian and Bangladeshi nationality, then Turkish. This indicates that craft employers are looking for manpower with low wages.

Farmers' applications focused on the Egyptian nationality, since 6,597 Egyptians were brought in for this purpose. Although the Pakistani nationality appeared in second place, the indication here is that farmers found attributes in people of Egyptian nationality which compelled them to bring them in, such as language, expertise and low wages.

The Indonesian nationality occupied first place in the list of the nationalities requested for household servants and drivers; 5,198 of this nationality were brought in for people's families. This number accounts for 88 percent of the total nationalities requested for this purpose. The Egyptian workers present in the kingdom are considered among the nationalities which bring their families in the most; in the first half of this year, 3,819 individuals were brought in.

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CSO: 4404/100

SYRIA

PAPER VIEWS DETERIORATING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 26 Sep 85 p 3

[Article: "The Economic Situation in Syria: New Budget and False Slogans: Part Two"]

[Text] Revolution Is a Radical, Comprehensive Process of Change and Development

The revolution the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party led in Iraq was not just a formalistic political and economic change; rather, it was and will remain a radical, comprehensive process of change, development and construction for the sake of forming a new man and a new society genuinely connected to their profound innovative heritage and participating genuinely and creatively in a great brilliant present and future for Iraq and the Arab nation.

Central Report of the Ninth Regional Conference, June 1982.

We were not surprised when the ruler Hafiz Asad issued the general budget law for 1985 7 months after the stipulated deadline had elapsed and this law passed rapidly through what is called the People's Assembly although none of the Syrian people knew of it or the articles, details and figures in it and although the well known traditions in Syria before it came under the rule of the symbols of terrorism were that lengthy, important discussions and debates would take place within the legislative and executive authorities dealing with the general budgets and details of their sections and figures, since the general budget reflects the political regime's view and general platform and affects every citizen without exception and his duties toward and rights from the government.

The Balance of Payments Deficit: A Chronic Phenomenon

One of the distinctive black marks of the Syrian economy in recent years has been the chronic deficit in the balance of payments, especially since 1973. The trade deficit leapt from 3,554,000,000 pounds in 1976 to 12,048,000,000 pounds in 1981 and indications are that this deficit rose last year, 1984, to a figure much greater than 1983, to a degree surpassing all estimates. The International Monetary Fund's data shows that the deficit in trade

activities for the first half of 1984 came to \$1,066,000,000. This means that the magnitude of the ultimate anticipated 1984 deficit might exceed the trade deficit for the 4 years 1976-1979 as a whole. The fact is that had it not been for the remittances of Syrians working abroad, most of whom are in Arab countries, and the aid provided by some Arab oil countries, the balance of payments deficit would have been far above this level.

The fact of the matter is that the balance of payments deficit in Syria, while monetary in appearance, in reality reflects another grave negative phenomenon, which is attributable to the productive structure. The disrupted nature of the productive structure is reflected directly in the import-export structure. This problem will continue to exist in Syria -- indeed, it will be exacerbated year after year because of the continued great difference between imports and exports and the great disruption in the balance of trade.

It is worth referring here to a group of basic comments on the phenomenon of the balance of payments deficit in the context of Asad's regime and the path along which it is proceeding:

First, the balance of payments deficit is firmly linked to the phenomenon of inflation prevalent in the Syrian region. It is well known that inflation results in a slowdown in exports because of their high prices.

Second, the continuous balance of payments deficit leads to an increase and proliferation of foreign debts owed by the Syrian economy, which exerts negative effects on the present and future. The civilian debt that existed at the end of 1983 came to about \$4.5 billion and sources in the Bank of International Settlements, in addition to comments the ECONOMIST magazine made toward the end of the sixth month of 1984, quoting from sources in the Syrian Central Bank, have asserted that this accumulated debt does not include Eastern bloc debts, which the magazine estimated at billions of dollars.

By all standards, the foreign debt level was still very high in comparison with a number of countries in the developing world and accounts for burdens that exert pressure on domestic revenues. Debt instalment payments and interest on medium- and long-term loans came to more than \$750 million in 1982 and it has been pointed out that these payments rose to more than that figure in 1983.

Thus we can clearly see the natural result of the destructive policies of Hafiz Asad's regime, which are to mortgage domestic revenues and domestic resources to pay debts in the future, although we do not know how far these debts have helped create and increase future productive capacity.

What policies and solutions, then, are the Asad regime and the new budget law offering to remedy this situation? A reading of the statement and the sections which appeared in it prompts us to confirm that this law does not specify dangers and clear policies in this regard and does not dispel doubts about the regime's responsibility for increasing the burdens of debts on the Syrian economy and their risks to the country.

Third, while the people setting out economic policy in Asad's regime have in theory tried to reduce the gravity of the balance of payments deficit by

asking for increased revenues from the oil resources that have been discovered and from the remittances of Syrians abroad, the situation requires that one pause for reflection.

This is because these two variables are marked by uncertainty. The rates of migration to the Arab countries are expected to fall in the next few years, as are the [migrants'] remittances, which are subject to factors the planning instruments in Hafiz Asad's regime cannot control. The same is the case with respect to oil exports. Oil exports are expected to rise in coming years, if estimates related to the discovery of new fields in Dayr al-Zawr Governorate are correct, but local consumption will increase and swallow up any increase in production. Let us not forget, either, that the country's oil exports come to 140,000 barrels a day at the present time and therefore the economic policymakers in Asad's regime will find themselves faced with a drop in oil revenues in the next few years. Consequently, in the context of this embarrassing situation, Syria will face the threat of returning to a more serious balance of payments crisis than was the case in recent years, since production is increasing at rates much slower than the growth rates of consumption, and its effects are reflected on the increase in imports year after year: hence the aggravation in the balance of payments deficit and its attainment of a level whose seriousness will not be restricted by any policy which does not amount to more than patchwork.

The System of Social Priorities and the Inverted Pyramid

In the past years of life of Hafiz Asad's regime, economic policymakers have tried to follow fragmented policies with the goal of absorbing the people's aggravated vindictiveness facing the regime and have tried to ward off the negative effects of the balance of payments deficit and their repercussions on the regime. The fact is that this policy has had a reverse effect on the Syrian balance of payments itself, and not the opposite.

This led to an increase in imports from about 7 billion pounds to close to 20 billion between 1979 and 1983. Indeed, the decline in the value of foreign currency has resulted in boosting the course of local inflation by raising the costs of imported production accessories.

The law on the general budget as well as the statement by the Council of Ministers in Asad's regime have referred to an improvement in the status of the Syrian pound this year, 1985. In this regard, we would like to discuss this claim and refer to a fact which is no secret to anyone following and reading about the economic and financial situation in Syria, which is that if it has existed, this improvement in the status of the Syrian pound reflects the increase in the amounts of loans the regime has obtained abroad and the regime's apparatus has stopped defraying the stipulated subsidies on supply and necessary commodities. However, this improvement in the status of the Syrian pound does not reflect the true productivity of the Syrian economy, to say nothing of the negative, destructive effects of the borrowing policy Asad's regime is pursuing on the future of the country.

The Kasim cabinet's statement and the budget law discuss the system of social priorities on whose basis revenues are apportioned to various uses and the structure of production is thereby determined.

As a result of the system of social priorities prevailing in the Syrian region, as part of the policy of Hafiz Asad's regime, priority in the allocation of resources is given to the production of colored television sets, for example, while the sewers are running over in the streets of the cities, causing many diseases. It gives priority to the building and construction of palaces for the regime and its ruling symbols and the construction of a special palace for the ruler Hafiz Asad on top of Mount Qasyun at a cost of more than US \$1.5 billion, at a time when 65 percent of the inhabitants of the Syrian rural areas suffer from diseases and epidemics and the Syrian people suffer from their inability to satisfy basic food, public health, education, housing requirements and obtain job opportunities.

Most Syrian families also suffer from malnutrition. An International Labor Organization study lays emphasis on poverty in Syria; this study and various other data show that these families suffer from a 25 percent deficiency in the requisite calories per capita per day. In addition, the ratio of animal protein to total calories accounts for just 6.3 percent of total calories generated, 20 percent of children suffer from obvious malnutrition and more than 25 percent of the children in rural areas in the Syrian region suffer from an obvious nutritional deficiency.

The study shows the great failure to meet basic needs as well as the intense connection between the low average income of the Syrian family and the failure to meet the basic needs of Syrian citizens, showing that the number of families getting an annual income of less than \$250 accounts for 30 percent of total families, and the number of dwellings supplied by fresh potable water totals just 45 percent of the number of dwellings; consequently, 55 percent of the dwellings throughout the Syrian region do not receive fresh potable water.

Another study which was published in the last issue of the magazine DIRASAT 'ARABIYAH issued in Beirut (July 1985), dealing with agricultural conditions in Syria, points out that the food deficit in the country is growing more profound while the population is increasing at a great rate, with a constant increase in demand for agricultural products.

The study says that the deterioration in the economic condition of village families throughout Syria and the decline in agricultural output have been tied to the deterioration in the Syrian economy in the past 10 years in particular.

From statistics on the distribution of electric power in Syria published in the official magazine TISHRIN on 7 September 1983, one learns that the relationship between the number of low income families in Syria and the percentage of families which are not supplied by electricity is proportional in a negative sense.

The statistics show that the ratio of houses which are not supplied by electricity throughout Syria as a whole comes to about 46 percent of the number of dwellings, and the same is the case regarding education in general and girls' education in particular.

This simple observation of actual living conditions and the economy in the Syrian region is a refutation of all the slanders and gross errors which

have appears in the financial statement of 'Abd-al-Ra'uf Kasim's cabinet and the budget law for this year -- scandals and gross errors which reflect the destructive policy of Hafiz Asad's regime in the local and Arab contexts.

The Regime Talks about the Housing Shortage

The ruling circles in Asad's regime talk about the ramifications of the housing shortage and its harmful effects without, however, defining its causes and the possibilities for remedying it. These circles include the Council of Ministers, chaired by the millionaire 'Abd-al-Ra'uf Kasim, who in his financial statement and his draft budget referred to the housing shortage without referring to ways for coping with it.

In order to cast a scientific glance at the condition of housing and the housing shortage in Syria, one can pose the problem as follows:

The magnitude of the deficit of housing units at the present time comes to more than a quarter of a million, while the number of housing units needed to cope with the population increase in the next 5 years will be 300,000 units, along with 100,000 units to compensate for housing which will become obsolete and be eliminated.

It is clear that Hafiz Asad's authorities have been totally inadequate in offering any real solutions to this problem, aside from exceptions which have not alleviated the severity of the tragedy. The solemn cabinet statement regarding this problem contained ambiguous, brief references, pointing out that the government was prepared to build 100,000 housing units in the next 5 years, while not specifying the type of such units out of fear that the truth about it would come out and to avoid entering directly into details which might provoke controversy in circles of the Syrian people which have raised more than one question regarding previous housing projects, foremost among them the housing demolition project, whose construction the regime has long been singing about -- bearing in mind that work has not been completed on it yet and more than 4 years have elapsed since the date of final delivery to the citizens owning the dwellings, with more than 30,000 pounds being added to the cost of single apartments in this project.

The person in charge of economic matters in Hafiz Asad's party, who for 7 years held the position of the regime's deputy prime minister for economic affairs, stated that the government's capacity did not exceed 10,000 housing units per year. This person, who heads the group of people supervising the economic liberalization program, added that the housing shortage would not be solved in the decade of the eighties and said that it was necessary to rely on the private sector.

Thus this official rejected the allegation made by the statement of al-Kasim's cabinet and the new budget law concerning the regime's intention to build 100,000 housing units and proved that previous cabinets and the present one were not truthful when they promised to solve the housing problem. Moreover, he did not state how reliance would be placed on the private sector and what private sector he meant.

The private sector the Asadite official meant and referred to undoubtedly is the parasitic private sector which has been involved in all the grave

offenses and destructive acts that have taken place in the various sectors of the economy, among them the housing and construction sector.

Is there any blunter statement than that proving the bankruptcy of Asad's regime with respect to its economic program and the bankruptcy of successive governments in dealing with the housing shortage, which began openly in 1973? The Syrian people know that the housing problem before Hafiz Asad surged to power was controlled and limited during the period of the sixties, since ordinary citizens with limited incomes were able to find reasonable housing at reasonable rents in keeping with their income.

However, successive cabinets since what has been called the liberalization policy have not grown tired or exhausted in repeating on every occasion that the parasitic private sector and the regime's contractors who run this sector's activities in the housing and construction field can alone solve the housing shortage. This sector has been given full opportunities and total support in the past 10 years without helping to break the severity of the crisis; rather, it has made it worse and worse.

The regime's aides and mercenaries and the persons benefiting from its policies have no housing problem; they are the big merchants, parasitic classes, employees of Hafiz Asad's agencies, middlemen, smugglers and black market merchants. These people can obtain residential apartments at any time and price.

Government and public sector employees and people with limited incomes cannot do so.

We believe that the housing shortage is an integral part of the crisis of Hafiz Asad's regime, because the ruling groups and the beneficiaries and forces for corruption around them have grown rich, prospered and realized fantastic profits from the existence and continuation of this crisis. The time will come, and it is not far off, when the entire Syrian economy will be subjected to a violent convulsion due to the housing policy, which is considered the backbone of the economic activity concentrated around construction, repair, buildings and activities peripheral to them.

A Plan with No Planning

If it is a matter of writing an annual plan or a 5-year plan, that is easy. However, planning in the Hafiz Asad regime resembles other activities; as prime proof of the lack of planning and the failure of economic policy, the annual plan is more than 6 months behind the schedule officially set for it.

Many government figures have forgotten or pretended to forget that the plan is a law binding on all bodies and agencies operating in the area of economic activity.

The question is, who has the right to issue the law in Asad's regime? Who has the right to abrogate it and amend it, especially when we realize that the factor of binding oneself to the execution of the plan while providing the facilities for it is linked to the element of time?

Therefore, the question arises once again: who in Hafiz Asad's regime has the right to stipulate that the plan year is 6 months, not 12?

How can the plan and its binding law be reconciled with the aberrant whimsy of the regime, which approves amendments, replacements and postponements without relying on any basis of logic? Moreover, we have the right to wonder, thirdly, about the cost of these amendments, replacements and postponements and the effect they have on economic activity, the instrument of work and administrative activity, not to speak about the logic of that in executing and carrying out the plan. In reality, the question is not one of form; rather, it is related to the essence of the planning process, which is its continuation and the importance of plan followup and evaluation. We can imagine the atmosphere in which the plan is evaluated in the institutions of Asad's regime, as it is prepared by personnel who lack intellectual and moral breadth and do not have decisionmaking power which goes beyond the graph the head of the regime draws up, which expresses the interests of the ruling parasitic Asadite class oblivious of the interests of the broader masses and the broad sectors of the Syrian people.

The current annual plan for 1985, like other plans the regime's institutions have adopted, does not provide us with data on the followup of the previous annual plan or its achievements, problems, the policies it has followed and their effects.

When the current plan, for example, specifies an increase in planned growth rates, it does not offer us an obvious explanation of the slowdown in growth of the past period, which was not low if it was actually realized, the way the Asadist propaganda media talk about it.

The planners have not discussed the motive forces and sources of the ludicrous exaggerated upsurge in the growth of coming years with us either. All we know following this is that Hafiz Asad's regime continues to rely to a large extent on aid and loans it gets from abroad, from which the regime intends and hopes to cover a large part of government budget revenues and contribute to the attainment of some economic growth. Who, however, can guarantee the continued flow of foreign aid and loans at a time in which Hafiz Asad's regime is suffering from accumulated debts which it is not able to pay off?

The prime minister of the regime tried to present two strategies, not one, this year; these he called the general strategy and the reform strategy. In the general or comprehensive strategy, as 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kasim calls it, we find only a group of slogans which call for overcoming problems and supporting the foundations for takeoff. What is stranger is that some of these false slogans, such as the emphasis on building a productive force, are not reflected in the regime's policies, as far as application is concerned, but basically contradict the course of the plan itself as the prime minister of the regime presented it, in terms of the distribution of investments among the governorates of the Syrian region in a fairer manner or in terms of the anticipated growth rates sketched out in the imagination of Asad's prime minister and his assistants.

As regards the strategy of reform, which calls for another list of slogans, this confuses ends and means, the realization of new investments and reduction of the increasing burdens on the Syrian citizens as a goal and objective, and it poses a contradiction between the hope of mobilizing local resources and guiding private and public consumption and the actual policies Hafiz Asad's regime is pursuing, which lead to the loss and squandering of national resources and revenues and increased borrowing and foreign indebtedness, which have come to billions of dollars.

The obvious fact before us and the Syrian people is that Hafiz Asad's authorities have totally given up planning the domestic economy for the sake of confronting its problems in a scientific manner, and have settled for a group of propaganda measures, haphazard endeavors, fine-sounding labels and fraudulent slogans. Even what they have called the annual plan or the 5-year plan is no more than a mass of numbers lacking precision, orderliness, realism and veracity and deficient in the strategy and policies which would guarantee that it is realized. In this regard we can only say that it would be better for a corrupt regime which has this as its platform to declare frankly its abandonment of the program of planning, which is not within its power and for which it does not have the capability, or even the intent. Planning is innocent of the crises and catastrophes its bad economic policy is accumulating, which manifest themselves on all levels!

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CSO: 4404/125

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

DEVELOPMENT OF CHLORINE MARKET, PRODUCERS IN REGION

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 3 Nov 85 Special Supplement p 56

[Text] The chlorine plant located in the area of Ummal-Nar in Abu Dhabi is considered to be an important and complementary plant for the petroleum industry in the country. This plant supplies the country's entire needs for liquid chlorine, hydrochloric acid, liquid sodium hydroxide, solid sodium hydroxide, common salt, and crystalline industrial salt which meet international standards.

The importance of this factory in the area of petroleum is explained by its essential role of providing chemicals for the cleaning and maintaining of oil wells on land and at sea.

Mr Kilan al-'Azzawi, director of the chlorine plant, said that this factory was constructed based on the instructions of His Highness Zyid bin Sultan al-Nuhayyan, the president, and it was constructed in accordance with the industrial development and progress in the Emirates. The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, ADNOC, under the direction of the chairman of its board of directors, Shaykh Tahnun Bin Muhammad, founded the national chlorine industry in 1978 in the area of Ummal-Nar with completely national capital. The objective was to provide chlorine and its derivatives as well as to be an industrial complex producing special chemical materials used in desalination plants, electricity generating plants, and in the maintenance of oil fields. Its construction cost \$82 million and it began production in 1981. Currently there are 198 workers, technicians, and employees working there.

Mr Kilan al-'Azzawi confirms that the plant has become a significant center as a producer and source of materials due to its high quality and its flexible marketing policy. Lately, the chlorine industry exported 3,500 tons of sodium hydroxide and 1,500 tons of liquid chlorine to Iran, and the deal was completed with the cooperation of Swiss and Kuwaiti companies. The plant is still exporting its production to Jordan and Iraq, such that foreign exports are about 10,000 tons annually of the different materials.

Mr Husayn Nur, director of sales, discussed market conditions for chlorine, stating that the competition between chlorine and chlorine derivative producing companies in the area has lead to the lowering of prices both nationally and internationally. This is especially the case after the start-up of the

chemical factories in the Jubayal area in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the petrochemical complex in Libya. These two factories can put 1/2 million tons into the market, and they have lowered their prices to enter the market, and consequently competition has stiffened in the petrochemical marketplace.

Mr Husayn Nur indicated that the marketing department for chlorine products in Ummal-Nar is comprised of three persons who negotiate and initiate contracts under the supervision of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, ADNOC. The chlorine plant's annual sales amount to \$12 million.

With regard to most notable problems facing the plant, Mr Kilan al-'Azzawi, the plant director, confirmed that they are limited to competition and the lack of protection, indicating that protection could be provided if the petroleum companies and the electric stations would purchase their chlorine and its derivatives directly from the factory without resorting to public bids.

Mr al-'Azzawi added that the chlorine plant must be afforded such protection, because it is one of the good factories in the region due to its use of sea water as a basic material in the production of many chemicals to be used in the oil fields which are, in turn, dependent upon acid, salt, sodium hydroxide, and other materials for well cleaning and for increasing the porosity of rock in order to increase the productivity of the fields and to facilitate the extraction of petroleum from deep underground.

Concerning possible cooperation in the Gulf area in these industries, Mr al-Azzawi said an agreement was recently completed between the Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia "through the Kuwait Petrochemical Company, the Basic Chemical Industries in Dammam, and the chlorine industries in Ummal-Nar" about the formation of a joint organization to coordinate the sales of chlorine and its derivatives for these factories as well as to participate in bids. "In reality we met in Abu Dhabi and Kuwait entered into international public invitations to bid. This organization for the coordination of the chlorine industry is considered to be similar to the special coordinating organization for Gulf chemical fertilizers. The joint chlorine organization seeks to work as one producer, eliminating destructive competition and coordinating pricing and production matters.

Concerning the chlorine plant's marketing windows and annual production, Mr Husayn Nur, director of sales, mentioned that the local market consumes the greatest percentage of the factory's production, some 75 percent of annual production. The rest is exported to Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Iraq, and Iran. In 1982 chlorine production and its derivatives amounted to 32,000 tons, in 1983, 36,000 tons, and in 1984 it increased to 44,757 tons. "We expect that this year production will reach 46,800 tons."

12929/12390
CSO: 4404/84

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

ARAB INVESTMENTS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES GROW

Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 20 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] Experts at the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development have indicated that they expect an increase in fixed investments by Arab countries in manufacturing industries during the first half of the eighties to more than \$120 billion or approximately double the figures recorded during the last half of the seventies.

In a recently published report, the fund indicated that Arab countries spent about 18 percent of all investment funds on investment objectives in manufacturing industries during the last half of the seventies, before it increased to about 21.2 percent in the latter half of the seventies.

The experts at the fund indicated that this percentage reached its highest levels in Arab countries with moderate income during the first 5 years of the seventies, reaching a level of 24.4 percent, followed by non-Cooperation Council member oil states, then by countries with low incomes, and finally by the Arab Gulf states.

This situation changed unexpectedly during the second half of the seventies when this percentage trebled in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in light of increased interest in investments in manufacturing sectors and the no longer exclusive interest in the mining industries.

In addition, the percentage of investments earmarked for manufacturing industries within the total value of investments in the Arab oil producing states increased during the second half of the seventies to 30.2 percent from its level during the previous 5-year period of 18.2 percent. However, it decreased slightly in Arab countries with moderate income even though it maintained a relatively high level of 22.8 percent, while it remained low in the countries with low incomes.

The report indicated that the oil states took control gradually of the greatest share of Arab investments in the manufacturing industry sector, reaching a level of 67.8 percent during the second half of the last decade compared to 43 percent in the first half of that decade.

On the other hand, the share of the Arab countries with moderate income in the total of Arab investments in the manufacturing industry sector decreased

from 54 percent in the first half of the seventies to 21.9 percent during the second half.

As for the countries with low incomes, their share in total Arab manufacturing industry investments dropped from 11.1 percent to 9.9 percent from the first half to the second half of last decade.

Despite the increasing interest the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development indicated that the yield returned to the Arab countries from the manufacturing industry sector has not yet been proportionate to the huge sums spent in this area because of a number of hindrances, among the most important of which are the increase in the cost of construction, increase in the cost of operation and production, inflexibility of supply, and difficulty of adjusting supply to demand, not to mention dependence upon imported equipment, technology, and intermediary goods.

The experts believe, despite all these obstacles, that these difficulties are attributable to the nature of growing industries, and it is expected that Arab industries will gradually be able to lower their cost of production, increase their flexibility, and strengthen their adaptability to regional and international developments.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

SECURITY CHIEF REVIEWS LATEST IMPROVEMENTS IN FORCE

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 18 Oct 85 p 7

/Interview with State Security Minister Ahmad Musa'id Husayn by 'Umar Ba Wazir: "The Security Agencies Have Witnessed Great Development Following the Exceptional General Conference"

/Text The security agencies witnessed a great development in the period that elapsed between the holding of the Yemeni Socialist Party's second exceptional conference to the holding of the third general conference, and this has been reflected on the on-going state of security in the country. In addition, security competence has been increased and it has exposed many conspirational spy networks which have been implanted by foreign bodies with the goal of harming our experiment and our progressive national regime.

In their activity, our security agencies have proceeded on the basis of democratic legitimacy, which is the foundation of our regime. In our practical followup, we met with Comrade Ahmad Musa'id Husayn, member of the political bureau and minister of state security, in order to shed light on the developments which have taken place in the security agencies and the pursuit of their activity.

Security Stability

/Question Is it possible to talk about aspects of security and the stability of security conditions in the country since the exceptional conference? What is the extent of the developments which have been made in your ministry up to now?

/Answer Aspects of security in the country hold special importance under all circumstances, since the development of the forces of the revolution and their ability to create changes which are continuing in all aspects of life of necessity stir up the rancor of the revolution's class enemies inside and outside the country. Consequently, these vindictive forces hasten to draw up schemes and mobilize people with weak spirits for sabotage activity and also to spread rumors which have the goal of shaking the forces of the revolution.

Direct and indirect sabotage activity is all escalating in the context of the revolution's decisive turns, with the purpose of:

First of all, preventing the revolutionary class forces from pursuing their course; second of all, distorting the foundations of principle which bring together and unite the genuine revolutionary forces; thirdly, spreading chaos and disturbances among the masses of the people; and fourthly, weakening the relationship between the party and the revolutionary authorities on the one hand and the toiling masses on the other.

To this end, security's task is to seek to deprive the forces of the enemy of a chance to work to realize their tasks and goals. For this purpose, the security agencies are working to expose, unearth and monitor the activity of forces hostile to the revolution, strike out at their schemes and break them up without mercy.

Security conditions in the country since the second exceptional conference have received great attention from our Yemeni Socialist Party and the government of the revolution. In this area, a number of security measures have been realized which have laid the foundation stone on the road to pursuing a firm security policy and consequently devising advanced new methods which will guarantee the decisive elimination and repression of all hostile activities.

As we pointed out above, the hostile forces are active and always become vicious in the face of the escalating revolutionary tide. Since the second exceptional conference, these "hostile forces" have tried to work to halt the progress of the revolution and incite their hired agents to sabotage activities hostile to the citizens' security and stability. In this regard, the evil sabotage network was monitored and caught; the security agencies have also managed to pursue and arrest the most recent espionage network. The facts have demonstrated the degree of depravity individuals reach when they become isolated from their society and the vital interests of their society and think only of resolving personal issues at the expense of all society's interests.

We in the Ministry of State Security, on this occasion, give great thanks and appreciation to the toiling masses of the people, the depth of whose link with the triumphant course of the revolution has been proved and who have offered much sweat and blood to protect and maintain this progressive, victorious regime. We might also draw the attention of some individuals who dream of bringing back their discredited old interests as well as the few people who rush like dogs after bones from the tables of the reactionary and imperialist forces in order to serve them in opposition to their own nation, people and relatives and tell them that the eyes of the revolution do not sleep and will have no mercy at all on people who try to manipulate the security of the nation and the security of the citizens and that retribution will be just and severe in its justice.

It is certain that our ministry, during the recent period, has managed to realize high development in the level of its performance and also in its forms of work and methods of activity. What is more certain and established is that our ministry will develop in a profound, strong way in the coming period, because we in the ministry are pursuing advanced new traditions as we can pick up everything in our work experience, large and small, and evaluate our activity in a constant, stable manner as well as being able to draw lessons and devise new methods which will guarantee us incisive action for the sake of serving our party, our masses and our government.

As has been noted, there is great stability in the security situation, which will be the basic task facing our ministry in the coming stage along the road toward raising consciousness among the masses and improving the performance of people working in the ministry with the end of turning the slogan "the security of the state and the masses are the alert eyes for protecting the revolution and the regime" into reality.

Democratic Legitimacy Is the Basis of Our Action

/Question/ How is the slogan "democratic legitimacy" applied regarding the issues your ministry deals with?

/Answer/ Democratic legitimacy means the pursuit of activity and action in accordance with the laws, statutes and bills regulating life in general. One of the Ministry of State Security's basic tasks is to preserve these laws and be attentive that all activity and practices are in accordance with this legitimacy.

Deviation from this legitimacy will pave the way for a group of practices and harmful violations which negatively reflected on the general approaches toward construction in all its various aspects. Therefore, a law has been issued for our ministry regulating its activity, specifying its tasks and consequently organizing its overall practices and activities on its basis.

The Ministry of State Security, first of all, must confine itself and adhere to democratic legitimacy and all its work must be regulated in accordance with this legitimacy. The ministry of course commits itself to this and does not leave any scope for the most minor violations in this regard. Secondly, the ministry monitors and oversees all practices which harm democratic legitimacy. Since the ministry is the vigilant eye that oversees and monitors everything that harms and damages the revolution, it, that is, the ministry, works to rectify all violations in this regard and also monitors the bodies concerned with putting a limit to them and consequently performing their duty as the bills regulating their activity stipulate.

The important issue regarding the matter of democratic legitimacy, before which I would like to pause briefly because of its importance, is, how does the ministry apply this important principle? What are the conclusions of this sort of application in the context of the various issues presented to the ministry?

In this regard, the Ministry of State Security, as I said previously, has statutes and bills which define its operating method and constitute its practices relative to security issues. It is completely true that all bills and statutes, no matter how beautiful and excellent they might be, will be of no value or benefit, unless their application occurs in the course of life. Precise, firm bills demonstrate their validity, and their output is determined as well only through their transformation into living reality, into actual tangible fact.

Since the constitution is the basis of the laws, citizens enjoy all their legal rights. The government has established legal institutions which pay attention to the rights of the state and the rights of citizens also, though not at the expense of one party for the benefit of the other.

We consider indiscriminate imprisonment to be a crime which strikes at the heart of democratic legitimacy and the citizen's constitutional rights, and we totally reject this sort of action.

Our ministry fully realizes that all rapid, imprecise procedures have results which are not positive, not to speak of the constitutional violations arising from them. By the way, we have set out new bases for the forms of interrogation, so that all detainees will be dealt with in a human providing them with all rights as a human and strictly prohibiting any illegal acts vis-a-vis any detainee.

I can stress, on the other hand, that since it is the guardian of the security of the state, our ministry will have no mercy on any transgressor, by which I mean the condemned person will be submitted to a just trial. If, his crime is established, we will ask the court, through the representative of the public prosecutor's office, to adopt the most severe penalty stipulated in the penal code.

Traitors against the nation can never be dealt with leniently or permissively, no matter what the justifications. State security is a strong, firm arm; when it directs its blows at criminals, they are lethal. No one committing a crime against his country can ever be dealt with tolerantly. If we deal tolerantly with him, the masses will not deal tolerantly with us and will not exempt us from punishment.

On this basis, our ministry totally looks after all the constitutional rights of detainees in terms of their rights during investigation to bring in lawyers to defend them during the investigation and trial, and to be persuaded to confess their crimes not by backward, primitive, brutal practices which we absolutely reject and condemn but by tangible, categorical proof and evidence through which the accused persons will find no recourse but to confess.

By means of this proper, moral, technique, we seek also to preserve the constitutional rights of all detainees, and thus work to exercise our rights in accordance with democratic legitimacy.

/Question/ The country has witnessed extensive preparations to host the third general party conference. Is it possible to talk about the importance of the preparations and the hopes the masses of our people are putting on the results the conference will produce?

/Answer/ The extensive, profound preparations that were made a short time before the convening of the third general conference acquire great importance. We have witnessed many positive, lofty contributions with our own eyes which the organizations of the party and the toiling masses have made in order to make the preparations for the third general conference a success. We can say that the great importance which has been assigned to the preparations lies precisely in the profound unity between the party and the masses, a principle which we have held to and still are holding to in spite of all the difficulties and objective obstacles which have been produced by the process of development itself.

It is possible to say that the preparations have mobilized the party members on the basis of the common goals the working paper presented by Comrade 'Ali Nasir Mohammad, the secretary general of the central committee and president of the presidential council of the Higher People's Council, has spelled out, and they have borne fruit in organizing the movement of all the members of the party, the unity of their movement as a whole and the unity of their will on a single intellectual, political and organizational basis.

Democratic dialogues, elevated intellectual controversy and differences in views over given issues were among the prominent features of the preparation process and acquired great importance in terms of the objective need which made it mandatory.

From this angle, our Yemeni Socialist Party has accumulated a large number of areas of expertise and experiences, has derived many lessons and has also deduced proper methods for its subsequent development process.

Since our great party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, has managed to realize these achievements in the context of the preparation process and has managed to be strong and firm, it also of necessity will realize other positive achievements through the results its third general conference has achieved.

It is certain that the fighting masses of our people participating today in construction and the defense of the revolution aspire to these results with great hope and optimism.

Of course the results of the conference have not abandoned these legitimate aspirations; indeed, they have realized a group of new achievements for the masses of our people which will be carried in its resolutions and recommendations.

The conference paused to consider the approaches of the new fifth plan, a plan which will be carried out by the arms of the toiling masses and will of necessity end up raising the citizens' standard of living and realizing a number of the masses' material and spiritual needs.

The political report which Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the secretary general of our party, presented to the conference contained a scientific analysis of the experience between the second exceptional conference and the holding of the third general conference on all levels. At the same time, it contained some indications of the subsequent development process, which, among other things, means an improvement in people's lives; a rise in the level of response to their material and spiritual requirements and at the same time the imposition of new missions on the shoulder of the masses of our people in the course of their subsequent struggle in various affairs of life.

The conference has realized the hope and aspirations of our masses by deepening the slogan of the unity of the party and the people on behalf of defending the Yemeni revolution, executing the 5-year plan and realizing Yemeni unity.

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CSO: 4404/104

AFGHANISTAN

ASPECTS OF SOVIET CONFLICT DETAILED

Effects of Guerrilla Warfare

Brussels LE SOIR in French 14 Nov 85 p 8

[Text] I myself am 36 years old; 1st Lt Kazbek Houdalov was 27; more than once the image of a reversal of roles crossed my mind and I better understood the internal conflict that he was experiencing in face of a situation beyond their control. Victor Loupan became thoughtful: impressed by the accounts of former American pilots held in Vietnam, in which the confusion and incomprehension emerged in every phrase, this journalist, who had himself spent his entire adolescence in the Soviet Union before emigrating to the West, wanted to know what a similar war was like from the other side of the ideological frontier, and, above all, what was the fate of the Soviet soldiers captured by the enemy. He left for Afghanistan in July, and today provides a reportage that is poignant, even incredible by the very force of its accounts, which he has titled "The Damned of the USSR.

All strategists agree: conflicts pitting the huge machine of a regular army against an evasive guerrilla force have the most cruel effects on the civil population. "Villages leveled, summary executions, children shot in the back: the press regularly condemns the depredations of the soldiers sent by Moscow. My objective was thus to understand how a 'dirty war' could transform into monsters young men who could have been my classmates." The result? An "Apocalypse Now," Soviet version, in which, behind the myth of the invincible Red Army, there emerges the image of an expeditionary corps that is prey to doubt, left on its own, and without any motivation.

"I, a citizen of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, now entering the ranks of the armed forces, do take the oath and solemnly swear to be honest, courageous, and vigilant; to always preserve the military secrets and the secrets of state (...) and to be faithful unto my last breath to my people, my country, and the Soviet Government(...)." Impeccably lined up on Red Square, facing Lenin's tomb, the new recruits spout the interminable liturgy that requires of them total allegiance to their hierarchical superiors. Do Nicolas, Igor and Kazbek still remember this ceremony?

Sent to the front for 2 years, and having fallen into the hands of the resistance, they now languish, well guarded, at the Pakistani border. Victor Loupan said: "We believe there are some 50 in their situation, spread over the whole territory. It is true that it is only since 1983 that the Mujahidin, concerned about their humanitarian image, no longer systematically kill the enemies they capture. On condition, of course, that at least by appearance they join the Muslim religion."

Deserters? Prisoners of war? Difficult to decide with certainty, and ultimately it matters little, since the Soviet high command regards them, on two counts, as "traitors": the official point of view refuses to admit a state of war in Afghanistan, and at any rate the military code leaves only one alternative to a surrounded soldier--win or die. Thus, whether they are kept in captivity or repatriated to the USSR, their life horizon is limited to a long series of detention camps... or the execution squad.

Farmer, Dodger, and Officer

A colleague by language and origins, Loupan was able to gain the confidence of these destitute people without a future. Nicolas, who came from a modest rural environment, represents the broken families that the regime does not like to show as an example. Having little education, he expresses himself with difficulty: "My father, an alcoholic, abandoned us. My mother works as a laborer in a factory: throughout the day, for a wage of about 150 rubles a month, she loads bricks on trucks." His buddy, Igor, from the industrial city of Kharkov, is from a more cultivated class. Son of a pilot, he dodged for 2 years to escape military service, condemning in the process the corruption of Soviet society: "I knew a buddy who went with the daughter of the colonel in charge of recruiting, and shared the pleasures of drugs with her. For only 1,000 rubles, instead of the usual 3,000, I was going to get out of it. My grandfather had the money, and my father agreed, but my mother was opposed for the reason that I should learn to become a man. When she learned that I had been assigned to Afghanistan she howled, but it was too late..."

Finally, Kazbek Houdalov, the first Soviet officer to be contacted by Westerners, symbolizes the "military intellectual." With a grade equivalent to captain at less than 30 years old, he appeared chosen by his superiors for a brilliant future and he retains a warm memory of them: "As a whole the Soviet army is really a good army." Yet he condemns the absurdity of the conflict in progress: "What is happening in Afghanistan is pillage pure and simple, it is genocide; they are destroying a people, a population, and the Soviets present it differently..."

Indoctrination

The only common factor among these three men: all underwent before their departure a strong psychological indoctrination campaign. Kazbek Houdalov: "You are familiar with the idea of international duty? Officially, that is why we were sent: to help our brother workers, the peasants, the poor, who were weak and had no arms." An ideological motive supplemented, while at it, by the world confrontation: "They told us about imperialism's bloody action to crush Afghanistan, and even cited specifically the countries associated in this aggression: the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, the United States, Iran, Pakistan and no doubt still others..." However, did the soldiers really accept this hackneyed dialectic? Kazbek, a fatalist, said: "If it was the commander who told them this, why would they not have believed it?"

Quite evidently, after they arrived they were quickly disillusioned. The "welcoming committee," first of all, was hardly attractive, brutal officers, abusing their power, showing contempt for their men and beating them on the slightest pretext. Igor explained: "It was primarily the first wave, the 'pros,' who behaved in a despicable way; these guys were assigned to clear the terrain: it was they who overturned everything in the country, they who massacred and cut the throats of all they could. With the arrival of the second contingent, fortunately, the atmosphere improved a little, and the troops were better treated by their superiors."

Baptism of Blood

The later initiation to real combat soon turned into a nightmare. Instead of the expected regular enemy forces, Soviet soldiers faced invisible fighters, past masters in harassing operations and deriving their major strength from constant mobility, coupled with total knowledge of a terrain favorable to ambushes. Thus, in order to enable their men to try their hand at minimum cost, the officers reinvented the horror: the "baptism of blood," in other words, massacre of civilians.

Igor recalled: "One day the commander sent us into a village of about a hundred people, near our camp. We were armed with Kalashnikovs with silencers and immediately we had to shoot the dogs, very large, that were attacking us. Then we advanced through the deserted alleys. My buddy decided to break down a door with gun butt blows, but hardly had he crossed the threshold when he received a sickle thrust right in the stomach. He fell, groaning with pain, and our lieutenant, furious, ordered to us to machinegun the inside of the shack through all the openings, before finishing the task by throwing an offensive grenade. In short, when we looked in the house, there were the torn remains of some 15 people, numerous children, blood everywhere, a real butchery."

As if seeking to exorcise his own memories just by expressing them, Igor was inexhaustible in describing the kind of operations in which he had been involved in various circumstances: "Another time, we captured a dozen or so youths who had two weapons for shooting birds. The officers had them bound hand and foot, put on the ground lined up on the road, not very far from the garrison, and then three tracked vehicles ran over them and completely crushed

them. Then they had us get out of the truck shouting: "Come on, get rid of all this meat for me!"

Dope and Vodka

Moreover, everything was planned in order to deaden the nervous shock of these "sights" on the new recruits, now dazed, who were participating in them for the first time: "On return to the camp, no one spoke, some were staggering, about to pass out, others vomited every 10 meters. Then, the oldtimers took charge of us: they comforted us, then plied us with dope and vodka to make us forget all that we had just seen." However, Kazbek Houdalov refuses to lay on the common soldiers the responsibility for these atrocities: "A simply human reaction, almost normal after the hostility that they encounter, the humiliations and daily privations to which they are subjected, and the constant anguish that grips them. No, the real crazies are the officers: some take sadistic pleasure in undertaking these special missions..."

Anyway, how could this expeditionary corps, which limits itself to controlling the strategic points in the territory, keep a cool head and show motivation when it is cut off from its national roots? Victor Loupan added: "The Red Army is in fact only effective when it is fighting a patriotic war; liberation of the people and defense of the Russian soil then assumes a quasi-mystical dimension that transcends the troops themselves; on the other hand, when far from their bases, the soldiers become as vulnerable as those of another, less powerful army."

Shortcomings, Sickness and Traffic

Their disarray is even greater since the military have transferred into Afghanistan the classical evils of the Soviet society: inadequate equipment--"the Kalashnikovs are primarily close combat weapons, not very effective in this kind of confrontation," Loupan explained, deficiencies in supply of food and equipment, and bureaucratic sluggishness. "More than two-thirds of the strength sent to the area is assigned to logistical support and administrative tasks," Loupan said further.

Finally, deplorable health conditions aggravate this moral decay: Nicolas had already had his fourth attack of hepatitis since his arrival, and it was in a lucky hospital bed that he made the acquaintance of Igor. Victor Loupan said: "Twenty-five to 30 percent of recruits are victims of infectious diseases during their Afghan tour."

In order to survive in this unhealthy environment, many get involved in a multitude of parallel activities, theoretically illegal. Drug use in particular spreads like wildfire: hashish cigarettes, injections of opium and heroin, "with syringes poorly sterilized." Igor himself, who had tried these substances in the USSR, admits to having regained the taste for them, "only to bear the sight of blood." The traffic in alcohol is also a flourishing business: "Even the officers engage in it," Kazbek said, "and they do not hesitate to use their authority to divert sugar deliveries to supply their clandestine distillery." This then is the picture of the reality of an army in the field, certainly far from the picture spread by the official

propaganda, but in which appears, in outline, the crisis of existence lived by each of its members: "Why am I here? In terms of what slogan should I die in an unknown land? Everyone you talk to, Houdalov asserted, ends up asking these questions, and the tragedy is that no one is able to give them a satisfactory answer..."

Moscow Adopts New Strategy

Brussels LE SOIR in French 15 Nov 85 p 8

[Text] For 10 days I lived in a house in the Cholgar valley, some 40 kilometers south of Mazar-e Sharif. The air attacks occurred at the rate of 15 a month.

In the morning of 22 August, at 8 a.m. sharp, two jets shrieked out of the sky. The people and mojahedin hurried in a throng toward the shelters hollowed out of the rock. A terror-stricken mother was still collecting her whimpering brood when the helicopters appeared.

In a puff of burning air the first bomb exploded 50 meters from the house. For more than 15 minutes a terrifying ballet took place over our heads. Six combat helicopters and fighter bombers took turns. The explosions made the ground shake. The animals howled in terror. The men hugged the ground, pitiable and impotent.

Perched on a knoll, a nest of machineguns harassed the enemy without even scratching the steel shells of the armored Mi 24's. Bombs and rockets exploded without interruption. When silence returned, ears humming, we ventured into the open, where an acrid smoke affected our throats.

A typhoon seemed to have swept the village. Fire was consuming the stacks of grain. Its life blood gone, a dog lay on the ground. Showing the defensive value of the shelters, this time there were no victims among the people. However, of the house where I had been sleeping an hour earlier there was nothing left but a pile of rubble. The Soviets had concentrated their fire on it: the rocket explosions had torn up the ground, and broken domestic implements were mixed with the rubble. Amin, a veteran after 7 years of war, said to me laughing: "They don't like you much, those Shurawis!"

In fact, the conclusion seemed evident: informed with precision about my presence, the communist forces had decided to make an example of the impudent strangers coming to deride.

Precision

Bombed regularly as it is, the Cholgar valley provides a magnificent observation point of the Soviet air operations. By comparison to the previous years, I noticed a very marked qualitative and quantitative increase in the military operations. Having been reinforced, this year the air bases of Didahdi (5 kilometers from Mazar-e-Sharif) and Airaton (on the Amu Daria, a

few kilometers east of Termez) have a complement of combat planes. Up to last year, Didahdi base was still limited to training the Afghan pilots. The new combat units are in addition to those that regularly operate from Soviet territory.

On the qualitative level, in bombings or reconnaissance flights the jet pilots show more boldness than in the past. On the other hand, the precision of their fire has become formidable, revealing more and more frequent use of electronics. In respect to projectiles, longer range rockets are being introduced: they enable the helicopters to fire at a reasonable distance from the weapons of the resistance.

More and more often, MiG 23's, faster and with higher performance, replace the old MiG 21, fighter bombers of another technical generation. As for the famous Mi 24, a helicopter that has no equal in the NATO armies, it appears in greater number and is modernizing its equipment. To face this arsenal, the resistance has 12.7 mm and sometimes 14.5 mm heavy machineguns. Too rarely, the guerrillas have a few anti-air SAM 7 missiles, made ineffective by the decoy systems used by the Soviets. Despite a significant increase in number of arms received by the guerrillas, the lack of effective antiaircraft capabilities is more and more cruelly felt.

More Mobile Army

The land army, on the other hand, is adapting somewhat better to the terrain by making itself significantly more mobile. The tanks more often carry out hammer blow operations against the mojahedin positions rather than the virtual sieges of the past. By not informing the Afghan officers until the last moment, the Soviet command is more often benefiting from surprise in the operations, thereby preventing the guerrillas' accomplices from informing their friends in time.

In the great plain of the north, relying on two east-west road axes, from Mazar-e Sharif to Chibighan, the Soviet and government troops have established new posts designed in principle to stop the infiltration of the Mujahidin, who return from their mountain sanctuaries to harass the communist forces. In fact, despite the increased logistical cost of these installations, the resistance still moves freely in the sector. One exception, the regional capital of Mazar-e Sharif: the strengthening of the militia and increased patrols by the regular army have made access to the town difficult for the mojahedin, who now refuse to take foreign journalists there. A few months ago an experienced group of some 30 men was decimated there. This same trend is also evident in Kabul, where the Soviet-Afghan forces are achieving tighter control.

Nevertheless, despite the stepping up of communist military activities, one cannot talk about an escalation as during the time of the Americans in Vietnam. The Kremlin is staying cautious and keeping its armed intervention

at a level that it considers reasonable. Time, secret war, psychological wearing down of the adversary, and external or internal propaganda continue to be the Soviets' preferred weapons.

Double Game

For example, Ismatullah Khan, a kind of local squire of Mazar-e Sharif region, passed in the eyes of the people for an opponent of the communist regime and commanded a sector in the hands of the resistance. In this sector he for years fomented armed disagreements among the various resistance groups. During the winter of 1984-1985, he took off his mask and joined the government camp. In the spring, with some other mercenaries, he was present at the grand djirga held in Kabul and thanked "the Soviet people for their fraternal aid to the Afghan people."

This story, like many others, shows both the KGB tactics and the complexity of the Afghan drama. In fact, several commanders in the Mazar-e Sharif region were perfectly aware of the double game of Ismatullah Khan. Documents captured from government administration representatives and testimony of deserters about these men proves unambiguously his active cooperation with the Khad (Afghan secret service). However, to have arrested him, or even simply denounced him, would only have increased the conflict among the resistance groups to which he in title belonged.

As understood by the clever Mas'ud in the Panjshir and some others, the security of the resistance derives from voluntary unity, other than forced, among the various guerrilla groups.

Fatigue

The seventh year of the war will certainly be indicative about the future of the "freedom fighters." The population, the fighters' essential support, is showing signs of fatigue, caused both by the Soviet military pressure and the lack of unity among the mojahedin. Some families have already lost a disturbing proportion of their young men, and, in order to survive, they might be persuaded to make up with the government in return for promises that the communists will not stay for the long term.

Thus, this summer, in Shibirghan region, the Soviet troops made a major push into the Sar-i-Pul sector in order to assure protection of the gas production sites. Though part of the population took refuge in the Hazarajat, another part joined the government. Given the lack of sufficient cooperation among the guerrillas, the inhabitants chose to save their lives and houses.

The year 1986 will tell us if the cooperation efforts among the leaders of the main movements located in Pakistan, on the one hand, and the relations among the young leaders of the resistance in the interior, led by Mas'ud, will develop in a favorable direction. Lacking this, victory by the Soviets in Afghanistan will become inevitable in the medium term.

30 January 1986

Offensive Launched

Brussels LE SOIR in French 16-17 Nov 85 p 8

[Text] "The Western doctors want to destroy Islam..." the speaker's face is hidden behind a thick black beard. His eyes have a fanatical glint. Seated on a blanket stretched out on the ground, a dozen mojahedin listen to him with respect. Despite the generosity shown in Afghanistan by a handful of Europeans, no disagreement is heard. The man, an Algerian, holds the audience with the authority of his words. Continuing his address, he asks: "Do you know whom the world belongs to?" The small group remains mute. Triumphant, the orator continues: "To the Muslims, certainly! And one day we will convert all the infidels to Islam. We will wage the holy war and will govern the world..."

Strange statements in an Afghan land that, despite the general ignorance of the population, shows itself rather accepting in regard to the foreigner.

However, having arrived this year, those referred to here as the Arabs, are exposing the Afghan people to a new form of offensive: that of the most rigid Muslim fundamentalism (integrisme). Haughty in their intolerance, strong in their knowledge of the Koran, and supported by superficial technical knowledge, they try to win the country over to their mystical ideal.

Having come for the most part from countries where the governments unhesitatingly suppress Muslim extremism, or even Islam itself, they transfer to Afghanistan their dream of a pure and strict religion. They are trying to impose their idealized vision of a perfect Islam, in opposition to the demoniacal forces of the East and West.

In a word, they identify with the "Muslim Brotherhood." A little reluctantly, they recognize their relationship to this movement and express their support for the assassins of Sadat. However, the strangeness of this drama does not stop there. Saudi Arabia, a discreet but effective ally of the West, is also participating in the operation. Despite repression of the "Muslim Brotherhood" on their own territory, the Wahabis* have allied with their enemies to drive out the Westerners and shift the Afghan resistance into the camp of the Arabic speakers. For this purpose the "Muslim Brotherhood" has considerable sums of money to entice the Afghan people, one of the poorest in the world. Thus, during the summer, among other payments, \$200,000 was distributed in the Mazar-e Sharif region by the Muslim extremists to the people who were most attentive to their views.

* The Wahabis: Muslim sect dating from the end of the 17th century. The sect was founded in Arabia and today dominates the political-religious landscape of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Funds

No doubt remains about the Saudi origin of the money when you see the Saudi Red Crescent organization providing logistics for the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Pakistan. On several occasions, we even saw ambulances with the marking of that organization carrying the new missionaries of Islam across the tribal area adjoining the Afghanistan border. Normally this area is prohibited to foreigners, under penalty of arrest.

In addition to the risk of a radicalization of the Afghan resistance, another threat emerges behind the maneuver of the "Muslim Brotherhood." Most of the recruits operating in Afghanistan come from Algeria and Syria, two countries relatively close to Moscow. Knowing the omnipresence of politics in Damascus and Algiers, one doubts that the authorities in those capitals can be unaware of the operation underway. That, at least, is the view of some diplomatic circles, who talk about toleration and even complicity to try to cut off the Afghan resistance from its ally of the early period: Western opinion.

Arms of Khomeyni

Viewing from Europe or America, one would readily associate the present Iran with this maneuver. However, this would be forgetting that the Muslim Brotherhood, as Sunnis, actively rejects the Shi'ites, going so far as to accuse them of atheism. Also, for his part, Khomeyni has obvious ambitions in Afghanistan, and particularly in the Hazarajat, the great mountain chain in the center of the country. Since the beginning of the war, travelers have not failed to notice the remarkable growth in the number of photos and posters with the face of the Iranian leader across the mountains of the Hazarajat. Doctors and journalists have become accustomed to this flow of propaganda that reflects more a fraternal sentiment of the Hazarats toward their Iranian coreligionaries, Shi'ites like themselves, than an unconditional alignment with Tehran's policy. Moreover, prior to the Islamic revolution portraits of the Shah appeared prominently in tea houses and other public establishments.

In the first hours of the resistance to the Soviet occupier, the "Shura" and the "Harakat-e-Engelab-e Islami," two Shi'ite parties that wanted to remain independent of Tehran, were able to keep this area of Afghanistan away from the direct influence of their powerful neighbor. Also, they maintained excellent relations with the Western medical organizations working in their areas. Thus far on the sideline and discreet, the pro-Iranian groups "Sepah Pasdarans," "Nasr," "Fedayan," etc. were satisfied to control a few villages. However, 2 years ago, under pressure from Tehran, they began to get busy and contest the power of the competing parties. Violent clashes followed, extending to the trading centers and the caravan stops. Last year they received increased military aid from Iran. This winter, a thousand camels carrying light weapons and ammunition were sent by Tehran to support the war effort of the Khomeyni supporters. None of these weapons reached the areas around Hazarajat fighting against the Soviet troops.

Cleanup

One can say today that the whole mountain area has passed under control of the Khomeynists, with the exception of a few villages isolated on the borders of neighboring provinces. The "Shura" leaders have taken refuge in Pakistan, such as Sayyad Mohammad Jangian, the historic leader and former soldier. The witch hunt has thus begun. Last year, on several occasions I attended anti-Western meetings organized especially for my benefit during my travel through Shi'ite towns. The Europeans left their makeshift hospitals both because of the pressure of fighting and the unfriendly atmosphere that they felt. For the Afghans, the "cleanup" took a more radical form: a Hazarat married to a Frenchwoman was caring for the people along with his wife. This winter, during a trip to Europe by the latter, he was executed after a summary conviction for espionage by the "Nasr."

Yet, in the spring and especially at the end of the summer, the language of the leaders of the parties aligned with Tehran suddenly became more conciliatory. From a reprobate suspected of associating with the "imperialist devils," I became a guest, if not a friend, at least someone to be tolerated. In the villages, at the checkpoints, in places where previously I had been treated coldly, the commanders offered me tea and the traditional flat bread. It should be said that once the Hazarajat was won by its supporters, Tehran hastened to slow down its aid. While at the same time the West's support to the most moderate guerrillas assumed a significant level during this year. Caravans of arms, medicines, and equipment cross the Hazarajat under the envious eyes of the pro-Iranians bound for Herat, Mazar-e Sharif or Kunduz.

And a new danger emerges for the Afghan resistance. If, motivated by need and jealousy, or prompted by Tehran, the pro-Iranian parties prohibited the passage of the caravans going to the north, the resistance fighting on the Soviet border would certainly not be able to hold out long.

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CSO: 4619/9

AFGHANISTAN

MUSLIM UNITY DISRUPTED BY FACTIONALISM

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 26 Nov 85 pp 1,5

[Article by Alain Chevalieras]

[Text] The preacher wears a turban carefully wound on his shaved head. A long brown robe like a cassock reaches to his feet. The billowing of his wide sleeves combines with his dialogue as if to better catch his audience in the snare of his words. With moving eye, his face half hidden under a growing beard, two bodyguards flank him. About a hundred people listen religiously.

Yet visibly the preacher is not a Hazara (resident of Hazajarat) like the people around him. He talks the Persian of the Iranians and takes pleasure in emphasizing the difference from the language spoken by the Afghans. When we wanted to come closer to take pictures, we were firmly requested to leave the area. Later, I obtained confirmation of the Iranian identity of the mullah in the brown robe. This scene took place at Nayak, a tiny hamlet in the heart of the Hazajarat. One of those places that looks like a town in a Western. One should be aware that the Hazajarat, the mountain chain that occupies the center of Afghanistan, lives in a state of semi-autarchy. At the beginning of the uprising against the Soviet invaders and their communist allies in December 1979, the Hazaras quickly got rid of the minimal government infrastructure that claimed to govern the region. A poor province and without any strategic interest, it has been virtually free of the horrors of the communist raids. The Soviets prefer to concentrate their efforts on the main roads and adjacent plains.

The population, of Mongol type, practices the Muslim Shiite religion, like its Iranian neighbors. Long looked down on by the other ethnic elements of Afghanistan, the Hazaras have always sought in Teheran the support for a religious practice held in derision by their Sunni compatriots. This explains why, ever since the beginning of the invasion, the Iranian revolution has played a dynamic role in the Hazarajat. Yet at that time, the main parties, Harakat-I-Islami and especially the Shura, rejected an unconditional alignment with Iran, and continued to cultivate their Shiite identity within the confines of their own traditions. This independence of spirit was ill-regarded by Teheran, which supported the clearly minority parties: NASR, the Fedayan and the Se Pah Pasdaran.

Conflicts quickly broke out between the pro-Iranian and nationalist factions, culminating in 1984.

Anti-Western Xenophobia

Having received combat training in the Iranian camps, and equipped with light weapons by Teheran, the most radical young Hazaras today control the Hazajarat. And in their footsteps the Iranian mullahs hasten to spread the good word across the country. As inevitable consequence, the anti-Western xenophobia is assuming intolerable proportions. Thus, last winter a doctor, himself a Hazara, was executed by the NASR. Married to a young French nurse with whom he had had a son, he was working with her to ease the sufferings of a population cut off from the rest of the world.

During my peregrinations in this area last year, the aroused militiamen on several occasions made aggressive statements against the West and myself. This year, a sharp change in behavior: the local commanders, though convinced Khomeynists, invited me to drink tea in their company. In the bazaars, the traditional political centers, they sent me interpreters who in poor English offered me hospitality and paid for the food of my escort and horses. My surprise was matched only by the disappointment of the Afghan Shites. Iran, strong in its victory, quickly slowed down the aid to its coreligionaries, while at the same time the West's support to the moderate parties in other regions of Afghanistan acquired new impetus. The Hazaras watched with envy the medical teams and caravans heavily loaded with weapons and ammunition crossing their areas to supply the guerrillas in the north.

In the future, if they do not share in the Western manna, it is to be feared that in revenge the Hazaras may block the trails crossing their region. The guerrillas of Herat, Mazar-I-Sharif, Shibarghan, etc would then fall like ripe fruit into the hands of the Soviets.

The Sunnis also...

However, another danger looms over the Afghan resistance: Sunni Muslim fundamentalism, it also imported from abroad. Since last winter, representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood have been criss-crossing the Afghan countryside. By their fanatical statements they are trying to cut off the resistance of its old sentimental ally, the European public. They visit the villages seeking a few clerks who understand Arabic and then distribute money freely to those responsive to their propaganda. Among the themes propounded, one that seemed to us particularly harmful was accusing the European doctors of working to undermine Islamic principles.

Thus far, those called the "Arabs" have only held sway in the party of Sayaff, an obscure guerrilla leader established in Pakistan. In the field, there are only a few hundred men, all belonging to the same Pashtun tribe. With money from the Saudi oilmen, they are building schools and houses for those refugees who agree to come under their banner.

It appears that the Saudi ulemas, doctors in Muslim law, have decided to win over the Afghan resistance by carrying out a big stratagem. Being unable to find Saudis able to endure the particularly difficult living conditions in

Afghanistan at war, they have turned to their rivals, strict and Sunni like themselves, the Muslim Brotherhood. An unlikely alliance in which each no doubt expects to exploit the other's position to his advantage. Already internally divided, the Afghan resistance, at a time when it finally seems to have grasped the urgent necessity for a real unity, is undergoing new strong pressures. Also, the Arab operation is already showing effects: Mr Rabbani, leader of Jamiat Islami and favored by many Westerners, has just refused to permit women doctors in the medical teams. A clear answer from "Doctors Without Borders," which refuses to limit its activity to men patients, in a country where, for religious and traditional reasons, men doctors cannot care for women.

9920

CSO: 4619/12

INDIA

RAJIV'S LACK OF FAITH IN COUNTRY'S INGENUITY CRITICIZED

New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 15 Nov 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Propaganda to Help Sell Foreign Goods"]

[Excerpt] The ineffectiveness of our government's economic policy can be measured by the fact that on Wednesday, Mr Kursheed Alam, finance minister, was shedding tears in a meeting of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee over the heavy increase in import expenses. On the same day our prime minister addressed the inauguration meeting of the Science and Technology Conference and advised importing expensive things rather than manufacturing them in India. The policy to become technologically independent started during the Nehru era was always implemented half-heartedly. This policy was almost abandoned during Indira Gandhi's rule. However, no other prime minister has tried as hard as Rajiv Gandhi to make our country backward in international markets. During this 2-day conference, Rajiv Gandhi told the conferees to adopt a scientific viewpoint while at the same time he advised limiting the development of science and technology in the country! As if this "scientific viewpoint" can be developed by opening stores selling foreign-made goods in India instead of trying to become independent in this area.

Rajiv Gandhi's half-baked economic ideas are pushing our country toward the misfortune that several Latin American, African and Southeast Asian countries are facing. The prime minister said that we should not try to produce everything. We should limit our production to the areas we are experts in. The era of socialist economists who proposed specialization in production for the world market is long gone. Our political leaders, however, still subscribe to that theory.

If we recognize Rajiv Gandhi's economic policy then we must limit our scientific research and development to family planning, agriculture and programs for eradication of poverty. Even in these areas, ideas and know-how are being imported from other countries. Perhaps from Rajiv Gandhi's viewpoint, we do not have to produce anything for the international market, just show our face there!

While discussing the services of government science and technological undertakings, he mockingly said that their achievement has been limited to managing science and technology. Free-thinking citizens have been accusing various government undertakings of such underachieving tendencies for a long time.

If Rajiv Gandhi considers this complaint valid, he should push for developing a self-dependent science and technological program in the country. He is doing exactly the opposite! The gist of his speech is that our talents in the areas of science and technology are subpar. Thus, he does not want us to promote research and growth in these areas. Instead, he wants us just to import science and technology and manage it. India will end up importing modern technology from the West and those of us who can afford it will live in an island of luxury goods.

Rajiv Gandhi is not the only one who lacks faith in our country's talents and the ability to work hard. Most of his associates have similar beliefs. One example of this attitude is Yunus Saleem, who was interviewed about the proposed international technological exhibition in Pragiti Maidan. Some reporters asked him why no Indian industrialist was involved in this exhibition. He replied with malevolence that Indian industrialists cannot join this exhibition because of the trash they manufacture. In other words, the international technology festival is not designed to show our country's technological progress but to propagandize foreign companies.

7997/12795

CSO: 4624/8

INDIA

JAGJIVAN RAM'S SYMPATHY FOR HARIJANS CALLED FAKE

Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi 17-23 Nov 85 p 82

[Article by Janardan Thakur: "Babuji's Crocodile Tears"]

[Text] A few years ago Babu Jagjivan Ram announced in a meeting of the Boat Club that he was worried about the existence of the Harijans. He felt that the whole Harijan community was facing extinction. Someone had said that "Babuji was seeing this danger because he was out of power politics and was going through a period of depression." Any person attending that meeting could have told that Babuji was lamenting his own political demise and not the plight of the Harijans.

A leader of Congress (I) reacted by labeling these tears crocodiles tears. He said that Jagjivan Ram has been in power for several decades. He has held important positions in Congress and Janata governments. He has, however, never stood up for backward classes. What happened to him during the Belchi incident? Where was he when Harijans were being massacred in Maharashtra, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh? Why was he silent?

According to government reports there were 40,000 incidents of persecution of Harijans between 1966 and 1976 when Jagjivan Ram was a central minister. The National Unity department of the Central Government has published a report based on various statistics. According to this report there was a sharp surge in incidents involving persecution of Harijans. Babuji, however, did not feel guilty about it. He neither took any step to stop those actions nor tried to leave the government (even just for show). Babuji always has been busy working hard to get the best portfolio in the cabinet. He used to remember his roots only when he was called to preside over Harijan conferences. In those conferences he never forgot to say, "Showing verbal sympathy to the Harijan cause is never enough."

Babuji, however, keeps forgetting how Harijans are being treated in Maharashtra, Karnatak and Tamilnadu. Why should Babuji care about the atrocities committed on Harijans in these far-off places? Charan Singh is not the only one with a regional mentality. At least he was willing to lead the Jats anywhere in India. What is Babu Jagjivan Ram's real philosophy? Did he ever look at the problems in Bihar? Sasaram district had elected Jagjivan Ram to Delhi repeatedly for the last 30 years. A Harijan Vashishta living in that district

was badly beaten by some high caste people in 1977. He was beaten and shot, and his blood-drenched body was dragged around in the mud. Finally, he was thrown in a burning pyre. His last screams came out of the fire and smoke while his tormenters rejoiced.

Babuji said nothing; he remained apathetic. Perhaps because this Vashista was a Dusadh [one who raises pigs]. If he was a Chamar Harijan perhaps he would have got better attention?

Jagjivan Babu has got the good things of life. If you want to know how he lives, you have to go to his village, Chandwa in Bihar. People say that a visit to this village can be very illuminating. You have to imagine the worst kind of a slum. This village is characterized by broken shacks, stench of bones, leather and open sewage and emaciated babies sucking at milkless breasts. And in the middle of all this you will see a mansion, the kind you find only in the fancier parts of large cities. This mansion stands there depicting stark contrast in living conditions. This mansion belongs to Jagjivan Babu who is a "Harijan Brahman." His kind is always born on this earth to mooch from the poor and the deprived.

During the independence struggle our great leaders had envisioned Harijans rising out of their centuries of backwardness. Their vision had some flaws. These Harijans were victimized by their own "brothers" who used them as stepping stones for their rise to "Brahmanhood." Such a "brown sahib" lives in Delhi. He became a member of the elite Indian Administrative Services by getting one of the reserved seats for Harijans. You can discuss anything under the sun with him, but do not talk about his roots. He is embarrassed about his origin and wants to forget it. He lives with his old parents, but when he throws fancy parties for his friends, he hides his parents in his servants' quarters.

It is said that Babuji becomes ecstatic when a Brahman or someone who has risen to the Brahman caste touches his feet. That is equal to "Nirvana" for him. Still he does not stop screaming at the high caste people and pointing fingers at those who suck poor people's blood. Not long ago, someone compared Babuji to Buddha--a happy, smart and immortal Buddha laughing at the world! Today, he can laugh only at himself. What else can he do but feel self-pity while sitting in the drawing room (a carryover from his ministerial days) of his posh mansion?

7997/12795
CSO: 4624/8

IRAN

FUTURE LEADER PORTRAYED, PROBLEMS, REACTIONS CITED

Montazeri, New Leader

London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 85 p 2

/London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh/

/Text/ A simple-hearted peasant or a learned man pretending to be stupid. These are the two different interpretations of the personality of Sheykh Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri. A man who has introduced the biggest innovation in the history of Shiite ecclesiasticalism. An innovation initiated by the kindness of another Ayatollah. In one night, he has been promoted from the rank of Hojjat-ol Eslam to Ayatollah. Being promoted to the rank of Grand Ayatollah originated from this favor also. Otherwise, this peasant from Najaf-Abad would not even have been an apostle until last year. It means that he lacked the most important qualifications of antecedent. But last year, after the insistence of those who wanted to make him a harmless leader and instrument, Montazeri copied Khomeyni's book titled "Towzih ol-Massael" and published it.

Based on the comments of his 80-year-old father in an interview with JAVANAN magazine, in the beginning of the revolution, Sheykh Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri forced his 75-year-old father to marry a second wife and from that marriage, he now has a 2-year-old brother and is in love with rural living, farm work and living in mud-brick houses.

Sheykh Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri, whose name is officially mentioned as the future theocratic leader of the Council of Leaders, was born in 1926 in Najaf-Abad. His father is a farmer in Najaf-Abad and since he wanted his son to be a clergyman, he sent him to Qom.

Montazeri studied in Qom for sometime and then went to Borujerd and started to study for the clergy with Ayatollah Borujerdi with whom he later returned to Qom. On this trip, the late Ayatollah Borujerdi selected him to be a teacher of theology because he had made great progress in religious jurisprudence. Montazeri became acquainted with Khomeyni in 1948 and began to study philosophy with him. Ayatollah Khomeyni arranged for Montazeri to marry his widowed sister in 1949.

For the event of 5 June, Montazeri went to Esfahan as a representative of Khomeyni and he took the pulpit and preached on his behalf. After Khomeyni's trip to Paris, Montazeri visited him there and during this trip, the Revolutionary Council was discussed, its structure layed out, and Montazeri appointed as its president. Sometime later, when Ayatollah Khomeyni was transferred from the heart hospital to Mamaran, Montazeri returned to Qom and according to the orders of the imam, he became the Friday imam of Qom and the director of Theological Studies of Qom.

When his oldest son Mohammad, who used the name Qolam 'Abbas, who had a Bahrain passport and lived in Bahrain and Pakistan years before the revolution, hijacked an Iran Air plane, said to contain confiscated jewels and money, to Libya with a group of youngsters in the beginning of the revolution, Montazeri simply announced "Mohammad lacks mental equilibrium." Later, when Mohammad was killed in the explosion at the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party, rather than being saddened by his son's death, Montazeri was relieved. By calling Beheshti "Rasputin" and attacking Rafsanjani, Mohammad had caused him lots of headaches. The other son of Montazeri, Ahmad, had an accident at the war front and today has lost his hearing.

Problems Facing New Leader

London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 85 p 2

/London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh/

/Text/ Sooner or later, Montazeri will be under the same two-sided pressure as Khomeyni.

On one side is the pressure of the extremists who want to nationalize the economy and have extreme anti-Western tendencies in their foreign policy. On the other side is the pressure from the moderates who are in favor of ending the war, are against a nationalized economy and who are afraid of foreign policy which leans towards the East. Although Khomeyni has been able to preserve equilibrium between these two tendencies, he has finally arrived at a deadlock. Now, Montazeri is not able to continue that policy and more than anything else, he must break the deadlock. Therefore, he must take a position in favor of one of the two tendencies. It is more likely that he will take the moderates' side. The government of Mir Hoseyn Mussavi will find another supporter. He has clearly stated that he is only accountable to Khomeyni and the Majlis for his programs, and has called the interference of other authorities against the constitution an intrusion upon the work of the government. Now he does not have any other way except to be accountable to the official successor of Khomeyni. As a result, government consolidation, which was only a dream, will come a few steps closer to reality.

Montazeri has repeatedly expressed his uneasiness with fanaticism and immoderation and has openly defended Bazargan's Freedom Movement. He probably will add new weight to Engineer Bazargan's position. Amir Entezam will probably not be freed from prison tomorrow nor will MIZAN newspaper be published again, but it is probable that the activities of the National Movement will be expanded.

The Rafsanjani, Mahdavi Kany, Azari Qomi and Yusof Sane'i groups, in short, all of those who are called the School of Qom and whose policy favors pragmatism more than fundamentalism, will be more free against Khamene'i's and Kho'eniha's famous School of Tehran group. Although Montazeri has been given the title of Grand Ayatollah by the mass media of the Islamic Republic, other mimics like Ayatollah Kho'i, Ayatollah Gol-Payegani and Ayatollah Mar'ashi Najafi have not accepted him as an example to follow. Even Khomeyni refers to him as Hojjat-ol Eslam. As a result, he will have a difficult task using his new political power for religious reasons. He will probably try to increase the power of the religious leaders in the Council of Guardians in order to enable him to have more supervision of the laws. It is more probable that the Islamic Majlis and Council of Guardians, who were on the verge of being overshadowed by Kho'eniha, will gain more power again.

Reactions to Montazeri Election

London KEYHAN in Persian 28 Nov 85 p 2

/London KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh/

/Text/ Dr 'Ali Amini: "This successors election was anticipated for sometime, but the official announcement indicates that Khomeyni is not in good health and in the meantime, intends to show the West that there will be some changes in the Islamic Republic policies. But it is certain that no fundamental changes will occur since Montazeri's policies are not different from the others. Nevertheless, we have to see who he will treat the clergy. The only possible event whose sign can be noticed in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, is that there will be some softness in regard to the war."

Bani Sadr: "I don't talk to KEYHAN."

Dr Abdol Rahman Borumand (secretary of the National Resistance Movement of Iran): "There will be an important change in the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the whole regime must be toppled."

Speaker of National Resistance Movement of Iran:

In regard to the election of Montazeri as the successor to Khomeyni, the speaker of the National Resistance Movement of Iran in London stated: "The view of the National Resistance Movement of Iran is that since the subject of religious government and theocratic rule is contrary to the principal of national sovereignty, therefore it is discarded and not acceptable. The reason for such hasty action is the existence of a split and extreme differences among the ruling fronts which has intensified in the last 2 months. In spite of Khomeyni's efforts to remove this annoyance from his neck, concern about the regime's future, caused him to arrange the session of the Assembly of Experts and order the appointment of Montazeri. According to the Islamic Republic laws, which at least must be accepted by the regime itself, Art 5 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic has explained the qualifications for the mandate for state affairs for the 'imamat' to be given to a courageous, efficient, uptodate and prudent person. Even imagining that Montazeri has these qualifications is a

joke. It is necessary to mention that since those clergy and followers of religious leaders, accepted and respected by the people, especially the eminent Shari'at Madari, do not have any freedom to act, therefore they are not able to show any reaction. But this appointment, which is basically contrary to the principle of Shiite belief, will definitely face the hatred of his followers and other sources of religious emulation inside and outside the country and will create more agitation for the regime."

Radio Monte Carlo

Amir Taheri, in an interview with Radio Monte Carlo said: "Khomeyni might be alive physically, but from a political view, he is like a deadman. Even the representatives of the Islamic Majlis do not listen to him. The Tehran government newspaper stings him everyday: "Taheri added: "It is obvious that the Ayatollah's ridiculous thesis in the name of theocratic rule, meaning that the clergy is able to interfere unconditionally in government affairs as representatives of Allah and all the members of the nation be received as the children of the theocratic ruler, is incapable of establishing a serious government system.

In regard to Montazeri, Taheri said: "He does not have any political nor religious jurisprudence power, and therefore he cannot be effective in basic Iranian affairs. The majority of clergy have realized that religion and government are two separate stories. Theocratic rule will drag them to a dangerous deadlock. The clergy must content themselves with performing their real task and let the people solve their problems. The full power of the government belongs to the nation and this is the message of the Iranian constitution in the last 80 years."

Ayatollah Rowhani

"The selection of Montazeri is not legitimate at all. The first qualification of a theocratic leader is to be Shiite, whereas Montazeri is not a Shiite Muslim as it is understood from the 'Eternal Martyr' book, he does not accept the iman's section, and he has denied the party about the ommat of Hoseyn-ibn 'Ali. Furthermore in the clerical hierarchy, Montazeri is in the fourth level and at least 200 people have higher rank and more knowledge. His appointment is a insult to the clerical society.

The View of the National Front

In a statement issued in Paris on 22 November, the National Front has called the official selection of Hoseyn Ali Montazeri by the Assembly of Experts as Khomeyni's successor dressing for the critical health condition of Khomeyni and has announced: "In principle, after the defeat and disappointment of the Islamic Republic in mobilization for war, the possibility of rotating war policy, and the war until victory toward peace and agreement, lead to Montazeri's presentation, who is one of the agreeable faces and against the continuation of the war in the mullah's government. The defeat of Rafsanjani's efforts in mobilizing the people has placed Montazeri as Khomeyni's successor is a higher position than his rivals. Undoubtedly, the unfavorable health condition of Khomeyni expedited this selection." The National Fron announced that the anxiety of the Islamic Republic over the Geneva negotiation, the secret agreement of the two superpowers in regard to ending the Iran-Iraq war, and their joint campaign against government terrorism, must be considered in this selection also.

PAKISTAN

DEMOCRACY CALLED ONLY SOLUTION TO PAKISTAN'S PROBLEMS

Rawalpindi HURMAT in Urdu 21-28 Oct 85 pp 7-19

[Interview with Altaf Gauhar, intellectual and former Information Ministry official, in London]

[Excerpts] Question: You have been in Britain for quite some time. There are a number of Pakistanis here of whose activities you may be aware. Possibly, you have met them. In your opinion, what are the highlights of this idea of confederation?

Answer: You are aware that most of my time is spent in reading, writing and, like you, interviewing people. I have very little contact with the Pakistani compatriots here, especially those belonging to political groups. But I do meet some of them occasionally. I have read and studied about this confederation idea, or movement. The fact is that something new is emerging in the world and that is the politics of exile. This is the politics of emigres. In the 19th century, people who left a country for whatever reason would busy themselves with education and studies and they would wait. Now communication facilities are such that they can keep constantly in touch with developments in the home country. They can telephone their friends. Now entire protest groups have come out of the country, whether Afghanistan or Iran, and settled in Paris. It may be the Sikhs from India who have settled in Canada and London. All the Pakistani politicians who do not get along with the government have settled abroad. Prior to this, the largest such group was the Palestinians. Similarly, there are people from Latin America. Now the people who have left Pakistan are not in small numbers. Complete parties are here. People from the left wing of these parties have come here. One difficulty of these parties is that the people they have left behind are like post offices. They can only relay messages to the people. They have no responsibility. Nor can they adopt any program of action. Now these people are here. Among them there is one group that wants democracy to be established there, elections to be held and freedom to exist so that we may go back and take part in it. It is difficult to live in exile like this. Another group wants the political vacuum to continue and disorder to remain. They want the nation to rally and invite them to take over the administration. Some people have reached the stage that they do not see any role for themselves in Pakistan. So they think that Pakistan is heading towards anarchy and when it breaks up they might get a part of it. They might find some position there.

Therefore, this confederation is the first step to the ultimate goal. Instead of saying that when the country disintegrates they will be able to return to their parts and become rulers there, they want these three provinces, which are minority provinces, to merge somehow and form a confederation. This is an interim move to ensure what their status will be when the break-up does occur. But I believe that this is a form of political bankruptcy, because those who are here are merely playing a waiting game. They may attain power, or there may be trouble and they may be summoned, or the country may break up and they may control a part of it. Like responsible people, these people should have profited from the situation, studied it, thought about it and done something constructive. I do not believe our people are doing this. However, I have met emigres from Chile and recently a person from Paraguay who has been out of his country for 35 years, living in Argentina. He told me that all the time he was engaged in developing a system that will work when a democratic-minded government is set up. These [Pakistani] people are not thinking what they will do when they come to power. Because of this, there is unrest and a political vacuum in the country.

Supporters of these parties cannot do anything on their own. They cannot hold talks with the government. There is only one course left for them and that is to stage confrontations, create obstacles and start riots. They could not take part in the non-party elections. Nor could they formulate any program of action. This is such a diverse group that they have no common and clear line of action.

Question: You have referred to three groups. Those who want democracy, those who support the political vacuum and those who are very frustrated. Where do the people living in Britain and Europe fit?

Answer: I have no first-hand knowledge, but I keep reading about them. To me, there appear to be three clear trends. But it is possible that, among these people, some may be involved in more than one group. One person may want democracy or a political vacuum and may also be frustrated. It is also possible that a person may have all three inclinations, but they may not be obvious. I believe it is possible that those who are frustrated may approach the first as well as the second group. The real thing is to improve conditions and timing in the country. Now just imagine, if it becomes clear that the country has an open atmosphere, that if you go there you won't be detained or subjected to any unreasonable restrictions and that, so long as you associate with other people in a responsible manner, you can play your political role, then I'm sure many people who are now frustrated will also join the first group.

Question: One group of frustrated politicians is such that if, God forbid, Pakistan breaks up, they are willing to take part in it. Would you consider people who promote slogans of confederation as belonging to the third group?

Answer: The fact is that they are on that platform. But the survival of the country or, God forbid, any unrest there will be decided on Pakistani soil. This cannot be done by any outside group. If you set up a democratic system there and if you stop people from making such remarks as "only people

of character should be allowed," "the formation of parties is not permitted," "this is an ideological country" and "no difference of opinion is possible" and once it is understood that we are equal, we are intelligent, we are responsible and we want to serve our country, then I believe that those who are frustrated might also be converted to the democratic camp. Once there is no possibility of the country's breaking up, they will have no alternative. Therefore, all of this is in your hands. In the country, the government and the press believe that a lot is being done from abroad. In fact, nothing is being done from abroad. When you meet them (emigres) you will find that they get some information from Pakistan but, for the most part, they merely listen to the BBC World Services, and the World Services carries the same reports that reach them from Pakistan. They have based their entire philosophy on World Services. It would be wrong to believe that these people have any connection with a big U.S. agency or that they are Russian agents. I do not think anybody cares about them. I am saying this with the utmost respect. I do not believe that they are very capable people. It is not as if these people had played any historical role in the past or that they will have any historical role in the future. Things will be settled there. Everything will be decided on Pakistani soil.

Question: People who promote slogans of confederation want to break up the country through the post offices you referred to. Then is it or is it not the responsibility of the government to ban these slogans, which, even you agree, are the brain children of the frustrated politicians. Is it not the duty of the government to counteract these slogans, to stop them and to discourage them?

Answer: Look here, the point is that a slogan is being promoted that Baluchis, Pathans and Sindhis should unite to create a confederation. When that slogan is recited, the government hears it, Baluchis hear it, Pathans hear it and Sindhis hear it. Now the government has to decide how this slogan affects the Baluchi people. If Baluchis or Pathans or Sindhis, in fact, feel that they have no part in the present regime or that they are not Pakistanis of an equal rank or that they are being discriminated against or if they feel that they are being treated like the blacks in North America, then I submit that whatever means government may use to contain these slogans will be doomed to failure. On the other hand, if the masses there are prosperous and they are getting their full share and they have a right to express their opinion and if they feel that they are Pakistanis and if they are proud of being Pakistanis, then these slogans will have no effect. You decide whether, in the system you have created, Baluchis, Pathans and Sindhis are equal partners. The point is that government should concentrate on the real issue. The real issue is not that slogans of confederation exist. The real issue concerns the masses of the areas to be included in the confederation. What are their feelings? Now if these people feel that an injustice is being done to them and if the government suppresses this slogan of confederation, then this feeling of injustice will deepen further. It is said that the only lesson to be learned from history is that no one learns from history. The case of East Pakistan is well known to you. This issue rose in your and my lifetime. You know I have proved at every level that I had no hand in East Pakistan's six points. But it is still being assumed that, had the six

points not been put forth, there would have been no feeling of deprivation among the Bengalis. With or without these six points, the feeling of deprivation was already in the air. Out of their total population, no more than 15 to 20 percent could read English or Bengali. Then how did the 100 percent of the masses come to follow them, people who knew nothing of the six points? They had the feeling that despite being the majority province they had no offices and no rights. Even when their people did become ministers or governors, they were in fact agents or the employees of the center. It is conditions that create slogans. Consider all the incidents where Russian spies have been captured. East German spies were discovered in West Germany. There are traitors in every country. But it does not mean that it should shake the very foundations of the society. The reason why you are upset over the slogan of confederation, why the government is upset, why politicians are upset, and why the press is daily writing on this is that you know that the people of these provinces are unhappy. This unhappiness will neither diminish nor increase as a result of these slogans. You should concentrate on this unhappiness and resentment. If this feeling is unwarranted, explain it away. If this feeling is justified, redress it instead of looking for ways to deal with the slogans. The slogans will automatically vanish in thin air. If you assume that the people of these provinces do not want to become Pakistanis and act on this assumption, as a next step, you should make them Pakistanis. One way is that they should see some gain in becoming Pakistanis. Now if I tell you that you are mistaken, and that I am very happy and I am in a very profitable situation, then no single slogan can change my life style. This is why representative governments go to the root of the problem. In every autocratic form of government, be it a monarchy or authoritarianism or dictatorship, you will find scheming policy. Find some way of accomplishing this. Now, in the budget it is said that something has to be done about black money. No one is trying to find out what black money is. How can you justify a wrong thing? If this money is not right, then even the government cannot use it. No one gives a thought to these matters and no one considers them on a moral plane. It is all a matter of expediency. Do something, find some way. You go to any country which has an authoritarian system, whether it be military rule or some other form, you will invariably find that there is one economic expert who advises the dictator how profit can be made from any kind of economic system. This is because he believes that all of this is a kind of magic show. Do this, and this will happen in life; do this, and this will be the result. This kind of sharp practice goes on and people remain shackled to these clever ways. People have no part in the economic system at all. Merely fearing these slogans or catching and destroying the slogan mongers will not solve anything.

Question: In a commentary, you have described as immoral the amendments which are under discussion in the National Assembly. In what respect do you find these amendments immoral?

Answer: I used this word with great deliberation. This is because in Pakistan there are many lawyers who understand, far better than I do, the constitutional and legal aspects of the amendments. They are fully aware of the constitutional effects of the amendments. I described them as immoral because the present regime is the first government to claim that it wants to

introduce an Islamic system and to make efforts to that end. Secondly, when it extended its rule by canceling elections, it said that it was essential to deal with the former rulers, that unless an investigation was conducted, an Islamic society could not be set up. On moral grounds, it is essential that an investigation be conducted. When I studied the constitutional sections, I felt that the very people who believed that investigation was essential on moral grounds now believe that there is nothing worse than this, that there should be no investigation at all, and if there is an investigation, the country will be ruined. It is immoral because of this. On the one hand you believe that without an investigation an Islamic society cannot be established. Now, Sir, good people will not come unless immoral people suffer the consequences of their misdeeds. When our turn comes, we close the shutters and tell people not to peer in because our matters will be decided in camera. Secondly, so far as the Koran is concerned, study reveals that it contemplates pardon of an offence or crime. It also contains the idea that if punishment can be somewhat reduced, it should be. This is the very thought behind recommendations of pardon that punishment should not be excessive. It also says that if you repent, though suffering punishment for a crime, the question of repentance is a different matter. This is because crime and punishment concern society but repentance is between God and man. A man who had murdered his wife was with me in Karachi jail. He was under life sentence. He was a young man. Only 4 or 5 years of his jail term were left. In the cell he would cry at night in my presence. I would ask him: "Why are you crying? It is a question of only 3 or 4 years. You are a young man. You will be released at the age of 35. Then you can start a new life." He was a Sindhi. He would say: "Sir, that is not the point. The sentence will be over. But what about the crime I have committed? What will become of that? After all, I did commit it." Then it occurred to me that offense is connected with repentance. That is why Allah has said that the door to repentance is open. In Pakistan or any other Islamic society, two things can befall any ruler. Crime or mistake. The Koran does not contain the notion that mistakes can be forgiven. The idea that crime can be pardoned is present in the Koran, but that no question can be asked about it is Un-Islamic and immoral. No ruler can say that he should not be questioned about his actions. Not only can questions be asked, but they have been asked and even in Mosque Nabhi when the then caliph was questioned and gave answers. And there was also a caliph who, when questioned, bared his sword and said, "This is the answer." And the questioner fell silent. History records both these instances. But it is amazing to say that no questions should be asked about my actions or that I should not have to account for anything. Leaving aside constitutional and legal aspects, it is a moral issue, because you know and you are convinced that you have committed crimes and offenses and, if a question is asked, you will have no answers. This is immoral. You close yourself off from repentance. You do not allow the nation an opportunity to forgive your crimes because the people might see for themselves under what circumstances the crimes were committed. If an act is considered necessary or unavoidable, then there is no reason why these extenuating circumstances will not be kept in mind. You close on yourself the door to forgiveness. This is an immoral thing. It is on account of this that I used the word immoral. And on top of this, to say that I should be given a guarantee that I will be pardoned also for whatever I do in the future and that no questions will be asked of me, is something

no one had thought of before. This advance immunity for a crime, of which you yourself have no idea, is beyond my understanding. The idea that He should pardon everybody in advance did not occur even to God. Rulers and governments should keep in mind that they should demand only those powers and guarantees as they are prepared to grant to their preceding rulers. This is because they won't be there forever. Any ruler will be in power for, at most, 5, 10, 20 or 25 years. This period of power passes like the twinkling of the eye. One should keep in mind what he is leaving for his successor. You have no guarantee who will succeed you and how he will use all the offices, all the power and all the laws. That is why society imposes restrictions. There is no bigger moral restriction than the realization that one's actions are an open book to the people and one can be made to account for them. No government that lays claims to an Islamic system should close the doors to this investigation. I do not believe that this is in their interest or in the interest of the nation or the country.

Question: In view of the aims of Russia and India and the game they are playing in this region, do you think that, after some time, conditions in Pakistan will take such a turn that values like democracy, political liberty and restoration of political parties, etc., will take a secondary place and the country will be faced with the question of integrity? Can you imagine a situation in the future in which Pakistan will be faced with a serious crisis regarding its survival?

Answer: The world today is constituted in such a way that rivalry between Russia and America and its effects extend into each country. Even in small islands, there is the same question, whether they are under the American or Russian sphere of influence. One way is open and that is not to join with either party in this fight between two giants. Once you have joined, it becomes difficult to decide what to do afterwards. Suppose you have linked yourself to America. Then what Russia will do is forever of concern. My answer to the question is: It is beyond my comprehension, now do I have any doubt in my mind that the Pakistani people will in any way or at any time want their country to be dragged into this conflict. The people will never want this because they know that this is a fight between two very big countries and any small country that gets involved in this quarrel can only get hurt. Momentary gain there may be. No Pakistani of any province, including Punjab, wants war with India or with Russia or wants war with Russia on account of Afghanistan. People do not want this. But if the government wants this, then the talk of a democratic system and talk of liberty is completely wrong. And if it believes that the talk of democracy and a democratic regime will hurt Pakistan, then it is following a course that will put the security of the whole in jeopardy, because it can extend this situation.

Question: Perhaps I have not been able to make my question understood. I am not talking of the wishes of the people or the government. I am referring to superpower collusion and their policy in this region. I am talking of the dangers that are looming before the country. I am referring to the designs of Russia and India.

Answer: In these international matters, one scenario is that you are completely helpless and your government is completely helpless and one country compels you to join in its fight, as America did when it captured Grenada. The people of Grenada couldn't do anything in this. Pakistan's condition is not like this. It is not as if America came and occupied the whole of Pakistan. Pakistan's government has willingly involved itself in this issue. The Pakistan government said it cannot tolerate Russian troops camping in our neighboring country. It made this decision on its own. This was the decision of the Pakistani government. The Pakistani government had the option at that time. It could have said: "What has it to do with us? We have no friendly relations with Afghanistan." Afghanistan is the same country which, when Pakistan was founded, voted against us in the United Nations to prevent Pakistan from being recognized. You know about the 1965 war. Therefore, we did not have such friendly relations with Afghanistan as to say that this is intolerable for us. As for communism, none of our governments has taken the stand that we can have nothing to do with communism. If this is not so, why do we have such friendly relations with China? Therefore, those two factors were just excuses. The profit they saw in this was the thinking that if we jump in this quarrel we will get \$3.5 billion in military aid and we will also get economic aid. With this aid we will further strengthen our military. In this bargain, they got in exchange 3.5 million to 4 million refugees. In this bargain, they have got tension on the entire border. Now incidents on the border are utilized in two ways. In the present conditions, the Pakistan government says, "See how much danger we are facing. Now we need more aid." It tells its people: Look, under these conditions, how can you talk of democracy? Although this is the very situation in which there should be talk of democracy. If there is such a threat to the security of Pakistan, if it is a question of the survival of Pakistan, then unless the people of Pakistan are prepared to fight, no army can fight. Iraq, too, made this mistake. It thought that its army could occupy Iran in 3 days because Iran did not have an army. The people of Iran routed this army. The point is that even if it is question of survival it should still be approached in a democratic manner. It is assumed that the military will fight Russia and India while the Pakistani people remain idle spectators. It is thought that, without the support of the people, the Pakistani army is in a position to face a threat from India, Russia or Afghanistan, or all together. This is a baseless assumption so long as people do not feel that this country should be saved, this country is ours and we will not allow anyone to enter this country. Once people have this determination, neither India alone nor India and Russia together can pose any danger to you. Nowadays it is impossible for a country which is disciplined and united to be occupied by a foreign country. Where has it happened? Search the entire history. It can never happen that if the Pakistani people are free, united and happy, they should be threatened by India. It is immaterial whether the threat is from India or from Russia. This danger is also like the slogan of confederation in that, by considering it in isolationism from people, you can calculate it on paper. Count how much you have and I can tell you how many days they will fight. Because once people have no role and only the soldiers have to fight, we can count tanks and cannons and estimate how many tanks and planes the other side has. The Russian danger that you are talking about cannot be tackled militarily.

Your own government says that it will have to be resolved politically. Politically, only politicians can work, because the military has no comprehension of politics. Rest assured, there is no country where anybody has had talks with the military. This is because they do not recognize the military. They believe that if tomorrow this regime changes, the agreement in its entirety will be worthless. Unless you start thinking on these lines, in my opinion, you are aggravating your problems. You have decided to let the military tackle everything as if this is the only solution to every problem. In our country we have a short history of military rule. But in Latin America, military governments have been coming and going for 150 years. Now they have reached the conclusion that, leave alone security of the country, the army cannot accomplish even the routine law and order and crime deterrence. This is so because this is not their profession. Now you have involved the military in creating an educational system and an Islamic system and running the press as well as the medical profession. Now you see how many things you expect the military to do. Moreover, they have to conduct marches and exercises too. How much work can you expect from a soldier.

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